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# West Europe Report

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9 July 1985

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POLITICAL

BELGIUM

# ORIGINS, VIEWS, PROSPECTS OF ENVIRONMENTALIST PARTY

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 17 Apr 85 pp 13-17

[Article by Chris De Stoop: "The Greens and the Fight over Windmills"]

[Text] An investigative study of the Green landscape: from the wooden-shoe ecology of Luc Versteyleen to the practical politics of Ludo Dierickx. Is AGALEV ready to assume power?

The Flemish party AGALEV is clearly no may-fly but rather an enduring phenomenon that continues to outgrow its clothes with every election and, according to the opinion polls, now pulls in 10 percent of the vote. The Greens are thus preparing for the seldom seen writ that will enable them, after scarcely 3 years of official existence, to take their seats in parliament with a faction that will soon amount to 10 representatives. The party is thus more than a cross-over party, which temporarily collects a number of protest votes, and more than a whip party, which only shouts the alarm for almost apocalyptic visions of the future; it will be invited to share in the power of the state, as perhaps the first in Europe, at the end of this year. This phenomenon, which continues to be difficult to understand, is sowing unrest within the classic political spectrum and is giving rise to a number of questions.

AGALEV did not arise out of thin air of course, nor is it that homogeneous, monolithic block that it is often made out to be. Its cradle was rocked in the Kempen village of Viersel by its founder Luc Versteyleen, teacher and Jesuit from Borgerhout, who founded a sort of reflective order here in the confrontational atmosphere that followed 1968, as a counterweight to the derailed, performance-oriented and authoritarian society. In 1970 he bought an old and dilapidated brewery for 2 million francs, which is now a refuge for those in great need of safe shelter and moral rearmament: living with the four elements, around the fundamental values of silence, simplicity and community, and in a clearly sacral atmosphere, one can temporarily escape "the system" and be at peace.

## Life in the Brewery

"I didn't found the movement," Father Versteyleen says, "I just happened upon it like others happened upon it elsewhere in Europe at the same time: I call that the mushroom effect." Viersel's brewery became the mother's lap and the heart of the movement of renewal called "Anders Gaan Leven," "to live another



way." The clock appears to have stood still here: with a thud and in wooden shoes, Father Versteyleen looks like he stepped out of a painting by Permeke. With the Leuven foot-stove, the old-fashioned pump stone and farmers' tools, it all seems a bit unreal. This isn't just back to nature; this is back to Bokrijk. The only thing that is new is the ecological windmill, originally intended for Haiti but which ultimately landed here, where it pumps water out of the Kempen ground. The furniture comes from the garbage dump.

To outsiders the atmosphere seems unreal and almost sectarian: group singing from the Book of Psalms in the attic of a storage shed named Dawn, meditation around the large open hearth in the Bakehouse, showering in a large tub out of doors, the cheerful wood gathering and cultivation of organic vegetables and flowers. The brewery doesn't serve beer any more but rather pine-needle tea. The restless souls that blow in here at irregular points in time put all their money into a glass jar, since they live together here in a communal sort of relationship, without possessions and detached from the world. All of the buildings are always open to everyone; keys do not exist "because otherwise you find yourself in the system again."

The whole fermentation process started in this farm yard, in the early 1970's, the time when people were distancing themselves from the detested consumption-oriented society, when words like engagement, involvement, and participation were raised to the status of dogma. In order to reach out of the enclosure of the brewery a small publication called STIL LEVEN was soon established which brought provocative and moral texts onto the market. People also started to conduct demonstrations centered around the alternative school in Massenhoven, increasing in unity against the Duwvaart Canal and then rising up into the large anti-nuclear movement which became the primary catalyst in the mid-1970's. In the meantime Versteyleen had founded his Green Bicyclists and he introduced, out of an unhappiness with the classical model of demonstration, the tactic of playful street theater which was not only extremely suited to the media but was moreover "difficult to oppose."

The original intention was to raise people's consciousness and change their attitudes, but gradually they turned more and more to political pressure. That led to the Green slates in 1974 and 1976 which gave favorable electoral support to certain people in all the parties. Best known was Karel Poma who became the secretary of environment but then flouted his Green promises. As a result of that disappointing experience Versteyleen and his renewal movement came up with their own slates. In 1977 they scored barely 0.3 percent of the vote, but that quickly grew to 2.3 percent in 1979, to 4.8 percent in 1981, to 5.7 percent in 1982, and finally to 7.1 percent last year.

Versteyleen explains that explosive success in his own jargon as follows: "First of all people felt they were being deceived, and we made them aware. Secondly, you had a general apathy, escape into illusion, and we gave them knowledge. Thirdly, people were discouraged, and we gave them back hope."



Father Versteyleen, who is still guru to a certain old guard in the party, fears that AGALEV is becoming too big and too professional and above all "that it is acquiring a pyramidal structure, with top and bottom, instead of remaining a spiral movement. I call that AGALEV-ization, and there is definitely that risk. We should be a small tickler party, a little bad-luck party that looks on from the side. We were born from a smile, and we suffer when that smile disappears from our face." There were already representatives in parliament when the party was finally officially established at the Rural Conference in Tielrode in 1982, after a lot of arguments within the movement. That is typical of AGALEV, a party that has continually had to chase after itself, which was drawn together by a voters' enthusiasm it didn't control and hasn't always understood very well.

### The Green Pillar

Viersel's brewery remains a sort of pilgrim's balm for the romantic zealots of the first hour, but the current party wants to be more than that alone. After objections on the part of the church, Versteyleen removed himself from political activities several years ago. AGALEV now calls itself the mouthpiece and the extension arm of what sociologists describe as "the new social movements." In the atmosphere that followed the turmoil of 1968, protest groups, environmental movements, welfare societies, neighborhood activities, shelters, legal offices, adult schools and the like shot up out of the ground everywhere like mushrooms--hundreds of associations which formed a complete counter-culture, almost a parallel pillar, in which a little world made up of similarly alternative-minded people found and continue to find one another.

The environment, women's liberation, pacifism, the third world, and participation are the post-materialistic themes of a generation which has grown up in peace and well-being, but which has turned against the establishment and endeavored to break with the past. They were very interested in and well-grounded in politics but felt an aversion to the calcified parties and were thus politically homeless. This "hole in the market" apparently was not satisfactorily filled in by anyone until AGALEV appeared on the scene and became an umbrella, or claimed to be, over all these new social movements. The AGALEV spectrum has thus become very broad and heterogeneous and those who still have an affinity with the wooden-shoe ecology of Versteyleen now form a small minority.

That emotional, irrational, capricious side of Versteyleen still has its exponent in the person of Senator Van Puymbroeck ("just call me Marjet"), who has fought and agitated alongside of him since the very beginning in Viersel. Originally from the tough world of business, she entered the senate in 1981 where she now has almost 4 years of parliamentary work behind her, and with great satisfaction: "So many subjects that were previously taboo have now been taken on by all the parties, that is our accomplishment." The CVP [Social Christian Party] and the SP have investigated her past in minute detail, she says, but she has nothing to hide. She really thinks that one term in the legislature is quite enough, but the party has asked her to serve for 2 more years. She now has a bill ready on responsible parenthood which would keep abortion illegal except when the physical or psychological integrity of the woman is in danger.

That appears to be one of the first real compromises within AGALEV, the result of years of angry and divisive arguments in the lap of the movement. AGALEV also wants to be the instrument of the women's movement, but this appears to be the first clash with the feminists, who have been working to legalize abortion for 10 years. There is a real danger that the party will have to work out still more creative compromises than the CVP in order to achieve its heterogeneous goals in the future. The uncompromising radical approach will slowly give way to a more pragmatic one. The party already appears to have outgrown its Sturm und Drang period, is more polished and mature, conducts a lot of serious research, engages less and less in street-theater antics, and is itself no longer devoid of electoral ambition.

They are, of course, conscious of the danger of becoming contaminated and institutionalized, of losing their innocence. There is still a basic "fundamentalism" that is viscerally allergic to any rigid organization or power structure, highly principled people who are so concerned about maintaining a democratic movement that they sometimes threaten to suffocate it because efficiency suffers so much in the process. Out of fear of "the iron law of the oligarchy," no chairmen have been elected, with the result that public opinion holds Ludo Dierickx to be something of an uncrowned king. In reaction to that the party now wants to present its views through its own "spokesmen" such as Wilfried Devlieghere and Leo Coutereels, both "products of '68" and both members of the party council and the executive committee.

#### Opportunists

It takes a lot of time and energy to make the understaffed party work. Wilfried Devlieghere, crisis analyst at the Office of Economic Affairs, regrets this tremendously: "It is as if I've been sentenced to a life term, my vegetable garden has become a field of nettles, and I haven't brewed my own beer for 2 years." The Rural Secretariat is still housed in an ugly building over a pizzeria in Brussels and eleven people work there, primarily BTK-ers [temporary help] and conscientious objectors, who labor under the strain of too many tasks. The party's purse is better lined this year: they expect to spend 9.5 million francs. In addition to that, there is a special election fund of 2.4 million francs which is no longer viewed as the dirty machinery of propaganda: a poster on every official billboard and a pamphlet in every mailbox, the slogan goes.

The money comes from membership cards and from the incomes of members of parliament and factions. The current representatives and senator hand over a portion of their earnings at their own discretion, but the arbitrariness of that system has become such a source of irritation that a new system has been worked out. Newly elected representatives may choose the maximum salary of an AGALEV employee (approximately 38,000 francs), in which case the party will pay all additional expenses, or they must turn over a quarter of their salary and cover expenses themselves. European Parliament member Paul Staes, who was the first one to be affected by this new system, wisely chose the second alternative and thus keeps about 75,000 francs net income per month.

The number of members is not growing in proportion to the spectacularly rising electoral support; on the contrary, it has temporarily stabilized at 1000 members, but there is considerable attrition: last year, after a short time with AGALEV, a good 200 members had seen enough. The discrepancy between active militants and passive hangers-on could be an indication that many people do in fact vote for AGALEV out of a negative motivation. It must be said that AGALEV does not put any stock in paper members as do the traditional parties; one cannot just buy a membership card but must even be tried out for a few months before being accepted. "We are afraid that a number of opportunists will jump on the bandwagon out of self-interest; thus the need for supervision."

The basic principles of AGALEV are: ecological, non-violent, and fundamentally democratic. The latter means that for the party itself power lies as much as possible with the local groups and is only conferred on the higher members in small measure. Wilfried Devlieghere: "But it is always like walking a tight-rope to find just the right balance, and we are handicapped in that we have to plan party activities in the context of a very centralized state. Hence, those at the top are now being reproached "that the top in Brussels has its hands in everything." With eighty local autonomous groups AGALEV has expanded substantially within the Ghent-Antwerp-Brussels triangle, but in the periphery of Limburg and West Flanders it is difficult to get a foothold.

Local autonomy also doesn't always apply 100 percent: for example, entering into cartels was prohibited on the local slates in 1982, and Marc Dubrulle was rudely cut off from the party for having done so. After him, three more members from Ghent were also excommunicated by the arbitration committee. "Hopefully that was a one-time thing. You have to understand that that was our pioneer period; there were little groups cropping up everywhere without any experience, who threatened to become sucked into the dynamics of politics. We had to protect them against themselves. But we regret that, and now we would approach it a lot more flexibly." Marc Dubrulle, a leader and one of the founders of AGALEV, who railed strongly against those "Stalinist practices" at the time, has not yet been rehabilitated.

The district councils have almost no authority "in order to avoid concentrating power in local baronies as with the traditional parties." The highest and sovereign authority is the congress, which is not composed of elected representatives but which is open to every member. That involves a risk of manipulation: a certain faction could mobilize people to force a decision on the congress. But voting is utilized as little as possible; they try to work according to the consensus model. The other bodies are also open to everyone, because AGALEV wants to be a "house made of glass." The party newspaper, printed on recycled paper like all their printed material ("otherwise the movement would fall apart!"), even publishes the reports of the party council and executive committee, which is unique in our politics and culture.

## Inside the Government

Much in the party is modelled after the German Greens, who are at this moment involved in a divisive battle between fundamentalists and political pragmatists; but that sharp dualism is not yet to be found in Flanders. Leo Coutereels: "There are different opinions, but no separate, polarized camps. Nor do we have any Otto Shily versus Rudolf Bahro; but that may come sooner than we would like, if we are asked to join in the government. That debate is already raging, but the majority has chosen to mature another 4 years in the opposition." And will they be able to return the missiles to their sender in the near future? "We definitely cannot be led astray by that issue. Nor do we believe that one can push something like that through on the sly, with a narrow, accidental majority."

The party will follow the same strategy as the city councils: setting up a well-defined, clear-cut program for people to take or to leave. It will include radical demands such as dismantling the public utility companies, serving more than one municipality, decentralization of power toward the municipalities, removal of all atomic and nuclear installations from Belgium, cutting the fat out of government departments, and so on. Devlieghere doubts that the SP will remain out of the government on account of the missiles, but he is almost certain that for precisely those reasons AGALEV will not enter into the government per se. More has to change, and he thinks that the peace movement will raise people's consciousness of that. But representative Ludo Dierickx is clearly not of the opinion that the missiles can be sacrificed for the sake of long-term strategies.

If there is to exist within AGALEV a wing of political pragmatists, he would in any case be the masthead. He also has a different background, does not come from the new social movements, previously had a well-paid position as director of the Organization of Public Welfare Institutes, and now feels very much at home in the existing structures of "our shrivelled democracy." Within a short time he was able to capture for himself a position there that one can no longer imagine without him; he has worked himself to the bone during the years past and does not always get the recognition from the party that he deserves. Ludo Dierickx lives with his wife Eva Maria in a beautiful, stylish house on Jan Van Rijswijcklaan in Antwerp, which does not exactly radiate the acetic spirit of the brewery in Viersel.

He fervently hopes that the current leadership will not be able to carry on and several weeks ago he shouted out challengingly in public that after the next election the Greens will have "the key" in hand. Dierickx does not speak in the unctuous, accommodating tone that sometimes characterizes the AGALEV people but rather sharply and curtly. "Nowhere in the Green movement are there people who necessarily want to make it to minister. They have bigger ambitions: not to be a controlling party, but a party with a grip on what is happening historically. We are the survival party of our time. We are no longer looking through the eyeglasses of the traditional pontiffs, who support an economy that speculates on future annihilation and is enriched by the war industry. Down with the growth-model: we are product-oriented."



He would find it a luxury if the Greens were able to tread water for a little while in the opposition: "Preferably next to the liberals, then we could define ourselves clearly. But history is not written that way. There are people in the SP who are already approaching us with little math problems. If we are morally obliged to support a government that rejects the missiles--and we must be that consistent--then that might mean leaving parliament as a result, or taking up ministerial responsibility. Public opinion will never accept our not making the missiles a priority. If we do take a seat in the government, then we will do so very cautiously and with constant, fundamentally democratic dialogue. If anyone makes fun of us, we will leave again."

Ludo Dierickx warns friends and opponents: "We have to prepare ourselves for everything, study thoroughly, arm our people with knowledge of the issues and intellectual baggage, so that we know where to place levers, and we have to think less about solving problems with playful street theater. Our opponents must have no illusions that they will be able to liquidate us by governing with us, because we can count on expert support--from the universities, even from abroad. And if we participate in the government, we will not leave a monopoly on the interpretation of our actions to our enemies because we lack our own press. We have never yet sat in on a BRT [Belgian Radio and Television] confrontation, while KP chairman Van Geyt was invited to participate on a previous occasion at the slightest provocation."

#### Green Varnish

The experiences of Schoten and Meise have taught AGALEV that the political partners will do their best to ensnare the Greens. In the two municipalities the coalition parties appeared to be ready to sign a well-defined, point-by-point program, but once the partnership was formed they would have nothing more to do with that little scrap of paper. Meanwhile, AGALEV representatives are sitting in the opposition again on both municipal councils, an experience which leaves a bitter aftertaste. The 43 Green council members in Flanders meet every month in the so-called Landweg or "rural route," the rural work-group management committee coordinated by Leuven council member Nicole Delbeque. She lives in an apartment across from the Women's House and also has her roots in the Dolle-Mina movement, which caused a short-lived furor in the early 1970's.

From that background she regrets that AGALEV now suffers from the same evil as the traditional parties: the underrepresentation of women at the top of the party. Even on the executive committee only 1 of the 10 members is a woman. Nicole Delbeque argues for "positive discrimination," in setting the coming election slates as well as other areas, but the party isn't paying any heed to her arguments. Furthermore, she came to AGALEV out of a Christian dissatisfaction with the Catholic tradition and the untrustworthiness of the CVP, and she now shares an opposition seat with Louis Tobback on the Leuven city council. On her woolen sweater she wears the well-known anti-racist button: the green hand with the slogan "keep your hands off my friend."



In the beginning, she and her two Green colleagues were continually intimidated and made fun of by the veterans on the city council: "We really were still green then and a bit awkward," she admits. Alderman Sprockeels still swears profusely at her, but in general people are listening more: "Naturally we don't have any direct impact, but some aldermen are putting a light Green varnish on their policies. For that matter, you see it in every municipality." The underground parking garage under Ladeuzeplein which they resisted fiercely has still not come to pass. Her accumulated experiences have nonetheless strengthened her feeling of disgust towards politics as it stands.

She is most disturbed by the manifestly political appointments and the intertwining of aldermen's interests in OCMW's [Public Center for Social Welfare] and the public utility companies serving more than one municipality, as well as by the sick system of services rendered, which clash with her fundamental democratic principles. The 43 AGALEV city council members will not for the life of them organize any day of reckoning. But she is also disillusioned that the population, and even her own constituents can barely be stimulated to active involvement: "In Germany that's going really smoothly; but here there is only one generation that has been afflicted with this virus, the others are terribly inert."

There is also a threshold to cross before becoming involved in AGALEV, and according to Nicole Delbeque, herself a "classic type," that may also have something to do with the rather uniform exterior: all beards and loose, nonchalant, not exactly fashionable clothing. (Devlieghere: "A well turned-out woman, who won't wear last year's dress, is considered to be more ridiculous than a Papuan with three rings through his nose!")

Nicole Delbeque does not see herself doing a second term of 6 years, which she also doesn't find healthy: "because then you cultivate a limited circle of specialists and career politicians." The German Greens have recently been fighting tooth and nail over their rigorous system of rotation which obliges members of parliament to vacate their places after 2 years; a system which many consider a carousel that only supports incompetence. The Flemish Greens will presumably, like their Wallonian sister-party Ecolo, opt for a rotation system of two legislative terms, thus 8 years maximum. The representatives would then have to leave their frontline positions and do research in a back room of the party.

For the last few months, AGALEV has had another member sitting in an alderman's college, after the fiascos with Schoten and Meise: Ludo Sannen, in the Limburg village of Ham, next to Tessenderlo and in the shadow of heavy chemical industry along the Albert Canal. We meet him at a working meeting in Kwaad-Mechelen, where the Limburg AGALEV militants are preparing a coming congress on economy "on a human scale." There is a lot of smoking, which is not permitted at some AGALEV meetings, and most of the participants are very accomplished in the art of debate. Argument is in their blood, and reality is often far afield, and sometimes things tend towards ego-tripping. Ludo Sannen--he

belongs to the "realists" like most of the AGALEV people who are fulfilling a mandate--finds it a little too undirected. It makes him think of the book "Utopia" by Thomas Moore. He himself is no don Quixote.

### The Good Murderer

At the congress, which will meet May 4th and 5th, the Greens hope to define their position on the economy, which is still always the Achilles heel of the ecological movement as they don't direct much attention to the unemployed population. The slogan "small is beautiful" is quietly being exchanged for the concept of "appropriate scale," since steel foundries can be organized on a small-scale model. Other pivotal issues: a product-oriented economy, for which a triple criteria has been established; as much socialization of the method of production as possible, by means of self-management and worker control; and a drastic redistribution of income and labor, leading towards a 32-hour work week. And on the issue of defense (pulling out of NATO), the Greens will define their position sharply this year, because they prefer committed electors to spiteful voters.

The famous Green mist will clear up little by little, to the great pleasure of Ludo Sannen who is an advocate of clear and concrete activity. He was elected in 1982 on an open slate centered around the Green's ideological paper INSPRAAK which captured no less than 17 percent of Ham's votes, breaking the time-honored CVP majority. Two chaotic and anarchic years thus went by, with shifting majorities and deserters here and there, before he became alderman for Town and Country Planning, Environment, and Information. He just imposed a substantial tax on the big industrial mud basin against which the Greens have been fighting for years here, and that is going to cost the polluting firm Tessenderlo Chemie about 5 million francs per year. He is not going to take on any more large structural planning but rather small projects concerning traffic, tree plantings, pruning regulations, participation, and the like.

A new village policeman was just appointed "after an objective examination, while all the earlier municipal employees had been close relatives of the mayor or alderman," Sannen says, not without pride.

He is however disgusted, like Nicole Delbeque, by the chicanery and haggling that he has to put up with, and he is also disappointed that he is able to get his constituents involved so little. Meanwhile the "utopians" do most of the talking at the pre-congress in Kwaad-Mechelen, cite Ivan Illich to one another relentlessly, talk about self-sufficiency and autonomous production at the Alken foundry, and are beginning to debate loudly over "the right of the murderer to a basic income," in view of the fact that society is partly to blame. It is twenty- and thirty-year-olds that have perfect command of the Green ideology.

A computer profile of the people attached to AGALEV indicates that the Greens have the youngest electorate of all the parties (up to 80 percent are younger than 35), that they live primarily in urban groups, come originally from the

Catholic tradition, are well-educated and work in the tertiary and mainly social-cultural sector. It is a profile that is being industriously studied by the traditional parties, which they are also doing in order to cut the grass from under the feet of the Greens; but such maneuvers are coming too late to be believable. Those who have the youth, have the future. But do the Greens really have the youth? Or will there follow another fracture with the youngest generation after them, the now-neutral generation, which is more individualistic, more sober, more rightist and less cohesive, and which stands ready to spew them out in their turn?

12620

CSO: 3614/88

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

# GREECE'S 'NO WAR-NO PEACE' WITH TURKEY AFFECTS NATION

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 23 May 85 p 3

[Editorial by Savvas Iakovidis: "The Great Dilemma"]

[Text] Again the resounding slogan flashes: "As long as Attila the Turk is occupying Cyprus, Greece is not about to participate in a dialogue with Turkey." This was stated by the prime minister of Greece, Papandreou, during a press conference. Papandreou has fermented on the Cyprus issue. He knows all its wrinkles. What was the Greek prime minister's policy when he was in the opposition? He gyrated between "sink the 'Hora'" and launching sweeping bombs against cancelling the "sinful" Right's responsibilities. When he came to power, he promised the suns of freedom and justice would rise over Cyprus. He spoke about a light at the end of the tunnel. He referred to little windows from which rays of hope flowed. He denounced the dogma "Cyprus decides and Greece assists."

What has Papandreou done, however? He augmented the assistance with more assistance. And then? Then he channeled the policy on the Cyprus issue into the frameworks of the feasible and the tolerable and full support of the Kyprianou policy. Now Greece has become embroiled in the pre-electoral campaign whirlwind. There is an overabundance of slogans and promises and exaltation of unyieldingness and political bravery. But the primary dilemma of Hellenism remains:

War or peace with Turkey? And if it is war, how does Greece, and especially Cyprus, prepare itself to confront Turkey? And if it is peace, how do we attain it? War means unspeakable sacrifices but not a solution of the problem. Peace also means sacrifices and concessions, and probably painful compromises.

All these years Hellenism has chosen neither a realistic peace nor total warfare. It has chosen no war-no peace. But no war-no peace leads nowhere. It facilitates the Turks, however, in consolidating and extending faits accomplis at our expense. And these are not overturned with pre-electoral assurances and literary proclamations, but with a specific policy and an organized diplomatic, and otherwise, counter-attack.

Now Papandreou is saying he does not talk with the Turk while he occupies Cyprus. It is not the first time the Greek prime minister has said he will not talk with Ankara because of the continuing occupation of Cyprus. And it is not the first time that he has boldly defended the positions of Cyprus and Cypriot Hellenism. But what is happening? The Turk is not threatening only Cyprus and is not

preparing Turkization of the free areas only. Turkey is threatening the Aegean and has designs in western Thraki, and for this reason it always keeps the so-called Aegean army ready for war. Therefore, since Papandreou is not talking with the Turk, one concludes logically that he is preparing for a polemic showdown.

Papandreou's policy and government in the last four years, approximately, have made it apparent that: He is preparing for neither war nor peace. Just like the previous Greek governments of the Right, he is occupied with the smokeless no war-no peace which circumstantially and seasonally accomodates various expedien-cies and goals. But it mortgages the future of the already half-occupied Cyprus and prepares sufferings in the Aegean and western Thraki. Elections will take place soon in Greece. Whether Papandreou or Mitsotakis wins, the dilemma of Hellenism does not change. Nor does it diminish our own internal crisis. On the contrary, as long as the internal battle in Cyprus is not solved, it ignites developments and prepares the ground for subversive works which Hellenism is probably not in a position to tame.

Since war has been excluded, it appears from the priorities and choices of Hel-lenism that it has no other option than to be concerned with concluding peace. And statements that Greece is not talking with the Turk when Greece itself is not offering an alternative solution to no-peace are, at the least, unfortunate. It is indisputable that, as long as Hellenism plays with no war-no peace, the price for us will rise. And as long as the dilemma is prolonged, the cost will be catastrophic for our side. Out of Cyprus begins and ends the survival and future of Hellenism. This must become understood, even now.

9247

CSO: 3521/264



POLITICAL

CYPRUS

# NATO REPORTEDLY CONCERNED WITH NEW PAPANDREOU GOVERNMENT

Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 23 May 85 p 3

[Editorial: "NATO's Concerns..."]

[Text] NATO circles have done everything to create problems in the Papandreu government as elections approach. They mobilized in these efforts the Right Wing of Mitsotakis who, unconcerned about the continuing occupation of Cyprus, declares he is ready to hold a dialogue with Turkey and support its accession to the EEC.

However, apparently they have realized by now that they will have for the next four years in Greece a PASOK government, with its given stance vis-a-vis Turkey both on the Aegean issue and, above all, on the Cyprus issue. And they are uneasy. Because they know the decisiveness with which the new PASOK government, with a renewed mandate, will defend Cyprus. They are concerned about the cohesiveness of NATO. Because they are certain that a Turkish attempt to extend or complete its invasion on Cyprus will not remain unanswered on the part of a prepared and decisive Greece. They know, moreover, that, by itself, continuance of the Turkish invasion is a threat against the cohesiveness and, above all, the effectiveness of NATO in the area. Because Greece--Papandreu's Greece--will continue to hold termination of the Turkish occupation on Cyprus as an immovable condition for smoothing its relations with Turkey and NATO.

Thus, while the elections in Greece are approaching, their concerns because of the continuing suspense of the Cyprus issue are intensifying. And we see these anxieties in the dominating position taken by the discussion on the Cyprus issue in the NATO-oriented West European Union's Parliamentary Assembly and in the intense concern expressed in the final text of the resolution on Cyprus.

Of course, we did not expect a pro-Cypriot positioning within such a NATOist circle. For this reason, the fact that they rank as equals the "leaders of the two communities on Cyprus," the failure to mention the Turkish invasion, and the exhaustion of their "interest" in projecting and supporting the De Cuellar proposals do not seem strange.

We do expect, however, that the renewing of the mandate to Greece's present socialist government will result in more active and more practical support to Cyprus, and this--the heads of NATO know--will upset the balance of forces with respect to the Cyprus issue and operation of the time factor.

And we are certain that a decisive--with a renewed mandate--Greek Government will exploit to our benefit the uneasiness of western circles, turning it to pressures on Turkey to terminate its invasion against Cyprus.

The message is most explicit to those who have a clear vision and can clearheadedly analyze and evaluate international political facts.

That a strong, prepared and decisive Greece pulls the Cyprus issue out of the isolation and the morass of being dragged out in time, upsets the balances and operation of time, and becomes the strongest catalytic factor for opening up the road in the direction of ending the Turkish invasion and achieving a functional solution which will ensure the salvation of Cypriot Hellenism.

9247

CSO: 3521/264

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN ON NEW UN SECRETARY GENERAL INITIATIVE

NC141154 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek 1030 GMT 14 Jun 85

[Text] The government spokesman has described as a blatant violation of reality reports that, concerning the Cyprus issues, the president now accepts that which he had rejected last January in New York. As his critics very well know, the spokesman stated, President Kiprianou never said that he rejects the documents presented at the high-level meeting in New York. The president accepted those documents, the spokesman said, as a basis for negotiations. This was stated then, and again now, both by the president and by the UN secretary general.

Never, the spokesman added, did we reject the documents. The spokesman also mentioned that the report prepared by the UN secretary general concerning the new unified document is sufficiently clear on whether this is the same or different from previous ones. I do not think, the spokesman said, that at this stage anything needs to be said.

Furthermore, the spokesman added, as we are respecting the confidentiality requested by the secretary general of both sides, we do not intend to analyze the document's contents.

Concluding, the spokesman stated that the president will brief the people fully at the appropriate moment.

CSO: 3521/277

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

KIPRIANOU, DENKTAS ON NEW YORK SUMMIT FAILURE

PM121435 Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Jun 85 p 4

[Part I of Jean-Pierre Clerc dispatch: "Cyprus: One Island, Two Situations"]

[Excerpts] Nicosia--Sometimes one is lucky. From the moment we entered the office of President of the Republic of Cyprus Spiros Kiprianou to the moment we left that of Rauf Denktas, head of the self-proclaimed Turkish "state" in the north of the island, less than 3 and 1/2 hours elapsed! What an opportunity for an in-depth insight into the 30-year-old imbroglio on the Mediterranean island!

"As far as we are concerned, the priority of priorities is the Turkish troops' withdrawal." To this uncompromising statement by Kiprianou, Denktas replied without hesitation: "The prime certainty for us is that the Greeks must accept the guarantee provided to us by the Turkish forces. That is not negotiable." Can one imagine a finer introduction to a dialogue of the deaf?

According to the Cypriot president--and according to all the advocates of a steadfast stance who now support him in the south--the island's sole crucial problem is the "foreign invasion" by Ankara in 1974. Were there not certain "difficulties" between the Greek and Turkish communities even before "Operation Attila"? This point was not even mentioned by President Kiprianou. And what is the reason for the absolute insistence in the north on the Turkish "guarantee"--first and foremost military? "My people want it," Denktas said, "because it is in line with our security requirements. The Greek claim that Ankara has imposed itself here by force is nonsense. As far as it may, we are in charge when it comes to the 'Cyprus question'; all Ankara does is to support us."

Kiprianou calls international law to the rescue, as often proclaimed by the UN Security Council or General Assembly: Indeed, how can a civilized international community accept a solution imposed by force, a "fait accompli," as they say in Nicosia, using the French expression?

Mr Denktas appeals to other nations' "realism": "We are one of the peoples who established the Cypriot state in 1960. But for 11 years from 1963 through

1974 we lived in our own country as in an open-air prison camp." At this point Denktas spread out the maps showing some 40 enclaves (representing, according to our calculations, about 10 percent of the territory) into which his fellow countrymen retreated, reinforcing and organizing themselves following the serious incidents of Christmas 1963. He went on: "In 1975 (that is, following the 1974 Turkish military intervention--LE MONDE editor's note) we set about creating our own state to make the world fully understand that what we have here is not a Greek majority and a Turkish minority but two equal sides!"

The two leaders are not yet in agreement about the reasons for the failure of their January summit in New York under the UN secretary general's auspices. After 5 months of "indirect" negotiations Perez de Cuellar was able to set down on paper a "draft draft" plan for a settlement. Denktas accepted it. As for Kiprianou, he went to the United States in an atmosphere of optimism on the Greek side such as had not been seen for a long time. But nothing came of it! What happened?

"We went to New York to conduct a constructive dialogue with the other side, to make political decisions that would serve as the basis for working groups yet to be created. We certainly did not go there just to have our picture taken," Kiprianou said.

According to Denktas, however, everything was cut and dried: "We were all agreed on the formula of a federal state comprising two zones, one Greek and one Turkish, deemed equal. There was to be a transitional government so that the Greeks would ultimately stop calling themselves alone the "government of Cyprus." On this basis a timetable for the Turkish troops' withdrawal was supposed to be decided at the summit. We agreed to retain only slightly less than 30 percent of the territory--a magic figure for them (as against the present 37 percent--LE MONDE editor's note). Agreement had still to be reached on the three dates and also on the creation of working groups; and we still had to sign. Then Mr Kiprianou said: "Sign an accord? What accord? There is no accord!"

In fact, the UN Secretary General was optimistic about the negotiations because he had set aside 3 days of his time to them. But clearly negotiations could not start again from scratch, as the Greek side's stance may clumsily have suggested. Denktas, apparently by no means disconsolate, took the opportunity to slam the door, to put the blame on the other side, and to announce new measures to consolidate his "Turkish Republic"--a vote on its constitution on 5 May and then presidential and general elections in June.

As for Mr Kiprianou, on his return to Nicosia he had to deal with the irritation and even the censure of the majority of parliament--the right and [words indistinct] "but before my departure for New York all the parties were opposed to a signature!" the president complained; he sees in his adversaries' stance only political "opportunism" "harmful to the country."



However, neither Greek nor Turkish leader made any irremediable statements that would close the door to further initiatives by the UN secretary general, which are indeed continuing.

Diplomatic circles in Nicosia believe that a revised version of the New York document is nearly ready. Will the Turkish side approve it this time? Denktas remains vague on the subject. He has always had two irons in the fire and he certainly intends to keep them there as long as possible. On 15 November 1983 he declared the "independence" of his "republic." And he feverishly sought the international recognition which he lacked, apart in the case of Turkey. At the same time he had it publicly announced that his sole aim was to put himself in a better position to negotiate a federal state formula with the South. What is one to believe?

Perhaps unlike Mr Kiprianou, who knows that time is not on the Cypriot Republic's side, Denktas is not in a hurry: Ankara's troops are there and determined not to leave so easily.

Kiprianou was categorical on a point on which we expressed some doubts: "Yes, we are still resolutely in favor of a federal state. It is not an ideal solution; it is a realistic compromise." But Denktas of course refuses to believe in his good faith. He prefers to repeat for the umpteenth time that his adversary still adheres to the formula of a merger with the Greek Fatherland (Enosis), for which he struggled from 1955 through 1959 against British colonialism to the detriment of the Turkish minority. Kiprianou's answer: "Enosis has been abandoned and there is no danger of its ever returning."

In his "parallel monologue" with his adversary-cum-partner Denktas averred that the Nicosia government "feels no need to resolve the Cyprus problem" any more than Andreas Papandreou, Greece's socialist prime minister and an advocate of a steadfast stance.

Is this not also the stance of the Greek opposition to Kiprianou, which demands early elections in the south in the belief that the head of state failed in his mission by refusing to sign Perez de Cuellar's document in New York in January? The president replied with a transparent reference to his conservative adversary Kiriakides: "I know that some people are now trying to give the impression that they are prepared to accept more sacrifices. But in a matter such as this it is not certain that a party's leader is in agreement with his voters' views. If we ask our fellow citizens whether they are in favor of the Turkish troops' withdrawal from Cyprus, people will obviously answer 'yes'."

Would it be rash to believe that Kiprianou has thus provided us with at least one scoop--the theme of his coming election campaign?

CSO: 3521/277

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

POSITIVE ELEMENTS SEEN IN EVREN STATEMENT

NC161018 Nicosia O FILELEVTHEROS in Greek 16 Jun 85 p 3

[From the "Liberal" column: "The Evren Statements"]

[Excerpts] It would be naive on our part to expect that General Kenan Evren, the Turkish head of state, will not blame Greek Cypriot leaders for the current stagnation [in the Cyprus issue]. At the same time, however, we must not stress just what we dislike in the statements of the Turkish president.

In our desperate search for even the dimmest glimmer of hope that Cypriot affairs will be led to something better, we must also note the positive elements existing in the other side's position. We must see to it that such elements are utilized. This will enable us to strengthen the positive elements and weaken the negative ones.

We therefore welcome that portion of General Evren's statement in which he says that "he believes talks on the Cyprus issue can now start on the basis of the UN secretary general's initiative," as well as his forecast that "positive results will emerge from this initiative."

It is understandable that fresh talks can start on the basis of the new document prepared by Perez de Cuellar, which is already in the hands of the leaders of the two communities. The Evren statement is noteworthy when compared to either the extremely controlled stance maintained by Rauf Denktas toward the UN secretary general's document, or to the statement made by a Turkish Cypriot citizen at the latest UN Security Council meeting. This latter statement created the impression that the position to be taken by the Turkish Cypriot leaders toward the Perez de Cuellar document was expected to be negative.

Turkish positions as expressed by Ankara, on the one hand, and by Nicosia (through Denktas), on the other, indicate that Denktas is much more reluctant in the face of the new Perez de Cuellar effort. The atmosphere which prevailed during the New York "proximity talks" had almost the same characteristics. At that time the deadlock was resolved, thanks to the efforts of General Evren. These efforts resulted in the new Denktas proposals which permitted the summit meeting, despite its eventual failure.

We hope that Ankara will not allow Denktas to pursue an extremist political position. In such an eventuality, there will be no Greek or Greek Cypriot voice raised in demand for rapprochement.

When commenting on Evren's statement, we must also note that a positive element exists in that portion which states that "the Turkish side supports an independent, nonaligned and federal Republic of Cyprus," provided that the practical implementation of such a Turkish policy conforms to this general principle.

CSO: 3521/277

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

ARCHBISHOP ALLEGEDLY WISHES PROTRACTED PROBLEM

Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 20 May 85 p 1

[Text] In an interview he gave to the pro-Zionist magazine, MIDDLE EAST TIMES, our church's primate supported the opinion that the communists in Cyprus wish "to accept a solution as soon as possible" because "they believe this will impede the United States from coming...."

Childish Thoughts

In the same interview, which is a model example of the archbishop's childish political thought, there is support, moreover, for the position that the United Nations and Secretary General Perez de Cuellar "are not interested in a solution which will restore the rights of the people." The archbishop, answering a question of whether he himself has another solution in mind in case the UN efforts fail, reveals his political "philosophy" by stating:

"For the present, no."

Complaints to the U.S.

Khrysostomos complains in his interview that the "American policy" does not help the church of Cyprus in its struggle to neutralize communism!

The archbishop states, finally, that the church offers jobs to the refugees "with the factories it pays" and "encourages people to build factories, cultivate the earth and do tourist work."

9247

CSO: 3521/264

POLITICAL

CYPRUS

BRIEFS

SOVIET DELEGATION EXPRESSES SOLIDARITY--At the invitation of the Union of Cypriot Metal Employees, Machinists and Electricians, SEMMIK (PEO [Pan Cyprian Labor Federation]), a two-member delegation from the Soviet Federation of Workers in the Automobile, Tractor and Farm Machines Industry, composed of the president of and man responsible for the International Relations Department, Alexander Kashirin and Guennady Korznikov, made an official visit to Cyprus from 14 to 20 May 1985. In their joint statement following the conclusion of their contacts, the representatives of the two organizations proclaim, on the occasion of the fortieth year of the victory over fascism, which was achieved "thanks to the enormous contribution of the Soviet people and its armed forces," that: "The representatives of the USSR's Federation of Workers in the Automobile, Tractor and Farm Machines Industry express their solidarity and support to the struggle of the Cypriot workers and people for solution of the Cypriot political problem on the basis of the UN resolutions on Cyprus and the Makarios-Denktas and Kyprianou-Denktas summit agreements. They fully support the initiatives of the UN secretary general, who is acting at the command of the UN Security Council, and call on the two communities, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot, and their leaders to respond positively." [Excerpts] [Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 22 May 85 p 10] 9247

CULTURAL AGREEMENT WITH USSR--A new agreement for cultural cooperation and a two-year program of cultural exchanges between the Soviet-Cypriot and Cypriot-Soviet friendship leagues was signed last Thursday in the offices of the Cypriot-Soviet league. The agreement includes a rich and diverse program of activities and exchanges between the two leagues. The agreement was signed on behalf of the Cypriot-Soviet league by Panos Taliadoros and on behalf of the Soviet-Cypriot league by Nora Akopian. [Text] [Nicosia O FILELEVETHEROS in Greek 19 May 85 p 16] 9247

CSO: 3521/264



POLITICAL

DENMARK

## FIFTEEN PARTIES QUALIFY TO ENTER NEXT GENERAL ELECTIONS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Jun 85 p 10

[Article by Helle Ravn Larsen]

[Text] The Internal Affairs Ministry approved the International Socialist Workers' Party as qualified to nominate candidates in the next Folketing election, making it the 15th qualified party.

If we had an election today there would be a real battle for voters. With the Internal Affairs Ministry's approval of the International Socialist Workers' Party's right to run in the election there are now 15 parties that are entitled to go out and fight for votes.

Internal Affairs Ministry election expert Vilhelm Brockmeyer told BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that the Socialist Workers' Party had submitted 23,000 certified signatures. Around 20,000 certified signatures are required for a party to be approved to run in an election.

In addition to the parties already in Folketing the Internal Affairs Ministry has approved five other parties in the course of a year. They are the Danish Communist Party, the Single-Tax Party, the Socialist Workers' Party, the Marxist-Leninists and the Green Party.

The Internal Affairs Ministry issued signature approval forms for 16 different parties, so there are around 10 parties or groups left, but most of them are not expected to be able to collect the necessary number of signatures.

The next election will be the first time the Green Party has nominated candidates. It is not yet known if the Schlesvig Party, which has a special status because it can nominate candidates automatically without needing to collect signatures, will make use of its right to run in an election.

6578  
CSO: 3613/159

POLITICAL

DENMARK

# SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S PARTY REGISTERS LARGE GAIN IN LATEST POLL

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 2 Jun 85 pp 1, 10

[Article by Helle Ravn Larsen]

[Text] The Social Democrats must realize that the gains they showed in the last poll were a brief respite. The Radical Liberals are slowly regaining lost ground and Prime Minister Poul Schluter can go on vacation in a calm frame of mind. There is no red majority, according to Gallup's latest poll.

The front lines are now being drawn up on the left wing. SF [Socialist People's Party] was the victor in the contest with the Social Democrats.

The party is slowly and steadily making inroads on SDP voters. The extreme left wing is making strong gains. If we had an election today, 18.1 percent of the votes would be cast for parties left of the Social Democratic Party, but the government can enjoy a peaceful summer vacation. There is no red majority in terms of Folketing seats.

This is shown by an opinion poll conducted for BERLINGSKE SONDAAG by the Gallup Institute. The information was gathered in the period from 4 to 20 May.

While SF surged upward with a gain corresponding to 7 seats--the best result since the election--and while VS [Left-Socialist Party] is reappearing on the scene, the Social Democrats had to face the unpleasant fact that support for the party today lies below the support level in the last election and way below the level in the last opinion poll. The gain the SDP made in the last poll has been completely wiped out.

Among the government coalition parties it was again the Conservative Party that picked up votes but this time not enough to mean the gain of a seat in Folketing. The Liberals would have 21 seats compared to 22 now and CD [Center-Democrats] would lose 2 of their 8 seats. The Christian People's Party, which was eliminated from Folketing in the last poll, is back on the right side of the line again but the party lost a seat compared to the election results, which would give it 4 seats today.

The government's support party, the Radical Liberals, showed a decline of 2 seats but the party could rejoice in the fact that it had a slight gain in relation to the last opinion poll.

While the Free Democrats were again given no chance of representation in an election, five unrepresented parties that are qualified to run in an election--the Socialist Workers, the Communists, the Marxist-Leninists, the Single-Tax Party and the Green Party--were also spurned by the voters.

The seat distribution according to the latest Gallup poll is shown on the following page.

#### Political Index

Question: Which party would you vote for if we had a Folketing election tomorrow? Information gathered in the period 4-20 May 1985.

	<u>Answers</u>					
	<u>10 Jan</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>Jan</u> <u>1985</u>	<u>Feb</u> <u>1985</u>	<u>Mar</u> <u>1985</u>	<u>Apr</u> <u>1985</u>	<u>May</u> <u>1985</u>
<u>Party</u>	<u>pct.</u>	<u>pct.</u>	<u>pct.</u>	<u>pct.</u>	<u>pct.</u>	<u>pct.</u>
Social Democrats	31.6	30.7	32.6	30.6	32.8	30.8
Radical Liberals	5.5	4.4	4.4	4.8	3.4	4.3
Conservatives	23.4	25.6	25.4	25.0	24.2	24.0
Single-Tax Party	1.5	-	-	-	-	-
Socialist People's Party	11.5	13.3	11.6	14.8	14.4	15.9
Socialist Workers' Party	0.1	-	-	-	-	-
Communist Party	0.7	-	-	-	-	-
Marxist-Leninist Party	0.0	-	-	-	-	-
Center-Democrats	4.6	3.6	3.7	4.2	4.3	3.6
Christian People's Party	2.7	2.7	2.1	2.3	-	2.2
Liberals	12.1	12.0	12.0	11.2	11.5	11.5
Left-Socialist Party	2.7	-	2.4	-	-	2.2
Progressives	3.6	3.3	3.4	3.3	2.4	3.1
Free Democrats	-	-	-	-	-	-
Green Party	-	-	-	-	-	-
Other parties*	-	4.4	2.6	3.8	7.0	2.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

\*Parties with less than 2 percent of the vote.

# Distribution of Folketing Seats

<u>Party</u>	<u>Poll</u>	<u>Now</u>
Social Democrats	55	56
Radical Liberals	8	10
Conservatives	43	43
Socialist People's Party	28	21
Center-Democrats	6	8
Christian People's Party	4	5
Liberals	21	22
Left-Socialists	4	5
Progressives	6	4
Free Democrats	0	1

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CS0: 3613/159



POLITICAL

FINLAND

SKDL CONGRESS SHOWED FUTILITY OF TRYING TO BRIDGE CP RIFT

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 29 May 85 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson: "Kivisto: A Dream Was Smashed"]

[Text] At the moment when Kalevi Kivisto leaves the leadership of DFFF [Finnish People's Democratic League] an epoch comes to an end. Kivisto's idea that DFFF could act as a link between the Social Democrats and the communists was successful in the beginning, but was spoiled with the increasing split within FKP [Finnish Communist Party] and the end of leftwing cooperation, and now the future of the organization is highly uncertain, writes Jan-Magnus Jansson.

DFFF's national congress over the weekend had little to celebrate. A subject pleasing to the organization's members was perhaps that they still could decide upon a new chairman at some level. MP Esko Helle, moderately unknown by the people and most political observers, had a sympathetic hearing, although he appeared a little strained in his official optimism--he clearly did not dare to make any colorful personal comments on the crisis in the far left.

Kalevi Kivisto's departure speech, with its bitter undertones, gained special attention. Kivisto placed great weight on the voting on the defense appropriation at the end of 1982 which put the People's Democratic League in the opposition. In fact DFFF's position turned out to be a much more fateful affair than most dreamed of then. Like the "scab war" of 1971, the crisis of the end of 1982 kept the people's democrats out of the government for a longer time. That time can still be considered long, because DFFF now finds itself in a condition which makes the party unattractive as a government companion.

One tends to believe Kivisto when he says that at the end of 1982 the people's democrats did not understand the seriousness of the situation. Still they should have understand the complete text which Prime Minister Sorsa expressed then, and which said that DFFF must approve the government's viewpoint on the question of the appropriation, or depart. But even more

remarkable is the fact that Kivisto does not see that the continuing crisis during Koivisto's and Sorsa's governments prepared the ground for the final breakup of government cooperation.

The crisis situation in its turn had its origin not only in the fact that DFFF was the leftwing front of the government block, but mostly in the advancing deterioration of the Communist Party and the continued resistance of the minority group against government participation.

Kivisto has moved over to the post of county governor like a man whose political dreams are smashed. One can perhaps say that as a political organization DFFF has never (except of course during the joyful years following World War II) been so influential as it was at the beginning of his chairmanship. Kivisto's predecessor Ele Alenius was anxious to demonstrate his own "blue-white" socialist line. Thus he was in opposition to the so-called real socialism, and far from welcome in Moscow.

Kivisto was less anxious to profile himself ideologically. Despite his interest in ideas and issues, he was primarily pragmatic. His aim was that DFFF should be a useful link between social democracy and communism. That obviously presumed leftwing cooperation, and that of course did exist during most of the period 1975-82 in the government.

Kivisto also tried to give the greatest possible support to Mauno Koivisto, who obviously appreciated his efforts. Among other things, that applied to the crisis of 1981 when Vayrynen threatened to overturn Koivisto's government. In addition as presidential candidate Kivisto did what he could to have Koivisto chosen for the presidential post in the first round with the support of the majority of Kivisto's voters.

In any case Kivisto's political line has resulted in nothing. If the non-socialists had not changed their political strategy and begun to cooperate, there would be nothing more remote than leftwing cooperation. With the Communist Party in its present shape, the Social Democrats can afford to neglect both DFFF and FKP and be satisfied with collecting the votes which eventually fall away from them.

The other politically interesting question at the DFFF congress is what the congress eventually will mean for the future line of FKP and how it will affect the possibilities of the majority and the minority within the FKP to present a common election front.

On all parliamentary questions, DFFF has a formal key position. The parliamentary group moves in the name of DFFF and under the flag of people's democracy. In fact, however, the election front is entirely dependent on its most powerful part, the Communist Party, and that came through also during the congress.

The isolation of the minority (in which can be included Kajanoja's small group) was demonstrated clearly despite the soft tones which were used during

the congress. With the election to the most important posts within the party leadership there were votes by which the minority was regularly knocked out. A noticeable trend was that the minority was certainly not left without representation in the leadership, but that it did not itself get to decide on its representatives in the organs of the party.

The important question of whether or not there would be an election front with the minority was left entirely open. Actually that will be decided within the Communist Party, where the new party secretary Esko Vainionpaa has established himself as an energetic and hard representative for the majority line.

One can also reflect on what will happen to DFFF after the change of chairmen, especially if the Communist Party definitely splits. The probability has been mentioned that DFFF will then be unnecessary as an umbrella organization. Such a conclusion is premature. There are many people who consider themselves people's democrats or socialists without being affiliated with FKP. They still need DFFF or a corresponding organization as a home. Neither does anything indicate that the majority of FKP intends to refrain from the label which DFFF has offered during the entire postwar period. Cooperation between the majority wing and DFFF, which are not so far apart ideologically, should not be impossible to create.

Another thing is whether developments will result in a totally new alignment within the leftwing as Aarne Saarinen, among others, prophesied. In that case it is probable that the DFFF socialists will partly blend into the newly organized Communist Party, and will partly establish themselves on the left side of the Social Democrat Party.

Ideologically it seems as if DFFF in many respects has its finger on the pulse of the times. They speak for equality, self-government and gentle care, all things which should win attention at a time when government policies have a clearly nonsocialist coloration and Reaganist undercurrents are not uncommon. But what can be done when the political power is running the party out of hand.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

FABIUS: SUPPORT TO ANC, SWAPO; SANCTIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA

PM101003 Paris LE MONDE in French 2-3 Jun 85 p 7

[Unattributed report: "Mr Laurent Fabius Threatens South Africa With Economic Sanctions"]

[Text] Threat of economic sanctions against South Africa and "facilities" for the ANC and SWAPO in France were the main measures announced by the prime minister in the closing speech he made on Friday 31 May in Paris at the International forum on Freedom and Human Rights.

"We want to invest in that region of the world," Mr Fabius said. "But if, in a reasonable time, between 18 months and 2 years, specific measures are not taken by the South African regime to end its (discriminatory) practices, then I think France will not only be unable to continue its investments but will have to call a halt." "I want the ANC and SWAPO to have facilities in Paris, in keeping with the hopes they embody," the prime minister also said.

#### Educational Initiative

However, Mr Fabius added, "We want to develop friendly relations with the South African people. It is with this hope that, after talks with Bishop Tutu, France has now decided to double the number of grants for South African students in France and to increase its financial aid to the humanitarian organizations helping defendants, prisoners, victims, and their families."

The other practical measures announced by Mr Fabius in favor of human rights in France and in the world are as follows:

1. Introduction of "a human rights initiative next September in the framework of civic education,"
2. The creation of "10 human rights grants each year" for young people "to reward an individual, group, or action in the world which made a particular mark in this sphere. These first 10 international human rights grants will be presented in Paris at the end of this year,"
3. France will support the plan to create a UN high commission for human rights. It will establish contact with its EC partners, the prime minister



said, "to ensure that we can all join together to throw our weight" behind this project,

4. The external relations minister, Mr Fabius announced, will "immediately establish the necessary contacts to enable the International Red Cross committee to be present in the refugee camps and wherever it is necessary in Lebanon. The same contacts will be made to ensure that the Red Cross has access to areas of South Africa where this is tragically needed."

In addition to these measures, Mr Fabius invited the consultative commission on human rights at the External Relations Ministry, chaired by Mrs Nicole Questiaux, to inform the government "immediately" of the suggestions put forward during this colloquium. The suggestions mentioned by the prime minister include the establishment of an "international habeus corpus and international jurisdiction." He also took up the idea of strengthening the links "between individual rights and economic and cultural development" and mentioned "the commemoration of the bicentennial of the 1789 declaration with regard to human rights."

Mr Fabius also explained the reasons for this colloquium by answering two questions: "Why human rights, and why France?" Because "the fight for human rights is never won," he said, and because "if progress can still be made, our history and our hearts are a foundation for freedom."

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POLITICAL

GREECE

SPECULATION ABOUT NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR, FUTURE RELATIONS

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 7 Jun 85 p 2

[Article by Giannis Kartalis: "New Ambassador Is Menios' Friend"]

[Excerpts] A new wind seems to be blowing in the oft-discussed Greek-American relations after the elections, while a "friend" is probably expected in Athens next September, "coming from the past." We are referring to the new U.S. ambassador, Bob Keeley who had served in Athens during the sixties and had established friendly relations with Andreas Papandreou. If this is somehow known, what is not is that Mr Keeley is reputedly a friend of Menios Koutsogiorgas'.

It seems no coincidence that the Reagan administration has decided to send to Athens someone who is already known to the Greek prime minister (as had previously happened with Mr Stearns).

In spite of all that has been written on the subject, Mr Stearns' departure from Athens is not due to any dissatisfaction in Washington, especially because, as is being said, he had not foreseen the developments concerning President Karamanlis. Mr Stearns' tour of duty is simply coming to an end.

However, beyond this change, there is another one that is expected to affect the course of Greek-American relations. This change will take place in Washington and is in regard to Richard Bert, whose past statements had created many clouds on the horizon of Greek-American relations.

It is not yet known who will replace him in Washington after his departure for Bonn. However, it seems that the change in relations will not only concern personalities. U.S. diplomats in Athens were not hiding their satisfaction, in the aftermath of Mr Papandreou's interview to the NEW YORK TIMES--where he had spoken of "calmer waters" in Greek-American relations--about the fact that the relations with Washington and with NATO had not been an issue during the electoral campaign.

Washington may have been surprised about the size of the PASOK victory, but the victory itself was no surprise: both the U.S. Embassy and the State Department were expecting it. And Reagan's message is definitely a positive

move. This new image was completed by Mr Papandreou himself, when he expressed the hope that "in this new 4-year period we shall significantly improve our relations." However, this improvement will depend on the extent to which "the United States will clearly recognize the national problems faced by Greece."

A long-time diplomat said, "The problem between the United States and Greece is Turkey."

This situation in Greek-American relations is now new. It preceded the PASOK government and this is the main reason for anti-Americanism in Greece. It is nature, therefore, than an improvement can occur only if the United States maintain a more evenly balanced attitude vis-a-vis Athens and Ankara, and also if they will pressure Turkey (they are the only ones who can) to abandon its aggressive policy against Greece.

Of course, there is also the problem of the bases. Mr Papandreou was repeatedly questioned on the future of the bases. He avoided saying what will happen in 1988, but was categorical for the fate of the bases until then: the agreement will be respected. He also said that "the terms of the agreement are known" and that "the interpretation of the terms of the agreement has been officially presented to the Chamber of Deputies by me." This means, then, that the agreement will end according to the terms agreed upon by both sides and not through some...sudden coup.

CSO: 3521/276

POLITICAL

GREECE

CAMPAIGN SEEN CONDUCTED ON INCONSEQUENTIAL ISSUES

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 28 May 85 p 24

[Article by Nikos Dimou: "Everyone Absent?"]

[Text] Five days before the elections, I decided to issue a call; to call all the issues that preoccupy me.

First, and most convincing, the Cloud. (If you can't breathe, what do you need everything else for?) So I called: "Cloud! Clou-oud! CLOUD!"

No answer.

Is the Cloud absent? Is it possible? I looked for it in all the electoral speeches, all the TV appearances, all the announcements and the programs of all the parties. Nothing. Almost no mention of the Cloud.

(O..., I know. I will continue to be asphyxiated for another 4-year period. No matter who is elected).

Then I shouted: Inflation! INFLATION!

Absolute silence. Which continued, whenever I called Unemployment, Education, Health. I especially called the Foreign Debt. (I feel bad when I owe money). Everyone was absent.

If this pre-electoral period remains in the country's annals, it will be because of the hegemony of the non-essential. All the serious, pressing problems which the country faces are either not mentioned or are consigned to the footnotes.

We are watching a show organized by the "special advisors." With issues that are unimportant and propagandistic, far removed from the serious and pre-occupying ones....

No one will tell the Greek people some bitter truths. No one will ask from the huge audiences at the rallies more work and less consumption. No one

will tell the students (and the professors) that they must study in earnest, because we have lost decades in development. No one will make it clear to the different categories of the more advantaged that they must limit their demands....

Who will announce tough and unpopular (but necessary) measures? Measures for Health, Education, Inflation, Deficits?

No one! How can one think of these things in a pre-electoral period?

But then, two things happen. Either they have no intention of taking serious measures--in which case they will govern without results and the country will deteriorate--or they will take those measures but are not telling us about it. They are fooling us!

So, decide what you want to have as your politicians: dumb ones, or sly ones?

And while our houses are going up in flames, our problems mounting, the electoral struggle becomes a personal confrontation. Here and now, far away from unpleasant subjects! The few who are concerned with the level of the struggle (some proud intellectuals), let them vote for what they want. The many--they are the ones who count--are very satisfied. Everyone is promising them Christmas bonuses, and they have, moreover, a free show. And what a show! Mud wrestling!

No one will explain to them that Santa Claus no longer "works." And that New Year's is a day like all the others. Just like the day after the elections....

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POLITICAL

GREECE

## RESULTS OF LARGE-SCALE POLITICAL POLL

### Adherence to Political Parties

Athens ENA in Greek 16 May 85 pp 10-12

[Text] Five-hundred and fifty-thousand voters, 7.8 percent of those registered on the voter lists, are still undecided with the 2 June elections approaching. They are the ones who will decide the outcome, giving the victory either to PASOK or ND, since the difference between the two parties appears to be small and--above all--unstable. This is the most significant element emerging from the second part of the poll conducted by the Metrix Research Center for ENA. The instability is confirmed by a second finding: Aside from the number of undecided, an additional percentage, approximately six percent, of those who voted for a certain party in the poll do not exclude the possibility that they may change their minds by 2 June and vote differently.

### Result of the Poll

In more detail, the "voting" result gives 40 percent to PASOK and 36.8 to New Democracy. The KKE collects 11.9 percent, while KKE(Int.) gains 2.6 percent of the votes. The position of the smallest parties became significantly clearer last week: KODISO [Democratic Socialism Party] will cooperate with ND, as will EDIK [Democratic Center Union] with PASOK.

In the category, "other party," which has 0.3 percent, is EDA--which is cooperating with PASOK--with 0.1 percent.

A characteristic element is the relatively low percentage of those who cast a "blank" ballot; it amounts to 7.8 percent.

Particularly as concerns the two great parties, they will not restrict their effort in the pre-electoral campaign only to the undecided but will try to "shift" votes from their adversary's primary electoral force. If the effort pays off, "surprises" on 2 June 1985 should not be excluded.

We note the smallest difference between the two parties in the age group 50 to 69, where PASOK leads ND by 2.0 percent, and from areas in Salonica where again PASOK surpasses ND, by 2.7 percent.

The very high percentage of undecided voters in semi-urban/rural areas, with 10.2 percent versus the average 7.8 percent, is explained by the fact that the polling occurred mainly in these areas in the first days.

This gives us an indication of what was approximately the percentage of undecided voters around 18 to 20 April and how it then began to decrease as things were settled and the date for conducting elections became more specific.

For the Athens area, if we divide up proportionally those who cast a blank ballot, the poll result gives us, with a slight improvement for the four leading parties, the outcome seen in the June 1984 Euroelections. The KKE seems to have profited the most.

The "margin of error" for PASOK and ND is plus or minus 2.5; that is, for PASOK it fluctuates from 42.5 to 37.5 percent, while for ND it varies from 39.3 to 34.3 percent.

For the KKE's percentage, 11.9 percent, the margin of error is plus or minus 1.7 and the result is between 13.6 and 10.2 percent.

After the "voting," the question was asked: "Does the vote you gave now express your definite decision, or will you wait for the last phase of the pre-electoral campaign to finally make up your mind?"

The data provide the following picture:

CHART 1

I have definitely decided	85.9 percent
I have decided, but want to follow the pre-electoral campaign	7.3 percent
I will decide the last week before elections	6.8 percent

CHART 2

Question: Which party would you vote for if elections were held next Sunday?

PARTIES' ELECTORAL FORCE  
(Voting With A Ballot In A Ballot-Box)  
(In Percentages)

	SEX			AGE			AREA			
	Total 2005	Men 964	Women 1041	18-29 526	30-49 796	50-69 683	Athens 626	Salon- ica 145	Urban 419	Semi- Urban/ Rural 815
PASOK	40.0	39.5	40.5	36.3	41.6	41.1	36.4	39.3	41.8	42.0
ND	36.8	36.1	37.5	30.4	39.0	39.1	33.4	36.6	38.4	38.7
KKE	11.9	13.4	10.6	18.4	9.4	9.8	17.1	13.1	10.5	8.5
KKE(Int.)	2.6	3.1	2.1	4.9	2.8	0.6	5.0	3.4	2.4	0.7
National Array/ EPEN*	0.3	0.3	0.2	-	0.4	0.4	0.5	-	0.7	-
KODISO	0.2	0.3	0.1	-	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.7	0.2	-

\*[National Political Union]

	Total	Men	Women	18-29	30-49	50-69	Athens	Salonica	Urban	Semi-Urban/ Rural
EDIK	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	-	0.3	-	0.5	-
Other										
Party	0.3	0.4	0.1	0.6	0.3	-	0.5	0.7	0.5	-
Blank (Undecided)	7.8	6.7	8.7	9.2	6.0	8.7	6.5	6.2	5.0	10.2

#### Method/Technical Execution

The survey was conducted by the Metrix Research Center from 18 April to 30 April 1985, and planned, coordinated and analyzed by K. Ploumbis. The polling sample amounted to 2,000 people, aged 18 to 69, who have the right to vote.

The sampling method: "guided," random selection in stages.

The survey covered continental Greece and Crete.

The geographic area is divided, in accordance with ESYE [National Statistical Service of Greece] data (1981 census), into large centers (Athens, ex-capital area and Salonica), urban areas with a population of 10,000 or more, and semi-urban/rural areas with populations of up to 9,999. The selection of the areas in which the survey occurred followed in relation to the population.

Aside from Athens and Salonica, 12 urban centers, 12 semi-urban and 22 rural areas, in 13 nomes, were selected.

For the large and urban centers, each surveyor took specific streets and squares on which he had to conduct a set number of interviews (eight).

For semi-urban and rural areas, locations were selected based on characteristic landmarks (squares, a school, a church).

The interviews were conducted by 42 surveyors, headed by four controllers.

For the "voting," those questioned were given a ballot which had the parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies but also those outside of it.

The person questioned completed the ballot by himself and then put it in an envelope and in a ballot-box which the surveyor had with him. The ballot-box was locked and opened only in the company's offices.

A "voter" was considered to be a person who has a voting card and votes in the place or area where he or she lives. This means that there are no persons from another community in the sample of 2,000 people.

After the typical and logical checking, the data were loaded on tapes and were processed with the special scientific program of statistical analyses, Quantum of Quantdata.

### Voters' Certainties

Athens ENA in Greek 23 May 85 p 9

[Text] The ideological-political area in which Greeks place themselves, the majority's certainty that the elections will, in any case, produce a winner of more than 150 parliamentary seats, and the probabilities for forming coalition governments are the three main political determinations of ENA's poll--a poll which everyone judged reliable and has been republished in many Greek and foreign newspapers.

In order to ascertain the voters' political affiliation, the classic--let us call it such--terminology, rightist, leftist, centrist, etc., was used.

From the answers given by those questioned, three large groups are formed:

Thirty-nine percent place themselves in the Center-Left and to the left.

Twenty-seven percent say they belong to the Center-Right and area to the right.

Twenty percent see themselves in the Center.

Finally, 14 percent did not answer.

We have, therefore, 66 percent--nearly two out of three Greek voters--who clearly place themselves in one of the large ideological-political factions, as we have known them since long ago, while 20 percent--approximately one in five Greeks--are in the Center, that is, in a political area which, despite its instability and primitive and anemic party expression, continues to exist, to live, and will apparently play in the coming elections an important role in forming the outcome.

Of the PASOK adherents, 31 percent place themselves in the Center while 41 percent see themselves in the Center-Left and 11 percent in the Left.

A majority of the ND adherents, 49 percent, place themselves in the Right, while 35 percent talk about the Center-Right.

#### Self-Power

As concerns the likelihood of a self-powered government, 67 percent of those questioned believe that a party will arise with a self-powered majority from the coming elections.

This opinion is supported by 75 percent of PASOK adherents, 65 percent of ND supporters, 63 percent of KKE adherents and 62 percent of KKE(Int.) backers. But also, among the undecided and those reporting no party affiliation, the majority express the same opinion.

So we have determined that, irregardless of party affiliation, public opinion "sees" that there will be a "winner" in the coming elections.

As concerns the issue of forming coalition governments, there is a polarization in the public opinion's viewpoints. Thus, 41 percent agree on the need for forming coalition governments, while 48 percent do not agree with any such thing.

The formation of a coalition government is supported mainly by adherents of the KKE (70 percent) and KKE(Int.) (76 percent).

But within PASOK, opinion in favor of a coalition government has a noteworthy percentage of supporters (39 percent) while in ND 27 percent favor such a development.

On the questionnaire was a question referring to coalition governments and to public opinion's preferences on various combinations:

"If we hypothesize that in the coming elections no party takes the majority and can form a government by itself, which combination would you prefer in first place from those written on the card?"

According to the data we have about the total, 35 percent prefer a PASOK-KKE "coalition" government, while 33 percent express the opinion that the election should take place again. Eleven percent did not answer the question, and the remaining 21 percent divided itself among various other combinations. (see chart below).

Formation of a PASOK-KKE coalition government is supported by 49 percent of PASOK adherents, 88 percent of KKE backers and small groups from KKE(Int.), the undecided and those not reporting any party affiliation.

The great majority of ND adherents (60 percent) prefer "elections taking place again" as an alternative solution, which is also stated by 26 percent of PASOK supporters.

It appears that the possibility of PASOK-ND cooperation does not engage public opinion. Only seven percent of those questioned made this choice.

The poll interviews were conducted by 42 surveyors, headed by four controllers.

The survey took place in Athens and Salonica and the following nomes: Evros, Kavala, Serrai, Pella, Karditsa, Larisa, Ioannina, Evvoia, Fthiotis, Aitolokar-nania, Akhaia, Argolis, Korinthia and Irakleion.

If we hypothesize that in the coming elections no party takes the majority and can form a government by itself, what combination would you prefer in first place from those written on the card?

COALITION GOVERNMENTS/COMBINATION							
	Party Affiliation						
	Total	PASOK	ND	KKE	KKE(Int.)	Have Not Decided	No Answer
	(In Percentages)						
PASOK-ND	7	4	15	-	3	14	10
PASOK-KKE	35	49	1	88	14	21	13
PASOK-KKE(Int.)	6	9	-	-	52	4	2
PASOK-ND-Cen- trists	4	2	8	-	3	5	6



	Total	PASOK	ND	KKE	KKE(Int.)	Have Not Decided	No Answer
All parties	4	3	5	1	10	9	7
Elections Should							
Take Place Again	33	26	60	7	12	38	35
No Answer	11	7	11	4	6	9	27

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POLITICAL

GREECE

## ELECTIONS 1985: FINDINGS, COMMENTS, CONCLUSIONS

### Electoral Geography

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 5 Jun 85 p 3

/Article by I.K. Pretenderis; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface/

/Text/ The results of the 2 June elections /confirmed trends/ in the making up of the country's electoral map, trends that had been manifested in the 1981 elections and had been confirmed in the 1984 Euro-elections.

PASOK draws its /strength/ primarily from /the rural areas./ It received 47 percent of the vote in agricultural regions, while ND too showed similar strength in these same regions, getting 42.2 percent of the vote.

/The two big parties thus got above their average national ratio in the rural areas/ while /the communists obtained much lower percentages in this area in relation to their national performance / (8 percent for the KKE and 1 percent for the KKE Int.)). A similar picture had been drawn in the 1984 Euro-elections and the 1981 parliamentary elections where "bipartisanship" in the rural areas had already been strong.

In connection with the Euro-elections, /PASOK rose by 3.2 points in the agricultural regions,/ while ND rose by 2.6 points. In other words, /the difference increased on behalf of PASOK/ even though both parties showed a rise smaller than their average national level.

/The semi-urban areas remained strong bastions of ND/ despite the fact that even here the difference increased to PASOK's benefit. ND garnered 43.3 percent of the vote compared to 44.9 percent by PASOK, while in the Euro-elections it had 40.9 percent compared to PASOK's 41.2 percent. Here too the communists were /lower/ than their average national level.

In the urban areas, /both big parties showed increases./ Their difference, however, that had been reduced somewhat in the Euro-elections (3.5 points in favor of PASOK) opened up again last Sunday (6.2 points in favor of PASOK). Both parties, however, with 44.9 percent of the vote for PASOK and 38.7 percent for ND, were below their average national levels.

In the urban areas, both KKE's remained relatively strong (12.2 percent for the KKE and 2.9 percent for the KKE (Int.)). It appears, however, that it was in the

Urban centers where the communists experienced their biggest switchovers to PASOK: the KKE lost 2.1 points in relation to the Euro-elections, while the KKE (Int.) lost 2.4 points.

On the other hand, there were less switchovers from the communists to PASOK in the semi-urban areas (the KKE lost 1.6 points and the KKE (Int.) 1.2 points) and even less in the agricultural regions (the KKE lost 0.7 points and the KKE (Int.) lost 0.8 points).

In other words, the communist vote switched to PASOK, obeying not so much to the "logic of the lost vote" (i.e. in those areas where the communist Left had no possibility of electing a deputy) but /influenced by the fear of a "rightist counterattack" / which was more manifest in the urban centers.

From 1981 until 2 June, /the Right followed an upward course in the urban centers/ that brought it rewards in parliamentary seats (37 seats now compared to 27 in 1981). Even though PASOK succeeded in limiting its losses (42 seats now compared to 47 in 1981), this is due primarily to the switchovers of communist votes.

It is not fortuitous, therefore, that PASOK showed a big increase in the urban centers: 7 points in the Second Electoral District of Piraeus (5.64 point loss for the communists); 5.3 points in the Second Electoral District of Athens (4.57 point loss for the communists); 5.6 points in the First Electoral District of Piraeus (4.7 point loss for the communists); 5.8 points in the First Electoral District of Salonica (4.83 point loss for the communists); 5 points in the First Electoral District of Athens (4.10 point loss for the communists).

Nevertheless, the gains in the Right's parliamentary seats were primarily restricted to /urban centers/ (the 10 seats it picked it there were its overall gain).

In the remaining regions of the country, the situation remained approximately what it was in 1981. Taking into consideration the fluctuations in the number of parliamentary seats on the basis of the 1981 census results, the two big parties showed the following results:

- In Peloponnisos, PASOK lost three seats overall and ND picked up one.
- In Makedonia and Thraki, PASOK won one seat and ND two.
- In the islands, PASOK lost three seats and ND two. In mainland Greece, Ipeiros and Thessalia overall there were neither gains or losses.
- As for deputies at large, PASOK lost one seat.

Therefore, in the last analysis, /"the counterattack by the Right"/ both in Makedonia and Thraki as well as in Peloponnisos (that began to be revealed in the Euro-elections) /did not yield results./

/Overall, the provinces were and have remained "green" and it is to them that PASOK owes its victory./

/Also, the strong areas of each party in Greece were also confirmed without any impressive changes./

/The "green areas"/ invariably maintained their coloration since PASOK went over 50 percent in Crete, Dodekanisos, Ileia, Akhaia, Evvoia and Kerkyra, i.e. in those areas where ND went over 47 percent in /"blue Peloponnisos"/ (Lakonia, Messinia, Argolis), Thraki, Fokis, Khalkidiki, Kastoria, Florina and Serrai.

PASOK, nevertheless, had many successes on the "Macedonian front" since it succeeded many times in increasing its difference with ND in those nomes considered "questionable," such as Kavala (about 5 points), Pieria, Drama (which it lost in the Euro-elections), as well as Pella and Imathia. It also succeeded in getting back the Second Electoral District of Salonica from ND.

As for ND, /it did better in the "green areas"/ than in the past. In Crete, it held on to its four seats despite the fact that the number of the island's seats had been reduced by two. Its percentage in Crete reached 29.35 percent compared to 24.55 in 1981 and 26.44 in 1984. In Akhaia, it gained four seats (compared to five for PASOK), while in 1981 the ratio was two to six.

PASOK was obviously preferred by women voters (45.9 percent), something that means that so many fainting spells were not in vain. As for the men's vote, PASOK's percentage was 44.6 percent.

Nevertheless, the same trends were shown by the ND electorate since 40.8 percent of the women preferred this party compared to 40.1 percent of the men. The revelation of the 1981 elections and the 1984 Euro-elections that /women prefer the two big parties more/ was thus confirmed.

On the other hand, /men showed some greater preference for the communists./ The KKE got 11.5 percent of the men's votes while the KKE (Int.) got 2.2 percent. As for the latter party and compared to the Euro-elections, it was preferred more by men (2.2 percent) than women (2.1 percent).

In accordance with data of the Delta-Doxiadis Company computer that undertook (under the supervision of its director Mr Drimiotis) to process the data and come up with the electoral conclusions, the parties involved show the following picture:

# PASOK: Irakleion and Rodopi

In Irakleion, Crete, PASOK obtained its highest percentage, while its lowest was in Rodopi, as shown in the following table:

Highest Percentage		Lowest Percentage	
Irakleion	64.32	Kilkis	41.89
Lasithion	61.58	Arta	41.82
Rethymni	57.20	Levkas	41.15
Dodekanisos	56.65	Samos	40.99
Khania	54.96	Messinia	40.86
Akhaia	52.52	1st Elec.Dist.	
Khios	52.33	of Athens	39.74
Kerkyra	51.05	Kastoria	38.94
Evvoia	50.33	Lakonia	34.87
Ileia	50.21	Xanthi	32.21
		Rodopi	30.41

# ND: Lakonia and Irakleion

In Lakonia, which remains "a bastion of the Right." ND garnered its highest percentage, while its smallest percentage was given to Mr K. Mitsotakis (the Cretan) by Irakleion, Crete! Here is the table:

Highest Percentage		Lowest Percentage	
Lakonia	56.91	Dodekanisos	36.11
Kastoria	53.81	Levkas	35.52
Rodopi	49.91	2nd Elec.Dist.	
Argolis	48.87	of Athens	34.80
Messinia	48.70	Rethymni	34.33
Fokis	48.11	Khania	31.15
Khalkidiki	47.82	Lasithion	31.14
Serrai	47.74	Lesvos	30.23
Evros	47.66	2nd Elec.Dist.	
Florina	47.64	of Piraeus	29.70

# KKE: Lesvos and Xanthi

A traditional "bastion of the Left," Lesvos gave the KKE its biggest --compared to other nomes-- percentage, while its lowest percentage was in Xanthi.

Highest Percentage		Lowest Percentage	
Lesvos	22.59	Evros	5.38
Samos	19.29	Argolis	5.11
Levkas	19.06	Dodekanisos	5.08
2nd Elec.Distr. of		Evrytania	5.07
Piraeus	17.08	Korinthia	4.33
Kefallinia	15.61	Kyklades	4.32
2nd Elec. Distr. of		Kastoria	4.31
Athens	15.50	Drama	3.71
Zakynthos	14.97	Rodopi	2.89
Larisa	14.15	Xanthi	2.35
Ioannina	13.91		
Trikala	13.61		



# KKE (Int.): Athens and Rodopi

It is ironical for the KKE (Int.) that in the area where it obtained its highest percentage (First Electoral District of Athens) it did not elect a deputy! Its lowest percentage was revealed in Rodopi.

Highest Percentage		Lowest Percentage	
1st Elec. Distr. of Athens	4.37	Kilkis	0.98
2nd Elec. Distr. of Athens	3.56	Kastoria	0.98
Levkas	3.06	Evros	0.94
1st Elec. Distr. of Salonica	2.65	Rethymni	0.94
1st Elec. Distr. of Piraeus	2.65	Pella	0.91
2nd Elec. Distr. of Piraeus	2.63	Florina	0.90
Samos	2.48	Xanthi	0.84
Kerkyra	1.96	Evrytania	0.83
Kefallonia	1.73	Lasithion	0.65
Voiotia	1.70	Rodopi	0.65

## Alleged Russian Wishes

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 4 Jun 85 p 7

[Article by G. Lampsas]

[Text] All those who ask themselves how PASOK managed to win the 2 June elections have only to do one thing: have them compare the percentages the two communist parties had in the two previous elections with the percentages they obtained this year. In 1981, the two communist parties had 10.93 + 1.34 percent, i.e. 12.27 percent. And certainly they had at that time subsidized Mr Papandreou. In the 1984 Euro-elections, they received 11.63 + 3.40 percent, i.e. 15.03 percent overall because there was no need for big subsidizations and they wanted with the opportunity of the simple proportional representation system "to gauge their strengths." The other day, the joint percentage suddenly dropped to 11.65 percent, i.e. about 3.4 points lower than last year's, although normally there should have been an increase, after almost 4 years of daily communist propaganda over television and the infiltration of leftists in important positions of the government.

How can one interpret this vertical drop? There are two possibilities: either the followers of Messrs Florakis and Kyrkos did not take into consideration the appeals of their leaders not to give one vote to PASOK or this phenomenon (the insurbordination of the followers) was observed only in the KKE (Int.), while Mr Florakis had agreed with PASOK, following a certain desire on the part of the Soviets, to have the former subsidize the latter and to have Mr Florakis pretend that he condemns the notorious "bipartisanship" so that the Greek people might not realize the game that was being played out.

I cannot, of course, know which of these hypotheses is closest to the truth. At any rate, it is evident that from the moment the KKE followers cast their ballots in favor of PASOK, New Democracy did not have any possibility of winning, unless it obtained 51 percent of the vote, something quite difficult if one considers that PASOK had made thousands of pre-electoral appointments, had made significant grants, had promised once again a whole list of miracles, had benefitted from EEC money and bottomry from foreign banks and generally had on its side the green state apparatus.

You may ask: does what happened benefit the KKE? Is it not afraid that it will be "put into the corner" by PASOK so that the latter will have peace and quiet? Would it not have been preferable to do what Mr Florakis had publicly asked --i.e. to force PASOK to cooperate with an increased KKE strength?

Certainly, this solution would have benefitted the KKE. And yet, either its followers were afraid of a return of the Right (influenced not only by PASOK's brainwashing but by the older words of danger by Mr Florakis himself) or such an order had been given by Moscow, as I noted above, once again sacrificing the KKE to the broader expediencies of Soviet policy. Because a Greece that is in NATO and the EEC and that propagandizes Soviet positions in these bodies is preferable for the Russians than a fragile and unreliable PASOK-KKE alliance. Besides, Moscow has implemented a similar policy in other countries outside the eastern bloc, such as Syria, Libya, etc.

Of course, in the case of Greece that is still closely linked to the West (loans, military aid, etc.), matters are not so simple as in the Third World countries: nothing rules out that Mr Papandreu might deceive Moscow, as he has done with so many others. But in case he should be ungrateful to his eastern patrons he will pay dearly --and together with him the country too will pay dearly.

Consequently, national vicissitudes await us one way or another. For most Greeks, however, the big problem begins right now: they will have to endure a continually more despotic and a continually more wasteful and economically destructive regime. Their daily life will certainly become more difficult, even for those who, without having this time the extenuating circumstances of deception (as Karamanlis accurately stressed), voted for Change for the worse.....

#### Ethnic Minority's Vote

Athens PONDIKI in Greek 7 Jun 85 p 20

[Excerpts] So, the electoral results in the "sensitive" nomes of Xanthi and Rodopi really were of great interest because in both nomes the Muslim minority voted.... Right and "strictly minority." Since the matter deserves discussion (since the games being played are many and difficult: Ankara's role and that of the Turkish consul, influence on the electorate by the muftis, the appearance in Xanthi of a minority party for the first time, etc.) we will return to it since we are today making a first "reading" of the election results:

1. In Xanthi, besides the other parties, the purely minority party "Peace" took part in the elections. It had three candidates, Mehmet Aga (son of the mufti of Xanthi and a candidate of the Progressive Party in 1981); Celal Zeybek (first runner up in ND in 1981 with 3,997 preference crosses); and Hikmet Cemiloglu. Pay attention now to the results in this nome compared to those of 1981.

- PASOK obtained 19,860 votes, 32.22 percent and two seats (19,073 votes, 34.85 percent and one seat in 1981).
- ND obtained 28,338 votes, 45.97 percent and 1 seat (20,155 votes, 36.82 percent and two seats in 1981).
- The "Peace" party, 10,340 votes (16.78 percent).

We have, therefore, a clear (guided?) shift of minority votes towards the Right. Do you want other examples?

- In the city of Xanthi, in the (almost) 100 percent Muslim sections with 3,592 valid votes, PASOK obtained 726 votes (20.2 percent), ND 2,061 (57.3 percent), the KKE 60 (1.6 percent), the KKE (Int.) 17 (0.02 percent) and the "Peace" party 654 (18.2 percent). Here too the Right prevailed.

2. Let us now go to Rodopi to see what is doing there: Here, there was one independent candidate, namely Sabahedin Galip (deputy in 1974 with EK /Center Union/-ND that went over to ND) who received 10,340 votes (16.78 percent) and won relatively close to a victory (the first time), i.e. to become an independent Muslim deputy since the electoral gauge in the nome is 20 percent. Here too the Right showed an increase. (The corresponding figures for 1981 are shown in parentheses).

- PASOK: 22,597 votes, 30.42 percent (19,073 votes, 34.85 percent)
- ND : 37,082 votes, 49.92 percent (20,155 votes, 36.82 percent)
- KKE : 2,154 votes, 2.90 percent (1,525 votes, 2.79 percent)
- KKE (Int.): 484 votes, 0.65 percent (405 votes, 0.74 percent)

We also selected at random eight almost all-out Muslim precincts in the city of Komotini. We have the following:

- PASOK: 416 votes (12.4 percent)
- ND : 2,059 votes (61.6 percent)
- KKE : 41 votes (1.2 percent)
- KKE (Int.): 17 votes (0.4 percent)
- Independents (i.e. Sabahedin Galip) 721 (21.5 percent)

How does that appear to you?

#### Simple Proportional's Would-Be Results

Athens PONDIKI in Greek 7 Jun 85 p 21

/Text/

PASOK	161	137	158
ND	126	123	130
KKE	12	30	11
KKE (Int.)	1	6	1
EPEN *	-	2	-
Liberal Party	-	1	-
ASKE **	1	1	-

\*National Political Union

\*\* Combative Socialist Party of Greece

How does the above table seem to you? Is it not good? The first column shows the seats picked up by the political parties last Sunday; the second column shows what they would have picked up (with exactly the same results) if the simple proportional electoral system had been in effect, namely the one that was in effect in the 1984 Euro-elections; the third column shows what the parties would have received if the Karamanlis-Rallis system in the 1981 parliamentary elections had been in effect.

You should note that the issue of the simple proportional electoral system, that constitutes a permanent demand on the part of the KKE, the KKE (Int.) as well as small parties that now have a voice in the Chamber of Deputies (KODISO /Democratic Socialism Party/, KhD /Christian Democratic/, EDA /United Democratic Left/, EDIK /Democratic Center Union/ and ESPE /United Socialist Front of Greece/) will be of concern to PASOK in this new period. Already, in his (pre-election) television interview at the Zappeion, the prime minister, when asked by the ELEVTHEROTYPIA political editor Ar. Manolakos if he intended to change the electoral law and to establish the simple proportional system "that had been continually called for from 1974 until 1981," answered that "the simple proportional system is the only proper system" and he added the following very interesting comment that we should not forget:

"I have to tell you that what is usually called simple proportional is not in my opinion simple proportional. In other words, the matter of the remainder is not at issue. So that we might be clear we will say that the Euro-elections were of the nature of a genuine simple proportional system because they were direct on a national level, without the intervention of nomes and there were no remainders. This is what I feel within me. And it is, let us say, within human designs, if the opportunity is given us, to move in this direction....."

And he concludes as follows:

"Indeed, I have my reasons, and not only I but the Movement and its leadership, because we did not deem it appropriate at this time to move forward to the simple proportional system. We are talking about the simple proportional. We have said this, and it is in my opinion, a simple proportional system. But it is not the simple proportional as I had previously determined it. There are reasons, Mr Manolakos, and some time when you are free I invite you to come to my house to give you my thoughts."

Our colleague has not yet gone to Kastri, not because he is not free but because the prime minister's schedule is filled. He intends to go even though it would have been more proper, in this second "green" 4-year term, for the prime minister to correct one of his personal faults: his rare to non-existent contact with the press.

In other words: More frequent general briefings through the prime minister's mouth, more direct contact with the press --and by extension with the people.....

#### Economic, Political View

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 6 Jun 85 p 11

/Commentary by K. Kolmer: "The Third Solution;" passages in slantlines printed in boldface/

/Text/ /The real loser in the 2 June elections was not ND but Greece./ This is so because the winner, PASOK, was authorized by the Greek people to continue its



/demolishing job/ to the detriment of the Greek /economy, education, administration and the institutions of democracy/ for another 4 years --of course, if our foreign borrowing permits it. And not unjustifiably so. /Because in the last 3-1/2 years PASOK bought out the votes of the new Greeks by offering loans (foreign borrowing is estimated at 6.5 billion dollars and EEC aid at 3.5 billion dollars) and other opportune moneys totaling 1 trillion drachmas. It also distributed many vain hopes and utopian illusions (for example, modernization without foreign technological knowledge or independent and proud foreign policy with foreign....loans that amount to 2.2 billion dollars annually, etc. etc.) with the result being the /buying out of the greedy big mass of voters./ Thus, 58 percent of the electorate voted Left without prejudice.

#### Extenuating Circumstances

Of course, the Greek people have extenuating circumstances for their choice, for their excessive Leftism: /they were not sufficiently informed during the course of the pre-electoral campaign nor beforehand on the consequences and dangers of PASOK's populist "program."/ And they did not remain unaffected in their judgement from various political extortions, such as the anti-democratic slogan /"The Right, Never Again."/ (Indeed, what does the Right, Never Again mean? /And if the people were to decide "Yes to the Right," would PASOK attempt a coup?/) Also, /"No to the desert islands,"/ "the dossiers have been burned" (note: the latter had in the meantime been microfilmed and...more copies made), etc. etc.

Responsible for this situation is not only the low level of awareness of contemporary reality or the brainwashing of public opinion by the state's mass media /but ND itself./ Because instead of having its electoral campaign concentrate on the genuine problems of the country and in making known the dangers that have come about because of PASOK's Third World doctrines in foreign policy or because of the overburdening of the future of the economy through borrowings /ND bogged down in empty slogans such as untaxed private vehicles and promises for additional allowances and pensions./ It was, however, known that PASOK was and is incomparable in promises and allowances. As for satisfying new allowances, Menippos' caveat holds true for the Greek economy (you cannot collect from somebody who does not have anything).

The third reason for the electoral result of 2 June was /ND's inability to "convince" public opinion about its adequacy to confront the country's contemporary problems. Because its renovation plans were inadequate and its program shallow and deficient./ Also, the absence of any concrete political countenance was evident.

It had a political profile "anything for anyone," as the Swyers poll taking firm had assuredly said. /From democratic socialism to traditional reactionism, everything of that nature was to be found in its electoral basket./

/But Greece, with its vast contemporary problems of underdevelopment and technological backwardness, has no need for a "neo-liberal social Right" party but a patriotic democratic modern party that would have its foundations in the grass roots. In the progressive and creative grass roots, not in amateur politicians.

Greece today needs /a third solution instead of a leftist or rightist prescription. Because to the point where we have arrived, with galloping national recession and the dangers all around, conventional aspirins are not sufficient for the recovery of the country. We need a strong awakening if we want improvement. A deep cut.



## More Patriotism

This cut must not be made on the traditional roots of the tree of the nation but rather on useless limbs that bear barren fruit and false hopes. In other words, modern Greece needs more patriotism and less radicalism.... It needs a democratic way of life rather than a government by the people. /Greater private economy rather than stifling state intervention./

All of the above, of course, cannot be provided by PASOK's national socialism that will now become entrenched since the state belongs to it altogether. /But national socialism and totalitarianism have never been successful for long and have never in the long run avoided Samson's destructive syndrome.

Soon --perhaps very soon-- the Greek people will be called on to pay the cost of its frivolity under very disagreeable conditions. And they will realize their big mistake to always go in the opposite direction or to be very backward for the times, as they have continually acted since November 1920 until now with the known consequences.

## ND's Failings

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 7-13 Jun 85 p 5

/Letter to the editor by "a man of the people"/

/Excerpts/ Criticism is easy, especially with hindsight. And it is even easier when an electoral failure is involved.

A few big fundamental errors were committed by ND that are due once again to the existence of some "closed circles."

The Electoral Campaign Committee (i.e the soul of the campaign) was made up of individuals who had no --absolutely no-- contact with the grass roots. It was primarily made up of the following:

1. A former minister, one of the most dynamic technocratic brains in the country, who, nevertheless, had failed to be elected deputy. An individual of great mental abilities but one who moved about in circles without popular accesses.
2. A technocrat, a company adviser, who it is unknown if he knows any other part of Athens except for its very center. Hard working and educated but one who is ignorant of the desires and feelings of the simple citizen (who constitutes the majority of the Greek people).
3. A politician who had definitely abandoned politics after the electoral failures. He was not cut out for politics and thus developed into a capable technocrat.

What connection do all of these worthy individuals have with the grass roots? Excellent when it comes to figures, to electronics, to office staff duties, they remained "stuck" to their desks. How could they possibly understand what the people wanted when they themselves were ignorant of that? Would the Electoral Campaign Committee been lost if it had one worker, one small businessman, a mere citizen from the public square?

The well-advertised Swyers pollster did not catch the pulse of the people. Its slogans did not have the warmth of the opponent's slogans. Let us take as an example PASOK's basic slogan: "Together we will continue Change." As Mr Laliotis explained to PASOK's committee: "The 'together' moves the audience because indirectly it stigmatizes the arrogance of power, i.e. the primary source of popular dissatisfaction toward us." The Swyers pollster (in truth, except for Mexico, where else has it been able to show successes?) did not agree to work together with Greek communications specialists. Its feeling of self-sufficiency and know-it-all was paid for by an entire party (and perhaps an entire people).

Moreover, communications programs (public relations, advertising and political marketing) are not static. They are not drawn up "once and for all." They are adjusted and revised almost daily in accordance with the reactions of the people.

Did not one of the well-paid Swyers sages "catch on" to the reality that the people waved ND flags and that they (would) vote PASOK?

The persistence on Mr Sartzetakis' politics and future was not made comprehensible to the people. The people did not realize that the constitutional abnormality could have future repercussions on their own freedoms. The people thought that ND was making a political issue because it wanted to bring back the former president of the republic. And the people did not want abnormalities that did not directly concern them.

ND's party mechanism was consumed in impressive demonstrations in urban centers and not in work in towns and villages. PASOK, in turn, worked "door to door" in the towns. Moreover, for this kind of work, PASOK relied primarily on local officials who were known in the region and not on elements brought in from Athens or some nome capital.

These lines are undoubtedly tough. They are, however, honest, while they are not unjust. They honor those who fought (first of all the indefatigable Mitsotakis), those who superhumanly worked (first of all the excellent ONNED /Youth Organization of New Democracy/) and above all the modest anonymous man. The one who alone improvised and reacted by seeking freedom. The one who was not taken into consideration by the "closed" superimposed "circles."

#### ND's Short-Sightedness

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 7-13 June 85 pp 9-10

/ "As I See It" column by N. Delipetros /

/ Excerpt / The analysis of the election results will certainly be the subject of broader and deeper studies. Already the first published reports have appeared all of which have as their common denominator hindsight wisdom.....

It is now being proven that all had anticipated the results! This column had not anticipated them. But it had managed, through one of its articles titled "Notes on Matters of Tactics" --published on 3 May-- to express, in time and without circumlocutions, its disagreement with the priorities being given during the pre-electoral campaign by the electronic Delphian oracles in the Tower of Athens where the campaign staffs had been installed.

The Tower of Athens chewed on laurel leaves and spewed out its electronic oracles. And, unfortunately, Rigillis Street, either because it did not have the time to check the oracles or because it felt religious awe in front of the miraculous electronic equipment, assented and worshipped before the Tower of Athens!

In that particular article, we had protested over the reticence over or neglect of the major national dangers with which we continue to maintain that are connected with PASOK's foreign policy.

The other day, Kostas Mitsotakis, in his post-electoral press conference, gave national issues and issues dealing with the functioning of democracy the priority they deserved. But this occurred the other day, i.e. after the elections.....

Anyhow, it is being shown that the ND leader managed --in record time-- to free himself from the electronic spell and exorcism and to find himself again.

Let the electronic oracles of the Tower of Athens and the amateurs on Rigillis Street cease saying that from the "marketing" survey they had conducted it appears that the people are not interested in national issues! PASOK's American and Greek staff also conducted a "marketing" survey and made use of electronic brains. PASOK's president, based on the data provided him by his staffs, called us "shameful underbidders" on national issues and "enemies of democratic normality!"

The attack made on us by Mr Papandreou on the national area and in the area of the functioning of democracy was continuous and intense.

And we, who had complete justification in all of these areas, and we, who had all the weapons necessary to go on the offensive --to go on the offensive until our opponents were politically crushed-- we set national issues on the margin of the electoral campaign. Because it is what the "marketing" survey of the Tower of Athens had held back!

But some of the "marketing" surveys were not correct. And since PASOK won the elections we may conjecture that at least its own "marketing" surveys were not insured.

Everything presupposes --and very correctly we think-- that the battle between PASOK and ND was scheduled to take place in the centrist area. And that the battle would take place under favorable conditions for ND.

Why? Because PASOK's president had openly flirted with the communist Left and had ostentatiously turned his back to the Center.

Nevertheless, ND, between the 1984 Euro-elections and the 1985 parliamentary elections, did not win centrist votes....

Mr A. Papandreou chased away the centrists but we did not do what was necessary to attract them.

We are burdened with prejudices --"the people do not forget what Right means"-- and slandered in the national arena as organs of foreigners. And we remained silent.

And we changed the topic of conversation. And we brought up only issues that the Tower of Athens' inquiries produced.

We ignored the basic interests, the basic concerns of centrist voters --interests that are linked with national and democratic freedoms. And we put in the shop window --in accordance with the dictates of the "marketing" surveys-- products of general consumption that were plentiful in PASOK's supermarket.

The electoral campaign ended up with our engaging in things in which PASOK is indomitable. This refers to promises for benefits and allowances! PASOK is indomitable in this area because it is unhesitating and resolute.

The Tower of Athens' "marketing" surveys urged us to become "small-time grocers."

And this state of affairs ended up with the following grievous result: not being able to attract centrist votes. We did not attract free, democratic citizens who remain with PASOK even though they curse and are humiliated.

What is happening? Are these citizens masochists? Or was it that we ourselves were incapable of unleashing them from PASOK?

It is certain that the 48.80 percent does not represent PASOK's true strength. It won 5 percent through its unrestrained use of the partisan state and para-state apparatus. Another 5 percent --about 5 percent-- it got from the two communist parties.

Nevertheless, we consider as unfounded and reprehensible the view that the KKE and the KKE (Int.) subsidized PASOK. Both parties waged a tough and consequent battle to hold on to their own strengths.

However, there are not only two leaders of the communist Left --it is not only Kharilaos Florakis and Leonidas Kyrkos. There is also a third leader whose influence in the leftist world is great. And this third leader openly sided --through his public pronouncements-- with PASOK. We guess that it has already become evident that we are talking about Capt Markos Vafeiadis.

Besides Capt Markos and other captains, PASOK's spectacular opening toward the extreme Left also had great influence. This opening to the extreme Left was expressed through such slogans as "The struggle is now being justified" and "The people do not forget what Right means."

It would be better if we stopped talking about subsidizations. Because erroneous evaluations will lead us to laying out an erroneous line.

As is evident, this article was written with indignation but also with a lot of bitterness.

Once again we are seeing that democracy in our land is not an acquisition but remains something to be aspired for. And the bitterness is due to the fact that most of the observations made in this article had already been made on 3 May in this very column! But unfortunately they were not noticed.



To conclude, we will note that Kostas Mitsotakis was the best possible leader we could have had in this campaign. With combativeness, he surpassed the expectations of both his oldest and his most trusted friends.

And it is a shame that the best possible leader had become a prisoner of the worst possible staff.

#### Reasons for ND's Loss

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 7-13 Jun 85 p 16

/Excerpt/ Mr K. Mitsotakis has stated that his party did not lose since it increased its votes. But PASOK's state and para-state won thanks to the unlawful means it used.

This was a basically valid argument that, nevertheless, is not a satisfactory one because it did not justify the defeat. ND people have since then been searching to find the causes for this defeat. They had so much believed in victory.

Now, if we want to pinpoint the reasons for the failure we must find them in the following:

- ND was unable to defend its democratic dedication. And although it did have citations for democratic struggles (anti-dictatorship struggle, plebescites, 10 years of Karamanlis democracy), it left them a little too exposed.
- ND showed a more rightist trend that did not convince older centrists, with the result that although it did win over remnants of EPEN /National Political Union/ it did not succeed in bringing back centrists to the fold.
- Speeches, promises and slogans did not have immediate replies to the expectations of the people.
- Coalitions, despite some renovative effects, did not signal ND's shifting from its former positions since within such coalitions there continue to prevail individuals who for a significant segment of public opinion of the party were corrupt.

Together with the above points, there should also be added a whole series of tactical errors, errors that K. Mitsotakis agreed had been committed (as, for example, the untimely brining up of the Sartzetakis issue).

ND lost its second round although it had many, very many prospects for success. And now it is proceeding to organize its third round with many hopes, despite temporary discouragement, and with vast experience.

#### PASOK Hardliners Seen Winning

Athens ENA in Greek 6 Jun 85 p 9

/Text/ PASOK is developing a new political reality: it is changing, more than in 1981, the political map of the country. Sunday's electoral results permit the government party to feel stronger now and to have more self-confidence than 4 years ago when it first took over power.



The "leftist choices," on which its pre-electoral campaign was based, are proving to be correct, as evidenced by the electoral results. They certainly mark its future course in power. Because it will seek to "embody" the "borrowed" votes, given to it in a percentage greater than the losses of the communist parties, so that PASOK might constitute a barrier to any return of the Right to power.

A cool evaluation of the percentages gained by PASOK throughout the country reinforces the view that it won "ideological votes" at the same ratio in both the rural areas and in the cities. Its predominance in the big urban centers is convincing that a large number of voters put aside economic problems and quality of life issues and made their choice exclusively on ideological criteria. Thus, the confirmation of the view of those who had advised "a more leftist turn," indeed with aggressive tactics, reinforces the role of the "intransigent partisans" who, of course, will demand its continuation. And the leadership cannot follow any other path. The election results are crystal clear on this point. After 3-1/2 years of power, its relationship toward the Right has been strongly marked out. The voters, who prior to 1981 used to vote ND or Center and who contributed to the 48 percent of PASOK's first electoral victory, made definite their choice by an overwhelming majority last Sunday. Because, if in 1981 they cast their votes for PASOK --PASOK that was still untried in power-- in the hope of getting a better government, in 1985 they at last cast a vote of their choice, tested and tried from its 3-1/2 years in office. In other words, those who remained in PASOK "put up" with the effects of the bad course of the economy, the mistakes and the severe ideological turnabout in PASOK's decision over the presidency of the republic.

It is therefore logical for the partisans who imposed this tactic and who were proved right by the election results, to demand that it be continued. The aggressive tactic toward the communist area that was considered by many as a bold one also had a positive effect. It is now easy for voters in this category to be embodied in PASOK. They too "put up" with the tough offensive of the two communist parties and they again cast their votes for PASOK in an even greater number.

Besides, Andreas Papandreu knows that it would be practically difficult for him to exercise a "two dimensional" policy. The slight drop in the KKE's strength compared to its 1981 percentage is not particularly great but in figures it puts the party in the 10 percent range, it gives it a good alibi in its "talks" especially in foreign issues. But, of course, this cannot be used in the planning that will take place for the "embodiment" of voters of leftist origin.

And Papandreu also knows that from the time his party imposed "a correction of the line" --abandonment of the "conservative guarantees" policy with the presence of K. Karamanlis in the presidency of the republic-- the probability of the "Andreassization" of power both in the party and government was almost eliminated. And he knows better --following Sunday's results-- that the grass roots, the voters, approve of this tactic.

So, PASOK must move more to the Left so as to secure its "frontiers" on this side too.

Of course, this "obligatory course" will increase problems since the existence of a government opposition with 41 percent of the vote cannot be cast aside with such aphorisms as "the people have thrown you into the ash heap of.....history."

PASOK, freed to a great extent from its obligations of the first 4-year term of office to balance out its actions to the Right and Left, is rewriting the political map of the country. A party of a most broad ideological spectrum, it no longer needs to be based on the "bugbear of the Right" so as to implement its policy. With one "of its own" as president of the republic, with complete control of the state and with voters of all hues who "put up" with the tough presidential game, it is now much stronger than in 1981.

5671

CSO: 3521/275

9 July 1985

POLITICAL

GREECE

## KYP ACCUSED OF CYPRIOT ILLEGAL ARMS ISSUE

## ND Denounces PASOK 'Caper'

Athens | VRADYNI in Greek 29 May 85 pp 1, 17

/Excerpts/ A devilish PASOK plan to accuse ND of supposedly undermining normalcy has been revealed virtually at the last moment /before the election/. PASOK operatives were to bring arms and munitions to Greece from Cyprus. Then, those who conceived the devilish plan would have them "discovered" in two apartments in Athens and blame cadres of the ND party.

The "discovery of the arsenal"--according to this plan--would take place tomorrow, Thursday, to coincide with the speech of the ND leader to the Athenian people at Constitution Square, in order to influence public opinion and allow PASOK leader Papandreou to exploit it in his speech on Friday /the following day/.

In this satanic plan, which smacks of the Mafia, PASOK had full cooperation of its sister socialist party in Cyprus, the United Democratic Union of the Center /EDEK/ of Vasos Lyssaridis. In Cyprus, the plan was under the direction of the EDEK military section chief who came to Athens to contact members of the PASOK Executive Bureau.

ND has full details of the plan and knows the PASOK criminal minds directing it; ND denounces it to the Greek people.

According to cross-checked reports the two PASOK agents, Zisimos and Dimitriou, merchants, bought the arms and munitions in Cyprus with the help of the EDEK military section chief. They loaded them in containers on ships going to Salonica and Crete with a cargo of bananas!

Panic stricken by the accusation/bomb of ND, the PASOK government did not dare deny the reports, but through the Athens Press Agency tried to 'muddy the waters.' Nameless government sources issued a release stating that police officials Roumeliotis and Dimitropoulos, who are said to work with merchants Zisimos and Dimitriou, went to Cyprus to search for the terrorist Ayraam Lesperoglou! And this...one month before the Gyzi slaughter and the announcement that Lesperoglou and G. Balafas were being sought! The two police officials did not find Lesperoglou, according to the nameless government sources, and came back to Athens on 24 April.

In spite of specific reports reaching the appropriate authorities, the Greek government ordered an end to the investigation of this matter, which nevertheless moves toward implementation on the basis of a plan which provides:

--for the shipment of arms and munitions to Salonica in containers and then their transfer to two apartments in Athens; and

--for the shipment of the rest of the weapons to Crete in a ship carrying bananas.

According to our information, those who conceived the plan wanted to discover the weapons and then accuse ND of getting arms on the eve of the election to possibly cause unrest.

#### EDEK Explains

A press release by EDEK last night--carried by the Athens Press Agency around midnight--claimed that it does not have any involvement in "shady deals of arms smuggling or information peddling." It also stated that EDEK has no military section.

It is interesting that EDEK does not deny the contacts its representative had on this issue with members of the PASOK Executive Bureau.

#### Accusation Against KYP

Athens PONDIKI in Greek 24 May 85 p 6

/Excerpt/ As is known, ND came out with its excrement vessel on Tuesday evening to tell us that two "flowers" called Zisimos and Dimitriou showed up in Cyprus seeking to buy arms to bring to Greece (Crete and Salonica) so the authorities could "discover" them and then...accuse ND. It is also pointed out that the caper was being assisted by Lyssaridis and his EDEK party and coordinated by certain high-level PASOK officials with police officers Roumeliotis and Dimitropoulos.

The government replied that these were police officers trying to find something about the "terrorist" Lesperoglou, and they had gone to Cyprus because of reports that Lesperoglou's girlfriend was there. But it seems that something else was behind all this and in the end PASOK stepped on the banana peel because it followed its beloved tactic of keeping the press in the dark until too late.

PONDIKI has learned from Cyprus that this story started a month and a half ago when the two rascals /Zisimos and Dimitriou/ showed up and sought to buy arms in the open. In fact, they were located by EDEK people who realized that something smelled bad, since those two said they did not want the weapons for resale but for something else. They even said that the caper would be done through Crete.

The EDEK people notified the Cypriot Intelligence Service /KYP/ which in turn notified the Greek KYP. They were put under surveillance, both here and in Cyprus, but then it was discovered that these two persons had their own connections. Those connections were with some other KYP types, Greek and Rightwingers; the official KYP leadership was in the dark about all this. It would be a mistake to think that today KYP is controlled by PASOK.

Anyway, through the surveillance of these two persons it was found that they wanted to let everyone know they wanted the merchandise before the election. The brains of official KYP eventually came to grasp that these two were trying to set up some kind of conspiracy. At that time they turned all their attention to the way they could foil it.

But instead of letting the story out in order to turn the bomb into a dud, they decided to wait until the arms were purchased so they could catch the two rascals redhanded! Of course, those two did not buy any guns but ND got the publicity it wanted by exploiting the provocation. It is a setup while the PASOK men still wait on the shores of Crete for the arrival of the weapons and catch the two rascals on the spot.

Do you understand now why the electoral battle is carried out? The Right knows by losing again this time it should forget the state and its mechanisms...

7520

CSO: 3521/269



POLITICAL

GREECE

# GOVERNMENT'S INATTENTION TO ELLINIKON AIRPORT SCORED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 20 Jun 85 p 4

[Article: "Anti-Elliniko..."]

[Excerpts] Within the past 10 years, we have regularly written about the fact that Ellinikon Airport is sick.

Not once, but uncounted times have we described the many symptoms--some slight and some more serious--which differentiate it from other European airports.

Under PASOK and before PASOK, we have written about the general atmosphere of disorder, the sadistic attitude toward the hapless traveler, the way he is mistreated, the long lines at arrival, the non-existent carts, the customs checks that follow the mood--good or bad--of the moment, the fight for taxis, which await defenseless foreigners like birds of prey.

Of course, it is not difficult to guess that there are more serious symptoms which are not seen by passengers.

But they are seen by others, by the specialists, by the foreigners, by the technical people, by our own and by foreign airline pilots and by the inspectors of the IATA, the international organization that monitors airline travel around the world.

But even their observations are met with the same disdain that greets ours. Not long ago, on 19 November 1984, we begged the then minister, I. Papadonikolakis, to pay more attention to the airport. He did nothing, proved himself to be indifferent and useless, did not reply, and our airports remained in the same dreadful condition.

If you watched yesterday's news broadcasts, I will beg you to forget them. They were full of lies. A minister had also been dragooned and, from the safety of the box, without anyone being around to expose his untruths, he accumulated a whole series of them--and we use the term in order to be polite.

And now the truth:

Foreign airlines have been expressing their concern for a long time about the lack of security at Greek airports...

I quote from page 6 of THE TIMES of Tuesday 18 June:

"Last April, 40 airlines serving Athens sent a telegram to the Greek prime minister expressing their deep concern about the lack of security at the Athens airport." Not one, but 40 airlines signed the telegram to Mr Papandreou, who refused to reply. The telegram had apparently been prompted by the incident at Ellinikon on 4 April 1985 [when a Jordanian aircraft with 62 passengers and 13 crew members aboard was attacked on a runway]. Since the attack failed and there were no victims, it did not meet with the publicity it deserved. However, it was spectacular...

Nothing proves more spectacularly the Greek guilt than the almost hysterical reaction of the government vis-a-vis the justified--and quite restrained--foreign concern. What don't we tell these poor Americans! What don't we accuse them of! They gathered at the Pentagon under the chairmanship of President Reagan and drew up a plan of action, not against the Shiites, who are holding their hostages, but against Greece... And our government warns: "If this policy continues, there will be consequences..."

"Did you hear what they said on TV? For whose sake are they telling all those stories? Aren't they ashamed of themselves?"

No, they are not ashamed, since lies are accepted by Greeks, if not by foreigners. Why shouldn't they be served to them, why shouldn't they nourish their faithful with copious portions, richly bathed in a PASOK sauce?

CSO: 3521/278

POLITICAL

GREECE

'CONSPIRATORIAL' VIEWS SEEN AFFECTING NATIONAL ETHOS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 22 Jun 85 p 4

[Article by Takis Mikhas: "Foreign Plots"]

[Excerpts] The recent statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs I. Kharalambopoulos, according to which the reaction to the government's handling of the hijacking is due to a "foreign plot" bring back into actuality the role played by conspiratorial theories in the political life of present-day Greece.

Whether it is a political event such as, for instance, the Cypriot issue, or a natural catastrophe like a forest fire, the cause is always sought first among the "dark forces" that provoked it.

Systematically cultivated by a large part of the press and encouraged by the domestic political and intellectual leadership, the prevailing view tends to interpret each event as part of a huge foreign conspiracy targeted against Greece and its citizens.

At the same time, there are very few political commentators who do not pepper their analyses with references to "foreign fingers," "secret forces," "underhanded plans of dark circles," "foreign undermining," etc.

There are various opinions on the birth and existence of such conspiratorial theories. Some maintain that these are perfectly understandable reactions of small and weak countries, whose fate is always dependent on the Big Ones.

However, there are other small, weak countries such as, for instance, Denmark and Holland in which, were a political leader to use the words "dark forces" and "plots," he would be sent to the nearest psychiatric hospital.

There are others who, starting out from the observation that such theories usually appear in underdeveloped countries. Economic activity in them is viewed as a "zero-sum game" (your death, my life) in which the adversaries attempt to divide an existing pie, rather than an activity that creates new wealth.

This type of situation involves an atmosphere of michiavellian intrigue, thus contributing to the cultivation of a favorable climate for the development of political conspiratorial theories.

Those views that maintain that conspiratorial theories in present-day Greece are nothing more than popularized transubstantiations of views of the world stemming from Eastern Orthodoxy are particularly interesting.

Specifically, we are talking about a view that considers the Orthodox flock as the Chosen People, whose role in this world consist in carrying out a certain Civilizing Mission.

Also according to this view of the world, the Chosen People moves within an essentially adversary environment, constantly surrounded by Enemies who are busily strewing obstacles in its path and are undermining its task.

Beyond the question of the birth of these conspiratorial theories, there is no doubt that they fulfill an important psychological function. By placing the individual at the center of a world conspiracy, they respond to his psychological need for recognition and acceptance by others.

When, for instance, the civil servant leaves his office, having exhausted his creativity analyzing the coffee grounds and some soccer player's deftness with the ball, is there anything more satisfying and more reassuring about his own being than reading in the press that the president of the United States does nothing more during his entire day than plot against us?

CSO: 3521/2997

POLITICAL

GREECE

PASOK ATTITUDE VIS-A-VIS KKE: THEN AND NOW

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 20 Jun 85 p 1

[Text] The presidency of the Chamber of Deputies was completed last night with the choice of vice presidents and secretaries, who belong to only two parties: the PASOK and the New Democracy. The president of the Chamber, I. Alevras, rejected the candidacy of Maria Damanaki for the position of secretary of the second opposition party, arguing that the KKE does not, according to the rules of the electoral law, fulfill the conditions that would acknowledge it as a party (10 percent nationwide or 15 deputies). The KKE had been in exactly the same position in 1977, and it had met with the same rejection on the part of the then president of the Chamber, Dim. Papaspyrou. But there are two significant differences: 1. The KKE candidacy then enjoyed the warm personal support of Mr Papandreou, who had declared that the PASOK believed the KKE should have a place in the presidency of the Chamber, even if the preconditions set by the Chamber regulations were not present; 2. D. Papaspyrou had agreed to let Ms Damanaki's candidacy come to a vote, in contrast with Mr Alevras, who rejected it yesterday out of hand. It should be noted that at that time, 13 PASOK deputies had disagreed with the party line, which had been very clearly expressed before the vote by Mr Papandreou...

However, the most impressive part is not Mr Alevras' strict implementation of the Chamber regulations, nor the fact that the government spokesman did not reply to the question asked yesterday at noon concerning the reasons for the change of attitude by the PASOK in this issue. The most surprising part is the mildness with which the parliamentary representative of the KKE, Mr Kaloudis, reacted to this very severe application of the regulations. He did not even comment on it...

CSO: 3521/278



POLITICAL

ICELAND

#### POLL FINDS INCREASED SUPPORT FOR COALITION GOVERNMENT

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 31 May 85 p 3

[Hagvang Public Opinion Survey: "Support for the Government Has Increased During the Last Three Months"]

[Text] Around 52 percent of voters support the government and 47.5 are opposed to it. These are the results of a Hagvang Inc. public opinion poll conducted earlier this month and based only upon those who took a position. Those participating came from all of Iceland and numbered a thousand in all. Compared to the results of a survey taken last February, support for the government has increased by 2.3 percentage points.

Support for the government is greater among men than women, 59.7 percent of men are in favor of it and 40.3 percent opposed. Among women on the other hand 55 percent are against the government and 45 percent say that they are in favor of it.

If those either refusing to answer or undecided (13.4 percent) are taken into account, the government enjoys the support of 45.5 percent of the voters and 41.1 percent are opposed to it. In the above mentioned February poll these same figures were 41.9 percent and 41.5 percent.

The greatest support for the government is in areas of scattered settlement with 66.7 percent of those questioned there saying that they supported the government and that is only for those taking position. In the capital district, 51.6 percent are in favor of the government and 48.8 percent are opposed.

The table below shows changes in support for the Icelandic government according to polls of Hagvang Inc. from April 1984 to May 1985.




Table 1: Public Opinion Poll on Support for Icelandic Government

Key: (1) "Do you support or do you not support the present Iceland Government?"

(2) Support

(3) Do not support

(4) Only those taking a position are included

9857

CSO: 3636/38

POLITICAL

ICELAND

# POLL FINDS ICELANDERS MOST CONCERNED ABOUT INFLATION, WAGES

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 1 Jun 85 p 4

[Hagvang Public Opinion Survey: "Inflation and Low Wages Are Considered the Greatest Problems"]

[Text] In a Hagvang Inc. public opinion poll conducted earlier this month 12.6 percent of those questioned said that inflation was the greatest Icelandic problem and the numbers of those so answering had decreased from February when the same figure was 19 percent. On the other hand, the number of those thinking that low wages is the greatest problem has increased, now 12.0 percent compared to 7.2 percent before.

Around one of every ten persons questioned said that Iceland's economic position is the greatest problem and 10.6 percent said overconsumption. The table at the end of the article shows how the views of respondents varied on various issues. For comparison the major results of previous polls are also provided.

Also asked along with the question as to what was Iceland's greatest problem was a question as to whether or not the person responding believed that it would be possible to solve the problem in the next year. Around 37 percent said that it would be possible to a substantial degree, 31.4 percent said to some degree, 12.5 percent said to a small degree and 7.4 percent thought the problem unsolvable.

The Havang public opinion survey involved 1,000 Icelanders and was conducted, as has been mentioned above, earlier this month.

	<u>April 1985</u>	<u>July 1985</u>	<u>Sept. 1984</u>	<u>Feb. 1985</u>	<u>May 1985</u>
<u>Problem</u>					
Inflation	12.4%	12.0%	10.3%	19.0%	12.6%
Low Wages	7.3%	8.7%	9.9%	7.2%	12.0%
Economic Condition	19.8%	10.3%	8.5%	13.6%	10.9%
Overconsumption	15.9%	10.9%	10.3%	10.7%	10.6%
Alcohol/Narcotics				4.3%	8.0%
Foreign Debt					3.3%

Table 1: Results of Public Opinion Poll on Icelandic Problems

POLITICAL

ICELAND

GOVERNMENT CRITICIZED IN HANDLING NUCLEAR ARMS BAN

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 1 Jun 85 p 9

[Commentary by Staksteinar: "From NT and the World Press"]

[Excerpts] Subject of Staksteinar today are news of Iceland in the world press in connection with the discussion here on nuclear weapons. The matter is a complex and emotional one that can certainly be misunderstood if the greatest care is not exercised.

News of Iceland in the World Press

In a comparatively short period of time Iceland has twice appeared in the world press in connection with Althing discussions on nuclear weapons. The first time was on account on the words of Icelandic Foreign Minister Geir Hallgrimsson on the movement of ships with nuclear weapons within Icelandic waters and the second on account of the Foreign Affairs Committee proposal to the Althing on Disarmament. In both cases the foreign press has said that there is reason for concern. It was stated in the first instances abroad that the position of the Icelandic Foreign Minister is the same as that of the Government of New Zealand, which is not true. If the policy of Iceland in this area is to be compared with that of any other country it would be best to look at Norway.

In the second of the two connections there was published in the pages of the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE a news item reproduced above [not published]. As can be seen from it, the item is assigned to the Reuters News Agency and in it it is reported that the Althing has unanimously resolved to make Iceland into a "nuclear-free-zone."

Whatever people will wish to say about the Althing resolution and however they will wish to interpret it, it is not possible to come to the conclusion that through it Iceland has been declared a "nuclear-free-zone." That concept has, to be sure, the same murky meaning as the proposal of the Foreign Affairs Committee as a whole, sufficient distinction is, however, made in the "mass media discussions" that people can realize that Iceland has not declared itself a nuclear-free-zone.

Although politicians make a big thing about making peace with one another in peace and disarmament matters in the Icelandic Althing, they should be careful in making resolutions in these areas that these resolutions are so clear and certain that they cannot be misunderstood. It is also important that those who have duty of explaining to foreigners what is being done in these matters in Iceland should discuss the matters in such a way that there will be no misunderstanding of Icelandic policy in this weighty area. This was the case, however, in both of the cases mentioned above.

9857

CSO: 3636/38



POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

# PCP, MDP SIGN AGREEMENT ON ELECTORAL COOPERATION

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 27 May 85 p 5

[Excerpts] Yesterday, the secretary general of the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] announced that his party has signed an electoral protocol with the MDP/CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Commission] with a view to competing once again as a coalition in the United People's Alliance (APU) in the elections for the self-governing bodies.

Alvaro Cunhal, speaking at the closing session of the PCP National Conference on Local Government and Self-Governing Body Elections, held in Lisbon with about 1200 delegates participating, added that the communists have also reached agreement, in similar fashion, with The Greens (Os Verdes) so that "they will continue to run on the APU slates."

Cunhal said the goal is "to win a great APU victory in the self-governing body elections in 1985."

## APU Slates in 305 Municipalities

According to the conclusions of the conference, the APU will nominate candidates for the self-governing bodies in 305 municipalities and more than 3,000 parishes.

The document approved sets forth the goals of "dedicated, objective and honest" work together with the officials elected by other forces, participation by the people in resolving problems, and the rendering of regular accounts to the people.

On the other hand, it urges mobilization of the workers in the self-governing bodies, reorganization and reequipping of services, saving resources, and adopting modern and scientific methods and techniques.

In the urban development and soil policy areas, it calls for the drafting of plans for the rational use of the territory, concern with the environment and support of the housing, economic and self-construction cooperatives.

In its conclusions, the conference also urges strengthening of literacy efforts, support of cultural activities, the drafting of an inventory and

classification and preservation of cultural assets, support of athletics, health education and development of the level of equipment construction for the support of children and the elderly.

#### Views of Carlos Costa

Moreover, in the course of the opening session at the conference, Carlos Costa, a member of the Secretariat of the Political Commission, expressed the view that the success of the APU in the self-governing bodies has to do with the fact that its administration is "open and involves participation," with "conscious and self-sacrificing" work and mobilization of the workers in the self-governing bodies and direct administration of a majority of the projects.

On the other hand, Carlos Costa stressed "the great opening toward unity" which has occurred in the discussions with a view to drafting the APU slates for the election programs. He said that this alliance will include candidates who were affiliated with other parties on the slates, with independents having considerable weight.

The communist leader presented figures on APU administration of the self-governing bodies to the conference, stressing the excellent results obtained by the alliance in the councils where it has a majority--in 55 municipalities and 335 parishes.

5157

CSO: 3542/183

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

#### MDP/CDE LEADER DENIES COMMUNIST AFFILIATION

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 30 May 85 p 4

[Interview with Dr Helena Cidade Moura, vice president of the MDP/CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement/Electoral Commission], by Joao Rosa in Sao Bento; date not given]

[Excerpts] "No! Neither I nor the MDP/CDE is communist!" The vice president of that organization, Dr Helene Cidade Moura, who is also vice president of its national political commission and an outstanding member of the national board of that party, assured us.

This statement was made, along with others of considerable political significance, during the interview she granted us in Sao Bento. We found her there in friendly and enthusiastic dialogue with another woman involved in culture and politics, Natalia Correia.

#### Democracy Not Yet Institutionalized

[Question] One matter is still being discussed: As vice president of the MDP/CDE, do you see yourself, and do you see your party, as communist, or not?

Dr Helena Cidade Moura smiled but answered quite spontaneously.

[Answer] No! Neither I nor the MDP/CDE is communist. There will be individuals who make communist, socialist and even perhaps almost social democratic choices within the MDP/CDE. The MDP/CDE is simply a party of democrats. Therefore it is also a party of the future and with a future.

#### The Communists and Alliances

However, a doubt remained in our minds as to the political party approach to the situation, particularly, moreover, in terms of the recent past. Why is it that the MDP/CDE continues to have the communists as its preferred allies, as it always has had? Helena Cidade Moura believes that the fact "is that there was never another possibility."

[Question] The PS [Socialist Party], then, could never have played that role?

[Answer] The problem is that no one every knows where the PS is on the political party chessboard. The PS has served for a time in government, in power, in state politics, diverging greatly, and this has been the case, from the guidelines of the MDP/CDE. Apart from this, the truth is that the Communist Party (PCP) has a great advantage in terms of alliances. It does not hinder us in alliances--we have the greatest independence--and then, it is a party which meets its responsibilities in terms of its promises.

[Question] In October of last year, the MDP/CDE proposed dialogue with the government, for which it was criticized at that time by the PCP. After some months, does the MDP/CDE still believe, as it did then, that its partner in the APU [United People's Alliance] lacked political justification for this criticism, or did this proposed dialogue with the PS/PSD [Social Democratic Party] government basically result in frustration?

[Answer] We believe it was a serious error for the PCP to criticize this proposal of ours for dialogue with the government, just as it was a serious error for Dr Mario Soares to reject it, in terms of practical results. As a consequence, there was in the end no dialogue.

Our interlocutor stressed this, visibly irritated with the PCP and Dr Mario Soares, from the political point of view.

#### Presidential Election Is Not the Solution

[Question] The coming presidential election almost seems at present to offer an "open sesame" for the national crisis, a decisive factor. Will that be the case?

[Answer] I do not share the idea that political facts can resolve basic situations. What was important was to find a president of the republic who would continue the 25 April revolution.

As to Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, it is a secret to no one that, although this is not perhaps true of all the members of my party, she is recognized by at least a majority of them, including myself, as identifiable with the political line of the MDP/CDE.

As to Mario Soares, he is merely an individual I respect, among other things because we were university students together, but he has pursued paths which from the political point of view have taken him far away from us.

Regarding Freitas do Amaral, he merits our consideration as a man of law who is consistent, and as such, he is a candidate who would bring no shame to the people of Portugal.

5157

CSO: 3542/192

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

OTELO SOUNDED FOR POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY

Lisbon TAL & QUAL in Portuguese 3 May 85 p 3

[Excerpts] He is imprisoned at Caxias but the proponents of his candidacy say that the authorities are obliged to release him for the electoral campaign.

A group of civilians and military of the revolutionary left is preparing the candidacy of Oteló Saraiva de Carvalho for the presidency, one of the promoters told TAL & QUAL. It only remains to be known whether the former commanding officer of the COPCON [Continental Operations Command] is willing to enter the race.

The first answer came a few days ago. "In principle I am not interested in running," said Oteló to those proposing his candidacy. With an important reservation: "Unless they have a solid plan that convinces me..." Countered the promoters: "There will be a plan in his hands before the middle of May."

Militants of the revolutionary left predominate in the group preparing the candidacy. There are elements of the former FUP, [United People's Front] rank and file soldiers, leftists without a party and, our source assures us, members of the Communist Party who consider it to be elementary justice to publicly refurbish the image of Oteló."

The promotion committee has not got beyond the debating phase of a basic program, which itself is not completely worked out. According to a supporter contacted by TAL & QUAL, "was to ascertain whether Oteló was at all receptive to the idea." According to the same source the "No, unless" of the lieutenant colonel "left all doors open, based on the proposition that there are guarantees of efficient and cohesive work." This guarantee has probably already been given to the potential candidate.

The fact that Oteló is confined at Fort Caxias awaiting trial for possible implication in the activities of the Popular Forces 25 April, does not seem to worry his supporters. "According to the Electoral Law he can perfectly well be a candidate until his guilt is proved," sources close to Oteló stated to TAL & QUAL. Should the presidential candidacy of Saraiva de Carvalho materialize, it would satisfy a wing of the radical left that "is not disposed to vote for the PCP," they said.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

# MILITARY SEEN FACED WITH INTERVENTION DILEMMA

Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese 30 Apr 85 p 2

[Article by Jaime Nogueira Pinto; "The Dilemma of the Military"]

[Text] Gen Altino de Magalhaes was the first military person--and the only one so far--to present his candidacy for the presidency. After the refusal of Gen Firmino Miguel--a refusal based not only on personal and family reasons given but also on the uncertainty, the folly and the divisions of the barons of the PSD (Social Democratic Party), where everybody talks about change but nobody can even come up with a minimal plan for change--the only military person with the strength and prestige to win the presidential race seems to be Gen Lemos Ferreira, who for the time being has reserved his decision.

In military circles the basic question has been posed, and it concerns fundamentally the ethics and functions of the Institution.

The main leaders of the military establishment are aware of the historic role of that institution as an arbiter and that should the party system self-destruct, the resulting vacuum would offer an ideal field of maneuver for a leftist subversive process that socio-economic conditions, destruction of civil society, and growing terrorism would prepare and facilitate.

They feel as well that if on the one hand the "Europeanization" of institutions and pressures of the Allies run contrary to intervention, it would be tolerated in a situation of chaos. There is already talk of a "Turkish model," and there is a certain interest at headquarters in this mode of intervention, which according to some analysts lately popular with the military is the swiftest, least costly and most efficient for avoiding the brutal confrontation and climate of pre-civil war that the financial situation might bring about in the medium term.

There are also strong pressures in the sense of an "availability for intervention," based on the idea that since the military bear the historical responsibility for the 25th of April and what followed, civilian society expects from them a reparation in the form of a cleansing action which would regulate and redistribute the cards and also the rules of the game in a stymied and corrupted regime.

For this intervention, it has been said, it is essential that the military be outside party politics and not subjected to the continuous attrition of the

political classes. In fact, the "return to barracks" would be a sine qua non for maintaining arbitral power and would never be thought of in any other way.

The speech made by Gen Lemos Ferreira during the 25 April military ceremonies also seemed to be moving in this direction when he mentioned the role of the national institutions in the life of the country. However, we also know that certain elements inside and outside the political class continue to pressure Gen Lemos Ferreira to present his candidacy, which would have the advantage of uniting the forces to the right of the PS [Socialist Party]. Being above parties, such a candidacy responds to the profound aspirations of the voters and identifies with change in the system. And that cannot be said of the candidacy of Professor Freitas do Amaral, a respected figure, but who would not present a strong enough image of change.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

# NEW INTELLIGENCE SERVICES MAY BE IN PLACE BY SUMMER

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 25 May 85 p 7

[Article by J.C.V.: "President and Government Accelerate Creation of Intelligence Services"]

[Text] Fear of a possible government crisis and the urgent need to face alleged threats to the "internal and external security of the State," must have determined the haste with which the government and the president of the republic have struggled in recent days with the documents for regulating the activities of the intelligence services, which now lack only the approval of Ramalho Eanes before becoming effective by next summer.

Circles linked to the organization of the Intelligence System of the Republic (SIRP) foresee that it will be provided with a sufficient structure for its operations 6 months after the regulations go into effect, therefore, only a delay in their approval--caused, for example, by the need for legislative ratification--will cause Portugal not to have a complete intelligence structure early in 1986.

It will take 3 or 4 years for the entire "machine" to be installed, but those responsible for the organization of the services told EXPRESSO that the fact that centers for collection and treatment of security intelligence, with special prominence given to the military subordinated to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces, will allow results to be obtained earlier.

Several government agencies have in recent times echoed the concerns expressed by police and military authorities with respect to "threats" existing either on the level of terrorism or the activities of foreign espionage services, both of which, allegedly, are causing some unease among Portuguese authorities.

Although the sources with whom EXPRESSO made contact have shown themselves to be divided as to the level of seriousness of the existing "threats," the truth is that the obvious urgency for turning the still unfinished documents into law led to a consensus between the president and the government.

Less than 2 weeks ago, the Executive Branch initially sent the regulatory documents for the SIRP to Belem, documents which aroused some reservations in Eanes, for which reason he returned them to Sao Bento where they were reevaluated by the Council of Government last Thursday, approved once more and sent to the Presidency.

#### The Objections of Belem

Eanes returned them to the government because he considered the foundations of the documents to be insufficient and because of some doubts he had as to their clarity and objectives, as well as because of his disagreement with their content (in at least one specific case), not without explicitly stating that his reasons were not such that they would prevent approval if the Council of Ministers decided to keep the initial wording.

The objections raised by the president were primarily of a formal nature, specifically in that which deals with the areas of the people's rights and safeguards.

In the opinion of Eanes, we managed to learn, the protection of these rights was not sufficiently safeguarded because the citizens would rarely be given the opportunity to question the criteria used by the intelligence services (possibly violators of their freedom and tranquility), in addition to the fact that oversight authority over the activities of the services was revealed to be very restrictive. On the other hand, in that which has to do directly with the military intelligence services, the president of the republic believes that different criteria is applied to the civilian personnel of these services than those which are stipulated for those in the other services.

In its meeting on Thursday, the Council of Ministers supposedly only agreed with part of the reservations indicated by Eanes, believing that the measures stipulated in the regulatory documents are basically justified by Law 30/80 creating the SIRP and which was approved without objections by Ramalho Eanes.

However, the government agreed to introduce some changes of a "formal nature" before returning the documents to Eanes.

According to an Executive Branch source, additional explanations are given to Eanes in the note accompanying those documents, while it is admitted that changes are being made in the question of the statutes for civilian personnel in the military services.

#### The Organization of the SIRP

In addition to the Military Intelligence Service (SIM), the SIRP will be made up of the Security Intelligence Service (SIS) under the supervision of the minister of internal administration; the Strategic Defense Intelligence Service (SIED) under the supervision of the prime minister, who may delegate it to the minister of defense.

Also part of the organization of the system are the Oversight Council elected by the Assembly of the Republic; a Superior Intelligence Council (a coordinating body headed by the chief of government) and a Technical Commission.

According to the sources with whom EXPRESSO made contact, the urgency being applied in the approval of the collection of documents that will regulate the services, and which Eanes has recognized as being necessary, may lead to the quick appointment (in coming months) of the first officials, to be followed by the intensive training of the personnel who would make up the services, specifically by means of courses to be taken abroad.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

CHURCH APPEARS APPREHENSIVE ABOUT EEC MEMBERSHIP

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 26 May 85 p 8

[Editorial: "The Bishops and the EEC"]

[Text] There is no doubt that the Portuguese episcopate has shown a mediative concern with national life recently. Its positions on the most varied issues, many of which generously exceed the field of religious concern, very clearly reveal its determination to appear--or to impose itself--increasingly as an essential interlocutor whose authorized statements will, in its view, have the same weight and force in the eyes of political officials as those of any other social partner. As which, after all, it wants to be recognized.

It is along these lines, naturally, that the position underwritten by the bishops' conference concerning the approaching membership of the country in the European Community, which was announced in the communication just published, must be interpreted.

Thus for the Portuguese church, we learn from a reading of this document, membership in the EEC may, or even will, constitute the most important and significant fact in our modern history, following the end of the imperial cycle, along with decolonization, imposed by the events of 25 April.

The 10 years which have elapsed between that decisive event and what will occur next 1 January will thus serve as an "intermezzo," the necessary and essential interval in which the people and the nation which we are can recover from the traumas which inevitably occurred and reestablish their own identity.

But will this be the opportune time for this to occur, in fact? Without saying so openly, the Portuguese church nonetheless seems to have some doubts in this connection, as well as serious concerns. The statement issued by the bishop's conference makes this clear. Above all, with regard to the danger that we might find ourselves transformed into a fief of the great industrial powers which in truth govern the EEC, and might be cleverly "colonized" by them.

In the view of the Portuguese bishops, the so-called and presumed reestablishment of our European identity which is to occur soon may in the final analysis, and ironically, constitute the irreparable loss of that

identity. In their view it involves our very special conduct as a "charitable" people, as we have always been known, God-fearing and given to "moderation and the humanizing of traditions," and duty bound "to do everything to halt the wave of paganism which may mortally wound the human and Christian soul of the West."

The statement by the bishops' conference will seek above and beyond everything else to serve as a harsh warning and, in the final analysis, to alert our awareness, just a few months away from our entry into the EEC, about the results of which, both positive and negative and on all levels, the popular strata still, even now, lack any concrete notion. Or, to be more precise, this development is being viewed hesitantly rather than with truly excited enthusiasm and happy confidence. Seemingly this is true for the bishops too, who see the EEC, which we are to join, more as a venal and corrupt courtesan, or a pagan and oppressive Babylon, than as the truly sweet and longed-for harbinger dove of the postdiluvian era.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

PINTASILGO REJECTS POLITICAL LABELS--Former prime minister Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo stated in an interview granted yesterday that she received an unequivocal majority in a poll of the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party] for the party's presidential nomination. Lourdes Pintasilgo told "Grande Reportagem" that her candidacy encompasses "the whole Portuguese electorate" and refused to accept a right or left label. The candidate admitted being supported by conservative sectors "in the noble meaning of the term which stems from deep roots, from a connection with Christian values and from a union of essential principles in our public and private life." Pintasilgo denied that her candidacy would provoke instability and asked whether stability lies in a "political situation in which the party leaders are always in the limelight, dancing whatever quadrilles and waltzes they like, while the lives of the citizens deteriorate." Asked about what attitude the Catholic Church will adopt towards her candidacy, Lourdes Pintasilgo surmised that it would certainly not be hostile because "the Portuguese church lays great store by the traditional values and consequently must recognize my great preoccupation with defending the national values." [Excerpt] [Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 20 Apr 85 p 3] 12942

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

## SEGURADO REVEALS ELECTORAL SHORTCOMINGS OF CONSERVATIVES

Madrid YA in Spanish 22 Apr 85 p 11

[Article by M. A. Mellado]

[Text] Jose Antonio Segurado, president of the Liberal Party (PL), is not prepared to make a fool of himself in the coming elections, and he has announced that he will demand that the Popular Coalition develop a professionalized electoral team. He is certain that the Coalition will win in the coming elections, provided it drafts an attractive program and finds an excellent communicator on the same wave length as the people. He is very clear about the distribution of roles necessary to achieve this goal: he allocates the economic sector to the Liberal Party and educational affairs to the PDP [People's Democratic Party], and he reserves state and foreign policy for the AP [Popular Alliance]

Jose Antonio Segurado has a reputation for toughness, and he attributes this to the distribution of roles in the business sector he agreed upon 8 years ago with Carlos Ferrer Salat, whereby the latter would be seen as willing to dialogue with the various social forces, while he took the opposite position. Now, in this new liberal stage, Segurado appears much less aggressive, although he makes a show of sincerity. "The slates do not concern me. I am certain that with two gentlemen like Fraga and Alzaga, I am not going to have any problems. After all, everything comes down to the first two names on each provincial slate. The position of the PL favors objectivity in choice, so that in each province the quality of the candidate each party proposes, rather than those nominating him, is taken into account. And if some doubt remains between candidates, then a survey should be made in 30 days so that the potential voters in the province can determine which of them has the best image."

### Why the PSOE Won

What concerns the former president of the Madrid businessmen's association the most is ensuring the professionalization of the electoral machinery of the Popular Coalition. "I am not prepared to make a fool of myself in the elections, and to avoid this I want a professional team. And no jokes at all," he says. He believes that the three parties making up the majority group in the opposition must reach an agreement as soon as possible on three

basic aspects, which were the factors enabling the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] to win the 28-0 elections. "The PSOE," he says, "won the last general elections first because it was able to draft an attractive basic program, secondly because it developed perfect electoral machinery, headed by a superprofessional in this field, Alfonso Guerra, and thirdly, because it had a perfect communicator in Felipe Gonzalez." He does not see any difficulty in achieving an agreement to draft a minimal electoral program, "in which it would suffice, for example, to take up the economic situation of the country and to offer solutions, clearly denouncing the insecurity of the citizens, and the limiting of liberties with the socialist government, and little more."

Manuel Fraga

Nor does he believe that the development of an electoral machine is an impossibility for the Popular Coalition. "We have two or three individuals capable of heading it." The matter of finding a communicator is still pending, "although I think that there are two or three individuals with this gift in the center right--I am no longer speaking of the Popular Coalition."

Segurado excludes Manuel Fraga from the possible candidates to serve as this "charmer" of public opinion, but he absolutely does not challenge his leadership. "In fact, communication is not the best attribute of Manuel Fraga. I like his writing better than some of his public appearances, when he thinks faster than he can talk. What is beyond doubt is that he is a statesman of the highest category, he is absolutely honest, and nowadays, he is the president of the party and the leader of the Coalition by a considerable lead over the others." If any doubt remains about his respect for Fraga, he adds: "With me, he has always behaved like a British gentleman. I do not know that Fraga who, they say, shrieks and breaks telephones. Segurado hopes that there will be few "corpses" on the Popular Coalition slates for the coming electoral confrontation, defining these as individuals incapable of creating an illusion, lacking any message, however much work they have done for the party. He does not specify further. The last leader to join the Popular Coalition seems to be clear about the distribution of roles there should be among the three member parties. He allocates to the Liberal Party nothing more and nothing less than the economic sector. He sees the PDP as best suited to educational matters, and for the Popular Alliance, he mentions, for example, state policy or foreign policy. The economic philosophy of the PL is very clear. "The policy pursued by Reagan is yielding some results desirable for any country. We urge it, and now, after 2.5 years, the PSOE is proving us right with the recent economic measures the government plans to implement. In the realm of liberties, my model is that achieved by Giscard d'Estaing." He also has great praise for the Japanese economic system.

Segurado is persuaded that the Popular Coalition will win the next legislative elections. "Not only do I believe that it can win, but that we will win. The two prerequisites for achieving this are very basic: avoiding spectacles like that provided by the UCD [Democratic Center Union], with seven barons who could not reach agreement. While I head it, the PL will not allow the slightest margin for the occurrence of a similar situation. And the second condition is that all members of the coalition be persuaded that we will win



the elections, and the best thing for those who do not believe this is to go home. I will publicly denounce any of those within or outside the Popular Coalition who try to prevent our achieving this goal." Segurado says he is a realist when he gives assurance that the PSOE will lose the coming legislative elections. "It lost by a wide margin in Catalonia and in the Basque country, and in the autumn it will lose in Galicia." However, at another point in the interview he admitted he is a dreamer.

#### Garrigues Offered Nomination

What he has not the slightest doubt about is that the PL will become the great party of the center right in Spain. "At the present time, the only consolidated institutions existing in our country are the PSOE and the CEOE. The AP must define what it is and can be. I do not know what the CDS and the PCE [Spanish Communist Party] will become, and the PDP and the PRD [Democratic Reformist Party] seem to me to have honest intentions." Segurado admits, however, that he would like to reach an agreement within the Popular Coalition with Roca ("He has a good head on his shoulders. No one needs to convince me that if he were No 1 on the slate for Madrid, the results would be spectacular") and the Democratic Reformist Party, although he does not think it viable, through its own fault.

He recalls one fact which has been almost unknown until the present: the former president of the CEIM, with the authorization of Alliance leader Manuel Fraga, invited Antonio Garrigues Walker to lunch in order to offer him the number one position on the Popular Coalition slate. Garrigues did not accept, "telling me that his 'Germans' predicted he would get 8.5 percent of the votes. In the end he only got something over 1 percent, which did not even win him a council seat."

#### Alfonso Guerra

It is curious to hear him speak about Alfonso Guerra, with whom he talked for an hour and a half last week. The little he does say about him is very respectful of the vice president. "Guerra has never deceived me. And you will note that I have negotiated matters of a certain importance to the country with him during my period as a business leader. He is very cautious and, naturally, a superb politician loyal to President Gonzalez. Guerra respects only those who demand it, and he respects me." About Felipe Gonzalez, he says "they have crossed up the president's lines." Concerning Alliance representative Kirkpatrick, in the news because of recent attendance of a meeting of extreme right-wing "Europarlamentarians" in Rome, he thinks that he risked his political career with this mistake.

On the subject of abortion, he says that "there is life when the doctor says there is." And although he says he opposes the interruption of pregnancy, he admits, like a good liberal, that there are extreme situations in individuals' lives which he would not make so bold as to judge. For example, he admits that if his young daughter, now 14, became pregnant following a rape, "it would probably lead to abortion."

POLITICAL

SPAIN

# GALICIA TO BECOME TESTING GROUND FOR CONSERVATIVE COALITION

Madrid ABC in Spanish 19 May 85 pp 28-29

[Interview with Gerardo Fernandez Albor, president of the Junta of Galicia, by Luisa Palma in Madrid; date not given]

[Text] In all this time, the tag "doctor" has never left him, although he is now far removed from that which throughout the greater part of his life, provided his daily bread. In a way, it is necessary in politics too, the field in which he has been moving for about 3 years, "to diagnose," "to treat" and "to cure," from time to time, pressed by circumstance. But it is different. Gerardo Fernandez Albor does not like to summarize his life in terms of a formula, and he is among those who still believe that the world must be reformed. However, he is not guilty of the sin of excessive naivete, since he knows that in the effort, one at least reforms oneself, and in the final analysis, we too are a small part of the world. In him, as in all of us, all of humanity is reflected. The presidency of the Junta of Galicia is his first political venture, but his goal is "to unite the entire right wing." And he wants to demonstrate this in his own native land, since he says "even if I win an absolute majority in the coming elections, I intend to establish a pact with other forces." He is convinced, moreover, that he will be reelected president a second time.

[Question] Does the Popular Alliance (AP) really need such a pact?

[Answer] Well, pacts are always needed. My hope is to unite the right wing, and I call all of those who are not socialist or communist a part of the right wing. In other words, for me the right wing is what they call the right wing. When a socialist or communist says "rightist," he is referring to all of us--the CiU, the old UCD [Democratic Center Union]--all of those who do not want to be rightist.

I said once in Barcelona that the right wing had never governed, and it is true, I continue to say it. The democratic right, the right wing which loves freedom, that which I have always defended, that of which I speak. For when the UCD governed, it was not operating in the right wing, but had some nonliberal programs.

[Question] In any case, Galicia will be a "test" for the rest of Spain.

[Answer] Yes. But I think that the most important test for me would be the demonstration of good sense by all the political forces which are not socialist, so that they could be united in an electoral pact. I am speaking of what I think, not what the others say.

[Question] When will agreement be reached with the PDP [People's Democratic Party]?

[Answer] Well, I do not know. I should think soon, this month. There must be a Galician and national pact achieved in unison and great harmony, because I have spent my life fighting for this.

[Question] But there will have to be posters, I would say. What will the slogan be?

[Answer] I do not know, because I think this is a part of a political "marketing" effort in which I do not have much confidence. I do not believe that a slogan or a catchword is appropriate. I think that the best slogan is to continue to work for your country, to continue in unity with your people.

[Question] There will be none of the "galego coma te"?

[Answer] I do not know, but for my part I do not believe there is a need to say this.

[Question] Does it trouble you that Fraga will join you in the campaign?

[Answer] On the contrary, I see it as an honor. I am pleased. Fraga is known in the most remote hamlets in Galicia. I do not believe that people vote for a phrase. People always vote for what they believe best for their future.

[Question] Do you believe that the right-wing pact will in the end be established?

[Answer] I hope so, but I can do no more than desire it and propose it publicly. I have found no one ready to undertake it prior to the election. For my part, what I will tell the people when the moment comes is what we have done, what we are going to do, the plan we have for Galicia and for Spain with our allies in the AP in Spain, hoping that the like-minded will join in too. Even if I learned that we had won by an absolute majority, I would advocate a pact, for I believe that it is important and the more people there are collaborating, the better. We established a pact with the people in the UCD, which was enriching, not only because of the parliamentary majority we won, but because these individuals served us very well for various posts. Having more people from whom to choose is an advantage.

[Question] If this pact is agreed upon, Fraga would be the prime ministerial candidate.

[Answer] Yes, of course.

[Question] Do you foresee a pact with Adolfo Suarez?

[Answer] That too.

[Question] Then one can imagine the possibility of Suarez as prime minister and Fraga sitting down at the table with him.

[Answer] I would agree to this if everyone accepted it, and it would appear to me to be good if this were the sense of the country. But at the present time, when Fraga has 5 million votes and Suarez 600,000...well, this is unthinkable.

[Question] Is the same true for Miguel Roca?

[Answer] Yes, but with one proviso: Suarez now has 600,000 votes, while for the time being Roca only has the votes of the CiU, because it remains to be seen about the votes of the PRD. For now they mean nothing, they are the Convergence votes. However, not he, but Mr Pujol, is the leader whom this prime minister's office will have to take into account in terms of a Convergence candidate.

[Question] How are relations with the PDP [People's Democratic Party]?

[Answer] On the personal level, magnificent, and on the political level, we are at a point at which we are discussing the strategy to be pursued with regard to pacts to be established, and I hope that all will go well, as it should, to the benefit of Galicia and Spain.

[Question] This really says nothing.

[Answer] It says that when the pacts on government legislation and the slates are completed, that will be the culmination, and meanwhile I will struggle to ensure that these pacts reach a proper conclusion.

[Question] Will there be a pact with the Galician Coalition?

[Answer] Well, I have already said that even in the event that I win an absolute majority with the AP alone, I will support pacts, not only with the Popular Coalition, but also with the Galician Coalition, to demonstrate that the right wing is united. Because in my view the Galician Coalition is rightist, although it is the gentlemen of the UCD who now call themselves that, and if I wanted to arrange a pact with them before, naturally I do now! I have always said that I wanted to establish a pact to set an example for Spain of what it must do. If there is a true desire to defeat the socialists, the right wing must unite. I want Galicia to serve as an example for unity of the entire right wing.



[Question] Do you believe that the right wing will win in Galicia?

[Answer] I have that personal impression, not because of what the polls say, but because of what can be sensed, after all the effort we have made, beginning at zero, and the difficulties on the central government and political party levels, with a lack of willingness to collaborate with us in legislative and governmental pacts on the part of parties as similar to ours as the UCD, and not, let us say, with the PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party], which has a pact now with the Basque nationalists, although we were not offered a legislative pact in order to make the autonomy of Galicia effective.

[Question] And what do the polls say?

[Answer] If I were to be sincere, I must say that I have never asked for polls nor do I believe in them. They tell me...but I believe that although they say things are going well or badly, one must continue to work in the same way. What I hear is that we will win in Galicia. But I know what I have to do, and I will try to ensure that the AP achieves what I want, which is the pacts, but what the polls say.... The majority falls within this given percentage which does not know or gives no answer, and here in Galicia, I do not know about those who say they "do not know," but I do believe with regard to those who give no answer that it is very difficult to know what Galicians think.

[Question] Do you feel strong enough to be a candidate?

[Answer] Yes, indeed. I feel strong enough because I would be furious if I could not complete this work in the period of transfer which we have not yet completed. We began last year to have some economic potential and really, as what I want for my land is to realize the common ideal of "soergemento," as we say here, in all realms, I would like to accomplish this in these 4 years. If all the government leaders say that 4 years is too short a time to complete the work of government, there are many things to be finished in less time, for example the administration. It interests me that the central government has the same ideals, but in this instance, I cannot limit myself to loyal collaboration with this government without bearing in mind that we are of different political hues.

[Question] Are relations with the central government going badly?

[Answer] They have their ups and downs with different cabinets. At best they go well with one cabinet for a season, or they do not. In general, what I see is that on the subject of naval conversion, for example, not all of the necessary right things were done. I cannot accept that we paid such a high cost, and above all, I did not protest although conversion was effected without taking the Statutes of Galicia into account, allowing them to come here without consulting with us on such an important matter. The cost we have paid seems to me brutal, and we will continue to protest.



[Question] Would you like to be the Pujol of Galician politics?

[Answer] I am that, in the sense that I am the president of the Junta and of the Generalidad. As to the fact that he won an absolute majority in these elections, well, good for him, but last time he did not. I would like to be a Jordi Pujol in the sense of enjoying the love and affection the people of Catalonia have for him. But I have always said that I do not want to promote a nationalist party. First, because one then has to put a label on it (the Esquerra Republicana [Republican Left] is also a nationalist party). However, I believe in autonomy for the parties within a given ideology, as we had in the days of the Galician Popular Party within the Spanish Christian Democratic context, which included the UDC, and wherein I do not see the CiU now.

[Question] What about national politics?

[Answer] There I have never risked anything.

[Question] Your goal, then, ends with Galicia.

[Answer] Yes, just one legislature more. Three legislatures would be too much for any politician. A second, yes, because it would give me the time needed to be able to complete all these things which I have been doing for these three years. Then we could already see.

[Question] Are the council members not getting along well?

[Answer] They are.

[Question] That is not what the newspapers say.

[Answer] No, well, but there is cordiality.

[Question] And yet they are not united.

[Answer] Yes, precisely, and this is what must be overcome. As Pablo G. Barbeita said, "We are Galicians and we do not agree." My goal is the opposite.

[Question] Are there spies here as well?

[Answer] Well, I do not know. I have never stopped to think about it, and in addition, it does not matter to me much.

[Question] No?

[Answer] No. I told you by telephone how it seems to me, and I do not care if there are spies or not. It would be dangerous, but in this connection, I have the greatest confidence. What it seems to me to be is inevitable. I do not understand it. The country must continue to proceed little by little toward democratic customs and habits.

[Question] It seems that in the Popular Coalition there is a left, a center and a right.

[Answer] I don't think so. All of this is something we will have to begin to forget, becoming very proud if the left says you are of the right. But within the right wing it is an error to have these distinctions and to try to set oneself off from the right, because then one is doing the left wing a favor, with this false progressivism from which they want to profit by identifying it with the left.

[Question] When will the elections for the autonomous bodies be held?

[Answer] Well, I estimate that it will be in November or December, because I believe that the period which ends in October will run to its end. The normal thing would be, observing these deadlines, to hold elections at the end of November or December, except that the Galician electoral law provides that I could dissolve the Chamber, and in such a case the best thing would be to dissolve it earlier, a month or something like that.

[Question] Do you tend to favor any specific date?

[Answer] I have no preference at all because I have no experience of other elections. I think that here in Galicia, bad weather does harm, but we may have this in October and in December.

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

#### LIBERAL PARTY'S CONTINUING DROP IN POLLS VIEWED

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Jun 85 p 2

[Editorial: "The Liberal Party and Confidence"]

[Text] When Bengt Westerberg was elected leader of the Liberal Party, he warned the members as follows:

"Remember that there is work and more work ahead of us." He also noted that political success must depend on people's confidence and that it takes time to build confidence.

Bengt Westerberg already knew that he was not going to reap an easy victory for the Liberal Party. As a result, he has spared no effort in the attempt to regain the favor of the voters. Unfortunately, not everyone in the circle surrounding the party leader--members of Parliament and others--is equally alert.

But all the same, the Liberal Party is slowly but surely winning back the confidence of the voters. Still, many members are probably disappointed today when the public opinion polls show a decline for the party.

But that disappointment springs from the fact that expectations were too great.

After the change in party leadership, the Liberal Party's percentages made a few joyful leaps in the public opinion polls. That was expected. Westerberg was new and therefore exciting, and the party again received space on the front pages of newspapers.

But support for the party gradually waned, slowly but surely. That was also expected. Those who are surprised at the decline are making the mistake of seeing the Liberal Party's problem as tied exclusively to the question of the party leader rather than as a problem that goes deeper. It takes more than a couple of years to win back voter support and sharpen the party's profile.

The possibilities for fighting on behalf of the Liberal Party--for putting across the liberal message--are not the greatest. The Social Democrats and Conservatives have decided that the space occupied in the debate by the Liberal and Center Parties will be minimal.

In the long run, the Social Democrats and Conservatives will also lose by not listening to the parties in the middle. The debate will not be objective. Pressed into their respective corners, the self-appointed chief opponents are being forced into stronger and stronger attacks. Agreement seems more remote than it has for a very long time. Paradoxically, polarization is increasing at the same time as the need for joint solutions.

Last weekend, the Liberal Party attracted some attention when it presented its election manifesto. The tone of that manifesto is a long way from the campaign rhetoric being used by the Social Democrats and Conservatives. But the party is not flinching from the big problems. The voters are being told that cutbacks are required if the national economy is to be brought into balance. But everyone is not being touched by those cutbacks. The people who are condemned to silence in forgotten Sweden are being given a voice in the Liberal Party's manifesto. And so are the poorest of the poor in the developing countries.

Voter interest in the policy outlined is growing. Despite everything, the party has increased its share of voters since the 1982 election. Only hard work can increase that share further.

11798

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

# POLL MEASURES ACTIVE COMMITMENT OF PARTIES' MEMBERSHIP

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Jun 85 p 8

[Article by Dick Ljungberg]

[Text] One out of every two Swedes has been politically active in some form over the past year. Sympathizers with the VPK [Left Party-Communists] are most active, while KDS [Christian Democratic Union] voters are least active. This is shown by a DAGENS NYHETER-IMU [Institute for Market Research] poll of Swedish participation in political life.

The poll was conducted in April and May and covered 1,435 people. They were asked to answer questions as to whether they had attended political or union meetings, demonstrated, written letters to newspapers, and so on.

Not unexpectedly, the poll shows that those most active politically are men, middle aged, well educated, and city dwellers.

There are big differences among the parties as far as activity is concerned. Of the VPK's sympathizers, only 25 percent did not participate in any of the nine activities listed by the IMU. The figure is 47 percent among Conservatives and Social Democrats, 49 percent among the Liberal Party's voters, 57 percent among the Center Party's voters, and 59 percent among the Environment Party's voters, while a full 64 percent of KDS voters did not participate in any political activity. Overall, those in the socialist bloc are somewhat more active than those in the nonsocialist bloc.

If we look at the breakdown by union membership, we see that 20 percent of the members of SACO-SR [Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees-National and Local Civil Servants Union], 31 percent of the TCO [Central Organization of Salaried Employees] membership, and 44 percent of the LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions] membership were inactive.

## In Broad Sense

The IMU measured political activity in a very broad sense, and here are the results:



Participation in union meetings: 27 percent. The men are more active than the women, especially those between 30 and 49 years of age (37 percent). Members of SACO-SR and the TCO attend such meetings more often than LO members. The most active participants in meetings are VPK members (42 percent) and Social Democrats (33 percent). KDS members very seldom attend peace meetings.

Participation in meetings by associations of tenants, tenant-owners, homeowners, and so on: 14 percent. In this case, older people are most active, and this is true even in the built-up areas and for SACO-SR members and the well educated.

Contact with a political or union organization to obtain information: also 14 percent. Those most eager for information were in the youngest age group (18-29 years of age) (19 percent), members of SACO-SR (26 percent), and VPK members (35 percent).

Participation in a political meeting: 9 percent. The percentage is higher among those between 50 and 74 years of age (12 percent) and especially among the Center Party's sympathizers (18 percent).

Contact with a member of Parliament or local politician: 8 percent of those interviewed, the percentages being highest among men and members of SACO-SR (25 percent) and the TCO (13 percent). VPK members (23 percent) and Conservatives (17 percent) were most active. On the average, nonsocialist sympathizers were twice as active as socialist sympathizers in this area.

Participation in a demonstration of some kind: 7 percent. The highest percentages were among big city dwellers (10 percent) and people with a higher education (10 percent). Socialists demonstrate twice as often as nonsocialists.

Participation in a campaign for a political party: 4 percent. Here again, it is people with a higher education who are more active. No differences were noted among supporters of the various parties.

Writing letters to newspapers: also 4 percent. Here it is the young people who are somewhat more on the alert (6 percent), and letters to the editor are twice as common in the nonsocialist bloc as in the socialist bloc.

Speaking on a union or political topic before a large group of people: 3 percent. Men speak twice as often as women. The higher one's educational level, the more likely one is to have delivered a speech. No differences were noted among the parties.

#### Commitment

If we combine similar activities, we see that of the active half of the Swedish population, 60 percent participated in a union meeting or demonstration march, 38 percent contacted a member of Parliament, local politician, or political or union organization, 28 percent participated in a meeting by some other organization of the tenant type, 22 percent participated in a political meeting or

campaign, and 12 percent expressed their own views personally in the form of letters to newspapers or speeches.

In all, 15 percent of the Swedish people say that over the past 2 or 3 years, they have served on a board or held some other position of trust in a political or union organization. And 26 percent of Swedes occupy positions of trust in other types of organizations. Altogether, one Swede out of three is involved on the board of an association or in some similar position.

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

BOURGEOIS ELECTION HOPES DEPEND ON FALLDIN, WESTERBERG

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Jun 85 p 13

[Commentary by Sven Svensson: "Falldin and Westerberg May Determine Election Outcome in the Final stretch"]

[Text] The politicians are now taking their summer break and getting ready for the final round of the election campaign.

A great deal has changed over the past 3 years, and at least 500,000 people are undecided today as to which party they will vote for 3 months from now.

A change in government this fall will depend primarily on the credibility of Thorbjorn Falldin and Bengt Westerberg during the final round of the campaign. If both middle party leaders go to pieces, the way will be clear for Olof Palme to occupy Rosenbad for another 3 years. If they can strengthen their profiles among undecided voters, it is probable that the election on 15 September will result in a nonsocialist government.

At least 500,000 voters are undecided as only a little over 3 months of the election campaign remain and the politicians take a short summer break. They are irresolute because of uncertain economic developments and the political mudslinging between the Social Democrats and Conservatives.

Social Democratic economic policy--the so-called third path to economic growth and high employment--was wrecked by the government employees' strike on 2 May and the shock of higher interest rates on 13 May. At the same time, the Conservative Party's demand for a "change in the system" has aroused increasing concern among so-called ordinary people.

The Social Democratic tactic of depicting the Conservative "change in the system" as the only nonsocialist alternative for government with any saving grace has been stepped up this spring. That tactic is supposed to increase Social Democratic mobilization while diminishing the desire to vote among Center and Liberal Party voters and increasing their confusion.

## Strong Spurt

So far, the tactic has been working according to plan. The Social Democrats have been moving up in the voter barometers ever since the end of the year, the Conservatives have grown stronger, and, in theory, the middle parties have been weakened. It is scarcely credible any longer that the middle parties together can get more votes than the Conservatives.

In previous election campaigns, Thorbjørn Falldin has always moved up fast at the end, either because the voter barometers were wrong or because he acted skillfully in the final stretch. In any case, Falldin moved out in front because he was the undisputed nonsocialist candidate for prime minister.

This time the situation is different. Olof Palme has chosen to nominate Ulf Adelsohn as the central figure on the nonsocialist side and to pay no attention to Thorbjørn Falldin or, especially, Bengt Westerberg. The middle party leaders are both in serious danger of getting lost in the campaign.

## Conservative Risk

It is unusually difficult this time to foresee how things will go in the final period of the campaign. Thorbjørn Falldin is a clever tactician, and he is inspired by a very strong desire for revenge, while Bengt Westerberg is assiduously pursuing his further education in the complicated world of political issues so as to create confidence in his objectivity.

The crucial point is that the Conservatives represent a high-risk political and economic alternative involving constant compromises for the Left. In the long run, that may become dangerous for Ulf Adelsohn's political credibility.

In the more cultivated political propaganda heard in the hustings, the "change in the system" consists of unspecified cutbacks totaling 20 billion kronor but rather specific tax reductions of 10 billion kronor. The Conservatives have taken very good care not to formulate their proposed cutbacks clearly. That would make the debate disagreeably specific.

## Hocus-Pocus

Like some kind of hocus-pocus, the entire Conservative "change in the system" is to be brought about in one giant step. It is an overall solution in which benefits and disadvantages are to balance each other in a harmony that has seldom been seen. As a result, the story goes, it is wrong to single out specific details in the Conservative policy.

Without swearing to the accuracy of their figures, the Social Democrats have come out with a study showing that reality is different than Conservative propaganda. Ordinary wage earners would lose from the Conservative change in the system, while two high-income earners in the same family would benefit considerably.

Common sense says that the Conservatives' proposed change in the system would favor people earning more and be unfair to those earning less. And that is, in fact, the purpose in changing the system, although the Conservatives deny it.

Decreasing the marginal tax rates will benefit primarily those earning over 130,000 kronor, while lowering the basic municipal deduction will hurt low- and middle-income earners.

#### Weak Are Hit

And the proposed reductions in social transfers in the areas of housing, sickness and unemployment benefits, and so on would obviously hurt primarily the weaker economic groups in society.

The necessary political majority in Parliament for carrying out the political change in the system more or less overnight will not exist. It is completely improbable that the Conservatives will have a majority, and the Center and Liberal Parties, to ensure their own political survival, are being forced to reject a great many things in the Conservative election basket.

#### Big Promises

Another objection to the Conservative change of system concerns legislative resources. It is easy to write up a bill on lower taxes, but difficult and time consuming to put together big austerity packages that interfere with wage negotiations and encroach on various sectors of society.

The nonsocialist parties have promised jointly to do away with wage earner funds and the property tax effective 1 January 1986 if they are allowed to form the government. They will also take several billion kronor away from the municipalities and county councils and sell off state-owned firms.

Deciding how to keep those campaign promises and reverse Social Democratic decisions requires a great deal in the way of legislative resources. And it will be impossible, both practically and politically, for a nonsocialist government also to find time on a few short autumn evenings to coordinate big tax reductions with giant austerity packages.

Here is another objection to the "change of system":

The deficit on current account for 1985 is already up to 11 billion kronor, and according to the Conservative Party's own estimates, it will be considerably higher by the end of the year.

Against that background, unleashing a further increase in private consumption in 1986 by granting large tax reductions to high-income earners is scarcely a realistic economic policy.



## Political Madness

The one overriding goal for a nonsocialist government in the fall of 1985 must be to avoid, at all costs, measures that will intensify wage demands and force a new devaluation of the Swedish krona. Carrying out an economic policy that lays the groundwork for quick and sizable demands for compensation on the part of low-income earners and the middle class would be political madness.

On Tuesday, the members of Parliament will go home for a brief summer vacation before the election campaign begins in earnest.

Forming an idea of how things will go in that final stretch of the campaign is even more difficult this time than it has been in the past. Many things in both the economic and the political area are still in the balance.

The Conservatives, for example, have recently grown considerably more cautious in talking about their change of system. The reason is the confrontation with the Social Democratic Party's cheering section that occurred during the "duels" in April.

## Mangled Center Party

On Parliament's Finance Committee, the Conservatives have also been making an effort at compromise with the other nonsocialist parties, at least in words.

And the Center Party's national conferences will meet in Norrköping in a week or so. There, Thorbjörn Fälldin will try to straighten out his mangled party following his illness with gastric ulcers. It may be quite a struggle.

One thing must not be doubted:

No matter what it takes, the Social Democrats have decided to attack the Conservative "change of system" at all costs in an attempt to force undecided voters, if possible, to move toward the two political extremes.

If the Social Democrats succeed in picking up a few percent of those irresolute voters, their chance of winning the election will improve and the trend toward a two-party system in Sweden will grow.

## Duels Will Decide the Issue

In the end, however, the campaign duel between Olof Palme and Ulf Adelsohn will be quite crucial even as far as the undecided voters are concerned.

According to Olof Palme, Thorbjörn Fälldin picked up 3 percent in 1982 as a result of his debate with Palme.

Will Adelsohn profit by an equal amount from his duel with Palme--in which all the accumulated hatred between Sweden's two "ruling classes" will emerge?

At the same time, the mudslinging and bickering between Palme and Adelson may provide the middle parties with their biggest chance to assert themselves in the exciting final moments of the campaign. Continued quarreling between "the big two" may give the middle parties a trump card in the struggle to win votes from the many undecided voters, whose choice of party will be the crucial factor in deciding who will form the government.

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POLITICAL

SWEDEN

# CONSERVATIVES GAINING IN URBAN AREAS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 14 Jun 85 p 13

[Article by Sven Svensson]

[Text] The Social Democrats have strengthened their position in the municipality of Stockholm since the previous SCB [Central Bureau of Statistics] poll (conducted in the fall of 1984), while the Conservatives have made progress in Stockholm County but lost ground in the municipality of Goteborg. This is shown by the regional figures in the poll on party preferences.

A comparison with the 1982 election results shows that the Conservatives are gaining ground in all urban areas except the municipality of Goteborg, where they are threatened with a loss. The Center Party is in danger of suffering big losses in all the big cities, while the Liberal Party stands a considerable chance of making gains.

The Social Democrats are maintaining their positions in the city and county of Stockholm and have a chance of making big gains in the municipality of Goteborg, but it appears that they will lose in the four-city area [in Skane]. The VPK [Left Party-Communists] is down in all the large urban areas.

The SCB poll is divided into 10 groups of constituencies, with the margins of error having been doubled because of the small sample.

Stockholm

In the municipality of Stockholm, the Social Democrats have 42.9 percent of the vote according to the May poll. That is not a statistically reliable increase since last fall. In the 1982 election, the Social Democrats received 39.4 percent.

The VPK is down by about 1 percent to 5.7 percent, compared to 10.1 percent in the last election.

In the nonsocialist bloc, the Conservatives are practically unchanged at 39.0 percent in May, compared to 33.7 percent in the election.

The Liberal Party is down by a few tenths of a percent to 7.2 percent in May (5.9 percent in the election).

The Center Party shows a statistically reliable drop from 3.3 percent last spring to 2.0 percent. In the 1982 election, the Center Party received 7.3 percent of the vote in Stockholm.

In Stockholm County, the Social Democrats show a statistically unreliable drop of a few tenths of a percent to 40.5 percent. In the 1982 election, the Social Democrats received 39.9 percent.

The VPK is down in Stockholm County from 4.8 to 4.0 percent, compared to 6.6 percent in the election.

Among the nonsocialist parties, the Conservatives show a statistically reliable increase from 33.2 percent last fall to 37.5 percent this spring. That figure should be compared to the 33.8 percent they received in the 1982 election.

The Liberal Party is up by a few tenths of a percent to 8.4 percent, compared to 5.9 percent in the election.

The Center Party shows a statistically reliable drop from 7.5 percent last fall to 5.2 percent this spring. In the election, the Center Party received 10.2 percent.

#### Goteborg

In the municipality of Goteborg, the Social Democrats are up by just over 1 percent to 47.0 percent. In the last election, they received 40.8 percent.

The VPK is also up by just over 1 percent since last fall--to 8.8 percent. In the election, it received 10.0 percent.

In the nonsocialist bloc, the picture is different in Goteborg. The Conservatives show a statistically reliable drop from 28.1 percent last fall to 22.8 percent this spring. In the last election, they received 27.5 percent.

The Liberal Party is up by three-tenths of a percent since last fall and is now preferred by 11.9 percent of the voters, compared to 9.7 percent in the 1982 election.

The Center Party has also improved its position, rising from 4.6 percent last fall to 6.0 percent this spring. It received 7.7 percent in the election.

In the four-city area, which includes Malmo, the Social Democrats are up slightly from their standing last fall, with 46.6 percent this spring. That is below their election result of 47.6 percent.

At the same time, the VPK is up by a few tenths of a percent to 3.2 percent, compared to 4.8 percent in the 1982 election.

On the nonsocialist side, the Conservatives are up by 1 percent to 37.6 percent, compared to 30.6 percent in the election.

At the same time, the Liberal Party is down by three-tenths of a percent to 6.5 percent, compared to 6.0 percent in the election. The Center Party is down by 1 percent since last spring to 5.4 percent. It received 8.1 percent in the 1982 election.

After the SCB released its figures on voter opinion on Thursday, Karin Soder, deputy chairwoman of the Center Party, told DAGENS NYHETER: "We should be able to conduct a good election campaign."

Karin Soder said: "The Center Party may have experienced a slump, and other public opinion polls have shown a decline for us, of course. These things involve a time lag of sorts. But we will see great solidarity in the campaign, even though people outside our ranks are describing it differently."

The SCB figures on voter preferences show that strong support for the Conservatives among first-time voters is a myth.

That was Prime Minister Olof Palme's comment on the latest public opinion poll, in which the Conservatives have 36 percent and the Social Democrats 46 percent of the first-time voters.

He does not consider it disturbing that 30 percent of the first-time voters have not decided which party they will vote for.

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9 July 1985

POLITICAL

SWEDEN

## PAPER SEES SDP, NONSOCIALIST COALITION AS BEST OUTCOME

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 9 Jun 85 p 2

[Editorial: "National Coalition Government in 1985"]

[Text] "A national coalition government may become necessary, and it may do so much quicker than anyone can imagine today," said Ulf Adelsohn in January 1983.

Since the war years, national coalition government has usually been seen as the natural way out of a serious crisis. Consensus will appear in the hour of trial, and the parties will then lay aside their differences in the interests of the country.

At present, Sweden is not showing the outward signs of a country in crisis. Economic growth has been good over the past few years, and we continue to be one of the countries with the least unemployment. Perhaps it is bearable, therefore, that we also have the highest inflation rate in the Western world.

The crisis lies in the phenomenon that causes high inflation: anarchy among special interest groups--the trend toward less unity and stiffer antagonisms in the labor market. Governments of various political hues have been forced into a series of devaluations because corporative power, which is independent of the voters, controls wages, production costs, employment, and the value of money without being able or always willing to demonstrate social responsibility. Government gets the worst of it. Special interests dictate the conditions for those chosen by the voters to keep the economy in balance.

A national coalition government would be in a better position than a government formed by only one bloc to restore common interests to their rightful place and establish more fruitful relations between the state and the labor market organizations. Ulf Adelsohn was right 2 years ago: Sweden is ripe for a national coalition government.

This does not mean that there are a number of simple and obvious measures against cost inflation that are only waiting to be put into effect by such a government. The question of which measures should be implemented must be open for discussion. The starting point is that we have the world's strongest labor market organizations and that the solution must therefore be sought in

cooperation on a positive note rather than in attempts to "crush" or "curb" one group or the other. As an undisputed representative of the public interest, a national coalition government would have the necessary authority. Unlike a government consisting of a single bloc, it would not have good relations with one side and rotten relations with the other. On a foundation of trust, it would be able to prevail upon union organizations and employers to subordinate themselves to the common good--at the same time, not by turns.

As long as the Swedish model worked, the government could rely on private employers to do their best to resist exaggerated wage demands. That is not the situation today. The employers now espouse an ideology of decentralization, meaning that they are no longer willing to offer coordinated and collective resistance to union pressure. That ideology encourages wage drift. So how can cost developments be held in check? The most unrealistic ideas on that subject are being put forward. A member of the SAF [Swedish Employers Confederation] management group claimed in the SAF newspaper that the way to combat "the Swedish monster"--that is, the pressure of wage costs--is for all of us to stop being envious. "It is all the jealous jockeying for position among union organizations that must be wiped out. And behind it, naturally, lies something as basic as Swedish enviousness."

If the employers continue to act on the basis of that naive view of reality, the next devaluation will not be far away. What kind of government can make the SAF change its mind? Hardly the current one, and also hardly a coalition of the same three parties that were in power during the big conflict in 1980. We are inclined to believe that a national coalition government comprising both blocs has the best chance of getting the employers to resume their natural place in the balancing system of the labor market.

Advocates of a national coalition government usually emphasize the importance of the ability of government authorities to make unpopular decisions. According to that line of reasoning, "narrow-based" government--with voter support of 51 percent at most--is unwilling to jeopardize its existence with heavy-handed measures whose good effects will not show up until a long time later. So the parties must take joint responsibility

That argument carries some weight, but it is scarcely the crucial one at present. The parties know from experience that their standing with the voters can fall off quickly if they fail to show sufficient drive when they are in the government. Both Social Democratic and nonsocialist governments are prepared more often than not to take responsibility for disagreeable decisions. The basic problem is not a lack of will or courage when it comes to pursuing a vigorous policy, but the actual limits to what a government consisting of only one bloc can accomplish.

Sweden is suffering from the fact that the political parties always form fronts against each other according to a pattern that seems to have been laid down once and for all, just as we presumably would also suffer from a permanent national coalition government. The parties have gotten locked into unproductive antagonisms. A national coalition government in 1985 would open new vistas and restore our faith that we, as members of society, control our future.

MILITARY

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

RESERVES, REINFORCEMENTS STRESSED AT NATO DEFENSE CONFERENCE

Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 23 May 85 p 5

[Text] Brussels (DPA/DDP). The NATO defense ministers ended their spring conference in Brussels on Wednesday, one day sooner than planned. Participants said that the conference had been so well prepared that the time allotted was not needed. The ministers resolved to eliminate the major weaknesses in the conventional defense of the Western alliance over the next several years, so as to keep as small as possible the lead that the Warsaw Pact has in this area. Within the framework of the defense planning committee, they affirmed the continued validity of the strategy of flexible response, including the nuclear component as well as forward defense.

The 14 ministers did, to be sure, resolve to make "special and coordinated efforts to strengthen conventional defense with the means available," but at the same time they reaffirmed the goal of increasing defense expenditures by 3 percent annually in real terms, a goal which so far has been attained by only a few countries. FRG Defense Minister Woerner emphasized that "special efforts do not mean special programs." The controversial American missile defense in space project (SDI) was not discussed, according to the communique.

The ministers approved a "deficiency list" of conventional defense that was submitted by NATO Secretary General Carrington. Weaknesses identified herein include, among others, the mobilization of reserves and reinforcements, staying power in the event of an attack, air defense, and the lack of an aircraft IFF system.

A draft of the military committee for a "military basic plan," by means of which the planning and elimination of these deficiencies are to be facilitated in the next 15 to 20 years, was noted by the ministers, to be sure, but for the time being was referred to the ambassadors. The defense ministers are hopeful of being able to give their political approval to the plan in December.

According to statements made by Lothar Ruehl, state secretary in the Federal defense ministry, the ministers pledged to see to it that their national armed forces planning is in keeping with the recommendations of the Carrington report. Available resources should be concentrated on the most urgent areas such as increased munitions stocks. The sought-for improvement and reinforcement of conventional armed forces should be considered only in the context of efforts which have just begun or are completed, above all for an improvement in equipment.

In the meeting, Woerner underscored that the federal government gives top priority to forward defense with the repelling of the first echelons in an attack by the Warsaw Pact. He stressed Bonn's commitment to a priority strengthening of conventional fighting power and indicated that the federal government will concentrate its defense expenditures on those areas in which a strengthening of fighting power was especially urgent. Accordingly, expenditures for munitions in the years 1984 to 1987 are to be 13 percent higher than initially planned.

Contrary to American desires, chemical weapons are not included in Carrington's "deficiency list" as a shortcoming in NATO defense.

Ruehl asserted that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) topic, including the question of a possible participation of Europe or selected countries, had played no part in the morning session. The determination by the ministers that the current strategy should be retained and its credibility strengthened was construed to mean that, even with the SDI research program in progress and a decision [having been made] regarding the production and stationing of such missile defense systems in space, a change in the strategic situation of the alliance is not expected in the near future. Woerner stated that the strategy of flexible response would continue to be necessary for some time to preserve the peace and prevent war, [and] its credibility must be maintained also with nuclear weapons and supported by the strengthening of conventional forces.

#### "The Danger of a Surprise Attack is Growing"

According to an AP report based on data received from military circles, the secret military basic plan "MC 299" includes the statement: "The Soviet Union has introduced measures which within the next 15 years could definitely give them the capabilities, and probably will give them the capabilities, deemed essential by them in order to be able to mount a sizable conventional attack against NATO without of necessity risking the escalation of combat operations by NATO forces." Increasing above all was the danger that the USSR would be capable of mounting a massive thrust into NATO territory, "from a standing position" and without any appreciable early warning time, before the West would be able to react politically or militarily--by moving in reinforcement troops, primarily from the United States.

Accordingly, the military views as the most important tasks: repelling the first attack echelon, attacking the succeeding enemy forces to a depth of up to 250 km behind the front line, the "maintenance of a favorable air combat situation," the protection of warships and merchant ships, and lastly the protection of their own rear areas. Carrying out these tasks would require, among other things, that substantial efforts be made to modernize the armed forces of the alliance, to increase their combat readiness, and to improve their staying power in combat (for example, their inventory of weapons and munitions).



Approved by the Military Committee

The plan commissioned by the ministers had been approved on the preceding day by the NATO military committee. The chairman of the committee, General Cor de Jager of the Netherlands, had only stated that the report was based on assumptions concerning the potential threat by the Warsaw Pact in the next 20 years. Based on those assumptions, NATO for the first time was better able to establish priorities for the future.

Concurrently with the military committee, the Eurogroup had met in Brussels on Tuesday already. In their concluding statement, the 12 defense ministers pleaded for a strengthening of conventional armament and expressed their support for the American position in the disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union in Geneva.

The European ministers also considered it necessary, however, to point to the contribution made by their countries to the conventional defense component of NATO. Thus, of the standing NATO units stationed on the continent, the Europeans provided 90 percent of the ground forces, 80 percent of the air forces, and 70 percent of the naval forces. Without express, but nevertheless clearly apparent, reference to the frequently voiced U.S. criticism of the extent of European defense efforts, the communique reads: "This is a reflection of the realization by the Eurogroup nations that they must share the common defense burden with their North American allies."

In the communique of the meeting, the ministers corroborated their determination to intensify European armament cooperation through the activities of the Independent European Program Group (IEPG).

On the 16 NATO member states, France, which does not belong to the military part of the alliance, and Iceland, which maintains no armed forces in peacetime, are not taking part in the spring conference.

12689

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MILITARY

DENMARK

# PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY FINDS DANISH SOLDIERS SERIOUS, RESPONSIBLE

Copenhagen AKTUELT in Danish 3 Jun 85 p 4

[Article by Peter Bergen]

[Text] Several myths about Danish soldiers have been proved false by two psychologists who made a careful study of young draftees who reported for duty at Antvorskov Barracks near Slagelse in March 1984.

The study could be important in discussions of defense policy. It was made as the result of a suggestion in a report on service discharges of draftees and is being read by politicians and central administration officials, among others.

The psychologists talked to a geographically and socially representative selection of soldiers before they were inducted, in the middle of their service period and just before they went home. They also talked to officers, social workers, librarians, soldiers' institute staff workers and others.

The picture that emerges of Danish soldiers shows that they are young (80 percent are 19-20 years old), serious, positive, responsible and friendly with their comrades. But they often have trouble finding the time and energy for both their military duties and relationships with a wife, fiancée or girl friend. And many are weighed down by a nagging problem common to many young people--unemployment, which is the reason why more people have volunteered for military service.

## Solidarity

Comradeship and solidarity are still important factors in military life. This is true even though soldiers today can leave the barracks at the end of a day's service and report back the next morning--which many of them do.

"Comradeship doesn't exist today," many officers say. But the soldiers destroyed that myth. In the interview halfway through their service, 60 percent of the soldiers spoke very positively about comradeship. Only 9 out of the group of 80 said it didn't mean anything. Actually a majority of

them were surprised at how good the comradeship is and how much it means. And when they were about to be mustered out 80 percent of the soldiers mentioned comradeship as the most positive aspect of their time in the service.

#### Sensible, Peaceful Pursuits

The information provided by the soldiers and others about what they did in their free time dispelled the myth of the noisy, lazy beer-drinking soldier. If he is one of the married minority he maintains his family life, although with difficulty. Otherwise the pursuits of young draftees are quite sensible and ordinary. They do read more books about war, both fiction and nonfiction, than other young people, according to the barracks librarian.

Drunken soldiers on the trains and ferries are probably part of the picture most Danes have of their country's defenders. But around half the soldiers said they drank less in the service than they did as civilians. However a small group mentioned drinking more beer.

#### Reading Lessons

The soldiers' institutes that are run by the YMCA and the Grundtvig people with funds provided by collections can rejoice in the fact that they still appeal to today's religiously apathetic young people. Some 60 percent come in regularly or even daily to the Antvorskov Soldiers' Institute and they are satisfied with the service. Only 25 percent found the Christian basis annoying.

Ten of the 80 soldiers voluntarily went to classes in their free time for assistance with reading and spelling disabilities and all were very satisfied with the results.

#### Guilt Feelings

Not surprisingly the service period is hardest, also financially, for the few draftees who have wives and children. The psychologists put it like this: The effort to maintain a normal civilian existence while fulfilling compulsory military service requirements was very hard on some people, leading to friction in family relationships and producing undeserved guilt feelings in the soldiers about being too tired to give enough to wife, child, girl friend or parents.

All in all, a quarter of the soldiers had problems with a girl friend, lover or wife due to military service. They did not have enough energy to handle both aspects of life satisfactorily.

When 58 men were due to go home after 9 months, most were satisfied with the benefits gained from their time in the service. Seven felt negatively about this period in their lives.

6578

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MILITARY

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

# CURRENT NAVAL TORPEDO INVENTORY, DOCTRINE, DEVELOPMENT

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German May 85 pp 32-38

[Article by Commander Wolfgang Laude and Lt Commander Armin Winckler: "Torpedoes: Operational Capabilities and Development Trends"]

[Text] Despite the far-reaching advance of missiles for the engagement of naval targets, torpedoes are assuming a special place in modern naval warfare. In the following article, Commander Wolfgang Laude, head of the department for underwater weapons and weapon employment systems in the General Navy Office, and Lt Commander Armin Winckler, of the department for underwater weapons, sensors and gun direction of the General Navy Office, present the light and heavyweight torpedoes now in use and primarily go into operational tactics. Torpedoes can be employed from submarines, surface warships, aircraft, helicopters and missiles. The future will lie with the intelligent torpedo that can hit a previously detected target without being diverted by means of interference.

The path from the first torpedo to today's complex weapon system torpedo has been a long one of continuous follow-on developments and improvements. One of the first torpedoes was presented around 1870 by the German engineer Schwartzkopf. It had a running distance of 500 meters and a speed of 24 knots. These first-generation torpedoes had to be employed from a distance of a few hundred meters if they were to reach and hit their target. A short running distance, inaccurate maintenance of depth and course, a clearly visible wake in the water, and the lack of its own search capacity were the reasons for low probabilities of success.

As a fire-control procedure, there was an application for the aimed launch of the straight-running torpedo, whereby the salvo was chosen to cover inaccuracies in the determination of the target course and speed.

Only with the technical development of an active and passive underwater detection capability after World War II was a big forward step taken along the way to increasing the hit probability. At the same time, it thereby became possible not only to fire torpedoes at surface ships but also to use them against submerged submarines.

When equipped with an underwater detection system, the torpedo is in a position to head for and hit a previously detected target independently and without the assistance of the firing vessel. Since the position-finding ranges are limited by the underwater sound-propagation conditions, then this self-searching torpedo must also be aimed when fired. Depending upon the distance, a change in the course or speed of the target after the firing of the torpedo can be compensated for only within narrow tolerances.

This deficiency was eliminated with the development of the wire-guided torpedo. It is thereby possible to influence the moving torpedo at all times from the firing vessel after the firing of the torpedo and before the torpedo itself has located the target. It is thus possible to guide the torpedo into the area in which it can locate the target by itself.

#### Torpedoes in Naval Warfare As a Whole

Naval warfare today takes place under water, on the water, and from the air. The main means of naval warfare thereby employed are:

--from the air: aircraft, helicopters and missiles

--on the surface: all types of surface warships

--under water--submarines.

Modern naval warfare requires the ability to defend against all three threats. The weight of the underwater weapon torpedo becomes clear before the background that the submarine today represents one of the most important means of naval warfare both tactically as well as strategically and that, with few exceptions, it can be effectively combated only with the torpedo. On the other hand, the torpedo is--apart from strategic weapons--still the main weapon of the submarines. For the foreseeable future, the torpedo is irreplaceable as a weapon for or against the submarine as an underwater means of naval warfare.

#### Today's Torpedoes

The table illustrates the multiplicity of torpedoes that have been introduced as well as the fact that heretofore neither the Western nor the NATO navies have been successful in developing one or two "standard" torpedoes. Although in part there are certainly solid national economic reasons behind this fact, it is essentially military reasons that are responsible for this.

To a very considerable degree, the operational area and target catalog determine the performance data and limits of the torpedoes. Thus, for example, the "deep-water navies" must expend considerable sums to make the torpedoes operational for great running depths, whereas the "shallow-water navies" must make great efforts to improve the torpedo sonar equipment so as to be able to compensate at least partially for the much more pronounced sound anomalies in shallow waters.

Overview of the Essential Performance Data of the Torpedoes Now in Operation or in Development

Country	Type	Deploy- ment Year	Drive	Max. Speed		Wire Guided	Caliber	Combat Load		Shallow Water Fitness	Operational Carrier
				Knots to ca.	sm			kg	kg		
FRG	DM2A1	1972	electric	33	-	yes	21"	250	1,370	yes	submarines, fast patrol boats
FRG	DM1	1975	electric	to ca. 33	6	yes	21"	92	-	yes	submarines
FRG	DM 3	1970	electric	16/25	9	no	19"	145	650	yes	frigates and submarines
FRG	SUT	1980	electric	ca. 34	12	yes	21"	250	1,370	yes	frigates and submarines
France	L5 mod 1	1971	electric	ca. 35	7	no	21"	150	1,300	-	frigates and submarines
France	L 6	-	thermodyn.	ca. 45	11	no	400mm	70	-	-	frigates and submarines
France	E 15	-	electric	25	12	no	21"	300	1,350	-	frigates and submarines
France	F 17	-	electric	-	-	yes	21"	150	1,410	-	frigates and submarines
Italy	A 184	1979	electric	max 36	14	yes	21"	150	1,300	-	frigates and submarines
Italy	A 244 S	1978	electric	33	7	no	12"75	40	230	yes	frigates and aircraft
UK	TIGERFISH	1974	electric	24/40	-	yes	21"	125	1,550	-	submarines
UK	STING RAY	1983	electric	45	8	no	12"75	46	-	yes	aircraft
USA	MK 37 C	1972	thermodyn.	34	1	possible	19"	145	766	no	frigates and submarines
USA	MK 48 mod 1	1979	thermodyn.	ca. 45-50	-	yes	21"	300	-	no	submarines
USA	MK 46 mod 2	1965	thermodyn.	ca. 45	9	no	12"75	45	1,638	no	frigates and aircraft
USA	MK 46 mod 5	1979	thermodyn.	ca. 45	9	no	12"75	45	250	condi- tional	frigates and aircraft



Essentially, to date two torpedo types have developed that are used in all Western navies:

--the lightweight torpedo (LWT)

--the heavyweight torpedo (HWT)

The LWT is purely a submarine hunter torpedo that is used to combat submarines. It is fired out of tubes from ships and is used as a payload of a missile or rocket as well as by antisubmarine helicopters and aircraft.

Its most important technical data:

--length: approximately 2.5 meters

--diameter: 330 mm

--explosive charge: 40 to 50 kg

--weight: approximately 250 to 300 kg

--drive: electrodynamic or thermodynamic

--speed: up to 50 knots

--running time: approximately 6 minutes

--active/passive sonar search head for underwater detection.

Since in the future as well the LWT will primarily be brought by air into the vicinity of the submarine to be combated and tube firing will be the exception only, it continues to be important to keep the weight of the torpedo low and thus reduce the problems of air transport in regard to missile power output, helicopter flight time, and aircraft useful load.

As a classic submarine weapon against surface ships, the HWT is also employed to some extent by frigates, destroyers and fast patrol boats. In addition, it exists as a submarine hunter torpedo or as a combined torpedo to combat both surface and underwater targets.

--length: approximately 6 to 7 meters

--diameter: 533 mm

--weight: 1,200 to 1,600 kg

--explosive charge: approximately 250 kg

--electrodynamic or thermodynamic drive


--speed: approximately 50 knots

--running distance: up to 20 nautical miles

--active/passive sonar search head

Modern HWT'S are remotely controlled by means of a communications line. The probability of success is thereby improved substantially. Consequently, the torpedo can also be fired from long ranges with some promise of success. In addition, it is used as a "forward sensor" to give the weapons carrier a better view of the situation.

#### General Torpedo System of a Fast Patrol Boat of Class 143



#### Key:

- |                               |                              |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 1. Tactical viewing screen    | 8. Torpedo tubes             |
| 2. Tactical plot              | 9. Torpedo "Seal"            |
| 3. Fire control               | 10. Information-line torpedo |
| 4. Torpedo sonar plotter      | 11. Target                   |
| 5. On-board simulation system | 12. Radar                    |
| 6. Information system         | 13. Optical target director  |
| 7. Distribution box           |                              |

#### Operational Procedures for Torpedoes

#### Operational Procedures for Lightweight Torpedoes

The LWT was developed to combat submerged submarines and it has now almost completely displaced the depth charge and the antisubmarine rocket. The main reason for this is the further technical development of submarines after World War II. Modern submarines have the ability to run at high speed, to make rapid changes in

course and depth, and to make for great submerged depths. All of these features, especially the great submerged depths, hinder the deliberate use of depth charges and antisubmarine rockets in deep waters. These two antisubmarine weapons represent the same level of technical development as the straight-running torpedoes that lack their own search capacity. But such weapons can be successfully employed only when precise information is available on the enemy (course, speed and depth) and the target does not change its course, speed or depth over a prolonged time. In this case, the fire control problem can be calculated and the weapon can be employed with the appropriate lead so that in the depths it will reach the immediate proximity of the target and achieve the required effect.

These interrelationships led to the development of a self-searching LWT that is able to pursue a previously located submarine in all three dimensions under water and to hit it.

The fire control problem for the successful employment of a LWT is thereby substantially easier. The torpedo must be brought near enough to the target so that it can, with the help of a depth-search program, search the relevant depth area, locate the target and attack it.

The volume of water searched by the torpedo per unit of time is, along with the torpedo detection range, dependent upon the torpedo speed. One should strive for the greatest possible water volume searched per unit of time; this will increase the detection probability and the overall success probability of the torpedo.

On the basis of these technical capabilities and interrelationships, the following procedures have been developed for the employment of LWT's:

--employment through aircraft. A surface ship locates the submarine with sonar and maintains contact. Over voice radio, an antisubmarine and reconnaissance aircraft (MPA) is brought into attack position with course directions. In the precomputed position, it receives instructions to drop the LWT so that it enters the water at the precomputed point. The MPA is controlled from the ship, where the actual position of the submarine is shown by sonar and that of the MPA is shown simultaneously by radar. The method is called "vector attack" (VECTAC) and its advantage is in the small amount of dead time from the locating of the submarine by a ship until engagement by dropping a torpedo from an MPA.

A different procedure is possible when the MPA itself has located or sighted the submarine. Through the use of additional sensors, it is necessary to improve the target data of the submarine, establish a picture of the situation, and, when the fire control problem has been resolved, employ the LWT as precisely as possible.

--employment through helicopters. Both procedures applied by the MPA can also be used with helicopters. VECTAC of a helicopter in accordance with the operational data of a surface antisubmarine ship and weapon employment of a helicopter on the basis of its own locating. The difference involves the employment of the means of detection. Whereas the MPA essentially uses jettisoned buoys to locate a submerged submarine showing no hull units, the helicopter relies on a powerful dipping sonar that it lowers into the best detection depth on a cable

while hovering. Through constant changing of position in accordance with a certain plan, an area is searched or monitored.

Another variation results from the cooperation of two helicopters. One helicopter does the locating and leads the second helicopter in VECTAC for weapon engagement.

--employment through missiles/rockets. As a payload, the LWT is fired from a surface ship with a missile or rocket. At the precomputed water-entry point, the torpedo must enter the water and the search program must begin. Target data for weapons employment can come from the firing unit or from another unit that is maintaining contact. The advantage of this procedure is in the rapid reaction independent of other units and in its employment over great distances.

--employment through tube firing on board a surface antisubmarine ship.

The LWT is fired from a torpedo tube using compressed air, enters the water and covers the distance to the target under its own power. At the precomputed distance, the depth search begins, which is to lead to target detection.

This method can be applied successfully only in the immediate vicinity of the firing ship, for the torpedo requires too much time for greater distances, time in which the submarine, in turn, can cover considerable distances in an unpredictable direction by changing course and/or speed, thus leaving the detection area of the torpedo.

In addition, the relatively low propulsion energy of the torpedo declines, so that only a limited volume of water can be searched in the search area or the energy is no longer sufficient for pursuing the located submarine.

With increasing distance, the probability of success of LWT's declines rapidly. It follows that lightweight torpedoes are employed most effectively from the air through MPA's, helicopters and missiles. Tube firing represents the exception against submarines in the near vicinity.

#### Employment Procedures for Heavyweight Torpedoes

A torpedo's decisive advantage of detonating a large combat charge at the most sensitive points of a ship--below the water line or even under the keel--was always opposed by its low speed relative to the target and, related to that, the long duration of combat and the quite small hit probability.


For this reason, to achieve acceptable hit probabilities for torpedoes from the time of World War II, short firing distances (less than 1 km) were required so as not to give the target any opportunity for evasive maneuvers after the firing of the torpedo.

Operational tactics led away from the aimed single firing to the salvo of individual boats and to salvos in the scope of formation attacks such as spread, pincer or sector attacks. Sometimes as many as 20 torpedoes had to be employed to make a hit sufficiently probable. Attacks of this kind presupposed great

skill on the part of the tactical leader and the commanders. The diagram makes clear the extent to which the hit probability of an unguided torpedo declines with increasing distance (and possible additional changes of speed and course by the target). But at the same time, the diagram emphasizes why the torpedo has developed in practically the same direction in all navies:

--By equipping the torpedo with its own search sensor, the torpedo sensor, the hit probability was increased substantially. It was further increased through the introduction of additional search programs.

--The introduction of the wire-guided torpedo with its own torpedo sonar increased the hit probability to such an extent that it was again possible to go to aimed single firing, despite a substantial increase in the firing distances (up to 10 nautical miles). The main effect is that the torpedo can be influenced and guided during its entire running time in accordance with possible evasive maneuvers or attempts to flee by the enemy.



Key:

- |                                      |   |
|--------------------------------------|---|
| 1. Hit probability                   | 5. No change of target course           |
| 2. Torpedo DM2A1/"Seal"              | 6. G-7a salvo (two torpedoes)           |
| 3. Torpedo MK-37 Mod 0 (slow runner) | 7. Range of fire                        |
| 4. Change of target course           | 8. Nautical miles (nm=1,852 kilometers) |

In considering the operational tactics for today's torpedoes, one must realize that a modern torpedo is no "shoot-and-forget" weapon as is a missile, for example, but that it is a component of a weapon system. In the joint operation of all system components, the torpedo can be employed in an optimum manner. It is thereby not just a weapon but, as soon as it has detected the target on its own, it is also a sensor, providing information to improve the picture of the situation and, if need be, the choice of targets.



The employment of an HWT takes place in three phases:

--In the first phase, the target is located, target data and range are determined, and the operational decision is made. Important in this connection is the determination of target data and, especially in the utilization of passive sensors, the determination of the accessible range, that is, the determination that the target can be reached by the torpedo even considering evasive and escape maneuvers. Depending upon the accuracy of the target data, the guidance procedure is established for the second phase.

--The second phase includes the leading of the torpedo to the target, essentially, then, the guiding of the torpedo from the firing boat until the torpedo detects the target on its own. If there are precise target data (only in the case of the utilization of active sensors: radar, active sonar), then preferably the collision-course procedure is applied, that is, the torpedo is guided along the shortest path to the point of impact or to the detection point, that point where the torpedo has the greatest probability of detecting the target itself. If there are only imprecise target data or only a direction-finding bearing to the target (in using passive sensors), then the torpedo is fired according to the line-of-sight system. In this instance, the torpedo is continually kept on the direction-finding line from the firing boat to the target.

In general, for this so-called transit phase, the economical torpedo speed is chosen so as, on the one hand, to make use of the entire running distance of the torpedo and, on the other hand, to have enough energy for the third phase.

--Phase three includes the first attack against the target by the torpedo and, if need be, a follow-up attack if the torpedo has missed the target in the first attack. In general, the torpedo is self-guided during this phase. That is, the operator on board the firing boat checks the target data reported back by the torpedo to see that the torpedo has acquired the proper target and then gives it clearance for self-guidance. He can, of course, continue to monitor the torpedo and take action to help it if need be. This is especially important when the target employs acoustical interference or decoys to defend against the attacking torpedo. Here all system components, including man as operator, can complement one another in the most outstanding manner by making use of all system capabilities.

#### The "Intelligent" Torpedo

The development of the new generation of submarines with speeds over 40 knots and submerged depths far beyond the 300 meters long considered valid with a simultaneous increase in the detection range and the capability of effectively defending against submarines forces one to adapt torpedoes to these realities. To combat nuclear submarines escaping at top speed, the torpedo must have a speed at least 1.5 times as great and have extremely long running distances. In addition, it must possess intelligence of its own, that is, an internal logic that can make decisions independent of the situation, recognize interference devices and decoys employed by the submarine, and not allow itself to be diverted from pursuing the target. One must thereby emphasize a low noise level of the torpedo so that even at high rates of speed there is as little self-produced interference as possible and great detection ranges can be achieved.

Moreover, a low noise level means that the torpedo is detected late by the target and thus an escape or the use of means for interference, deception and combat will be made more difficult.

In combating surface ships, it is important to take into consideration the increased detection ranges of the submarines and to have available torpedoes with great running distances and high delivery speeds.

Since the submarine defense of surface ships will be similar to that of the submarines, it will be necessary in this case as well to have the "intelligent" torpedo that additionally can certainly hit a previously detected or assigned target in a surface formation without allowing itself to be diverted through additional target echos.

Submarine development has continued to make progress in recent years and there is the danger that its superiority relative to other means of naval warfare will continue to grow. The weight of the submarine in modern naval warfare will thereby continue to rise in the future and as long as the torpedo represents the only conventional weapon for the effective combating of deep-submerged submarines, the torpedo will not only maintain its importance in the future but will increase it even more.

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MILITARY

PORTUGAL

#### NATO INVOLVEMENT IN MILITARY EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

Lisbon A TARDE in Portuguese 23 May 85 p 3

[Excerpts] The defense ministers of the NATO member nations decided yesterday to increase the aid allocated for the modernization of the armed forces of Portugal, Greece and Turkey. A statement released following the 4-hour meeting of the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) said that "the inadequacies in the forces of these countries are a source of particular concern."

Aid for the modernization of the armed forces of the three poorest countries in the Atlantic Alliance comes within the "plan of action" approved by the ministers, including Rui Machete, to ensure substantial improvement in the conventional capacity of NATO.

The Portuguese minister held bilateral meetings in Brussels with the secretary general of NATO, Lord Carrington, and with the defense ministers of the FRG and the United States, Manfred Woerner and Caspar Weinberger, respectively.

#### The Frigate Issue

The meeting with Woerner, requested by the Portuguese minister and separate from the DPC session, to discuss the purchase of three frigates for our navy from the FRG, took place yesterday afternoon.

The purchase of the three frigates for the Portuguese navy now depends on the granting of a subsidy to the shipyards which will build them by the German government.

The granting of this subsidy, for the purpose of maintaining jobs, would involve about 500 million marks, and this measure has been submitted to the government of the FRG for study.

After initial negotiations by the Portuguese authorities with a view to the purchase of three Dutch Cortenair frigates, their preference swung to the German Meko 200 frigates, mainly because the differential between the price of the Dutch frigates and the financing available was substantial.

If the German frigates, the cost of which is estimated at about \$750 million, are purchased, Portugal will contribute about \$400 million, obtained in part from the sale of the corvettes currently being used by the Portuguese navy.

The participation of other allies (the United States, Holland, Luxembourg and Canada), either in terms of equipment or through financial support, would not however suffice to meet the full financing requirement.

The differential of about 500 million marks still existing could be covered by the government of the FRG through subsidies to the shipbuilding enterprises.

"I hope that we can have a final decision by the end of June or early July," the minister said.

At about that time, Prime Minister Mario Soares plans to visit Bonn and Woerner will visit Lisbon.

5157

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MILITARY

PORTUGAL

#### SOCIALIST YOUTH LEADER COMMENTS ON MILITARY STRUCTURE

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 26 May 85 p 10

[Article by Jose Apolinario, secretary general of the Socialist Youth: "A New Prospect for the Military Establishment"]

[Excerpts] The relationship between civilian society and the armed forces is the subject of this effort and also the point of departure for more general reflection on the military establishment.

We live in a century oriented toward transition, and an era in which the differences between the developed and the underdeveloped countries on this earth, between the North and the South, are becoming more acute. The world has truly been divided into two blocs, more specifically those headed by the USSR and the United States. But to this bipolar world it is possible and desirable to oppose a multipolar world, one based on the growth and development of the Third World, on the diversification of international trade lines, and on the development of the South as a way of forcing the two giants of the North into dialogue.

Let us look now at the relations between society and the armed forces, proceeding to the case of Portugal.

The historical development of our country fully shows us the importance of the military institution in the changes which have occurred. Just in the very recent past, it was the armed forces which launched a process of social change and transformation of vital importance, a process of reestablishing democracy, the development of which will sooner or later involve a choice which becomes of greater civil importance the deeper and the more consubstantiated the existing democracy is.

In our country, the belief that questions pertaining to strategy, defense and the military establishment itself are matters exclusively for the military has erroneously taken root. We know that this concept is the result of the maintenance of an elitist attitude, but also of the ostracization of the military establishment. It is for this reason that the participation of society in the discussion of problems of a military nature is today taking on the aspect of an option in terms of the military institution itself. The choices made in this realm would have repercussions on all of social life,



even if it were not for our worrisome economic situation, and as such, the issue of the choices to be made is urgently posed.

Since Portugal is predominantly oriented toward the sea, the maritime choice will be readily understood. Today, in 1985, this choice takes on basic importance in the strategic plan. In fact, the so-called strategic triangle really represents a neuralgic zone with regard to which Portugal must have response capacity. In addition, it may yield economic benefits, with adequate protection and patrolling of the ZEE.

Going against this natural orientation and the strategic position of the country, the armed forces in Portugal have depended and even now depend above all on the army, a situation reinforced by the colonial war. However, our army, reduced to its European component, continues to be based above all on troop strength and not the resources available. The prevailing scheme relies on a proportion between officers and rank and file and not on considerations of a strategic nature.

This maritime option is not reflected here in terms of military expenditures either. The army spends about 43 percent of the military budget, while the navy and air force are left with 25 percent, according to figures recently announced. Expenditures on personnel represent an unjustified proportion. Rationalization and management are very little practiced in the Portuguese armed forces. The logic of the strategic position we have been defending should dictate a reduction in the volume of army troops, maintenance of the present strength in the navy and air force, rationalization and limitation of expenditures, such as to avoid excessive costs and mere ostentation, and an adequate supply and renewal of existing equipment. We believe it is possible, or at least desirable, to have functional modern armed forces and to reduce the overall expenditures now being made by the Portuguese state.

Another aspect of this picture is the need to dignify the rendering of military service. In principle, we are opposed to "Praetorian Guards" and exclusively professional armed forces. Military service should be viewed as a form of solidarity with the country, as a means of rendering a service to the fatherland, but this can only have relevance in fact if it has social dignity. The rendering of social service and collaboration in activities of interest to the people are for us issues of key importance to the military establishment. On the other hand, we urge a reduction in the period of compulsory military service to 12 months, an increase in compensation during recruit training, elimination of certain practices which violate the personal dignity of the individual, adaptation of the disciplinary statutes to the constitution, and the abrogation (for unconstitutionality, among other things) of provisions designed to prevent the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed civil rights for individuals in a military situation.

The recent legal endorsement of the right to conscientious objection and the imminent regulation of civic service are other aspects to be taken into account in this explanation.

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

MOTIVES FOR RESEARCH ON ATOMIC BOMB DESCRIBED WELL BY AGRELL

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 30 May 85 p 10

[Op Ed article by Fredrik Braconier]

[Text] Fredrik Braconier is current affairs editor at SVENSKA DAGBLADET and one of the authors of the recently published "Who Defends Sweden?"

In his doctoral dissertation "Nonalignment and Atomic Bombs," Wilhelm Agrell has made a narrow but still valuable contribution to modern Swedish history. Agrell has carefully analyzed portions of the Swedish defense debate and the role played in it by the prospect of atomic weapons.

Last spring, an old "unexploded bomb" suddenly went off in the Swedish public debate. As a result of articles by NY TEKNIK and reporter Christer Larsson, the nuclear debate of the 1950's and 1960's assaulted people's senses. Those articles mentioned test explosions with plutonium as late as the early 1970's, sneaky government behavior behind Parliament's back, and so on.

Could it really be that peace-loving little Sweden had considered acquiring atomic bombs? Could it be that Sweden, which now supports most disarmament projects and has also made quite substantial cutbacks in its conventional defenses, was trying just a few decades ago to become a junior member in the exclusive atomic club? And could that have happened under the leadership of a Social Democratic government headed by Tage Erlander and with Olof Palme as head of "atomic affairs"?

It sounds like a fairy tale, but it is actually true--at least to some degree. Our memories are short, and political somersaults are many. Yesterday's friends of nuclear weapons are today's apostles of disarmament, and not too many people notice the turnaround.

Let us take an example. According to Per Ahlmark's excellent book on "The Swedish Debate on Atomic Weapons" (1965), Olof Palme belonged to a small minority that departed from the party line during the voting in Parliament in May 1959. While the overwhelming party majority voted against proposals by the

Conservative and Liberal Parties for nuclear research, Olof Palme was one of seven Social Democrats in both houses who abstained.

Ahlmark's study of the voting shows that Palme was one of the three Social Democratic members of the entire Parliament who abstained during the vote on a Conservative Party proposal to purchase weapon carriers that could be fitted with nuclear explosives.

It can be pointed out that in November 1959, the Social Democratic Party's big internal investigating committee on nuclear weapons--of which Olof Palme was secretary--flatly rejected purchases of potential weapon carriers from abroad. Its report said that such purchases would "presuppose military cooperation with a big-power alliance."

At the end of the 1950's, the Social Democratic Party was studying the Swedish nuclear question with great anguish and under the threat of a serious party split. Bjorn von Sydow's well-informed dissertation "Can We Trust the Politicians?" (1978) shows how deep the conflict went, with Osten Unden and Per Edvin Skold being important leaders at the two extremes.

The Center and Liberal Parties were also split, while the Conservative Party and the Military Council were calling for an affirmative decision on atomic bombs.

It is precisely the Military Council's position and its handling of the matter that are elucidated comprehensively and well in the recent dissertation on history by Wilhelm Agrell, a peace researcher in Lund. Entitled "Nonalignment and Atomic Bombs. Continuity and Change in Swedish Defense Doctrine, 1945-1982" and published by Liber, it is a comprehensive study running to nearly 400 pages--that is, more than twice the length considered adequate by authorities for obtaining one's doctorate.

Agrell's dissertation is a well-documented but rather narrow and stodgy review of the changes in Swedish defense doctrine during the postwar period and the role of nuclear weapons in that connection. He views the Swedish quarrel over the atomic bomb from a special perspective and sets narrow limits on his source material and the scope of his study.

The political and national battle over nuclear weapons that took place just over 25 years ago is reflected only faintly in the volume, which deals mainly with plans by the OB [Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces], defense committee reports, and government proposals in connection with the defense issue. Agrell's dissertation is not an easily accessible basic book on Swedish difficulties with nuclear weapons--this probably needs to be stressed once again.

But what was the real situation as far as the main issue is concerned? Was Sweden on the verge of becoming a nuclear power, and did serious efforts in that direction continue throughout the 1960's--and even into the early 1970's--which is the impression given in some places by NY TEKNIK's articles? Wilhelm Agrell's answer agrees with the prevailing opinion and works out to a "no."

When the debate over atomic bombs was at its height at the end of the 1950's, Sweden lacked the technical means of producing bombs. We simply had no highly enriched uranium or plutonium with which to make atomic bombs. Not until 1964 did the small reactor in Agesta begin to produce enough plutonium--in addition to heat for Farsta--to manufacture about two nuclear charges per year.

But even if the general debate had not yet ended--the Institute of International Affairs, for example, published several books on the Swedish nuclear question in 1965--the real stand had already been taken. The Social Democratic decision in 1959 to postpone the matter was transformed by time and developments into an automatic and uncontroversial rejection.

That shrewd decision, which immediately won support from the equally split middle parties, left the way open for later action and rejected design research, but advocated an expansion of defense research, some components of which would correspond exactly to design research.

The test explosions carried out later by the FOA [Defense Research Institute] with small amounts of plutonium had received explicit advance approval in the Social Democratic report on nuclear weapons that was issued in 1959.

However, the wording of that report reflected primarily a successful attempt to find the smallest common denominator among the party's quarreling wings and thus avoid an open party split. In the end, postponement and expanded defense research were acceptable to everyone.

Jeopardizing that unity by adopting a new policy later in favor of Swedish nuclear weapons was an alternative that can scarcely have crossed the minds of Social Democratic leaders. Demands from other quarters for nuclear armament also dropped off quickly. Agrell shows convincingly that military leaders abandoned the idea in the early 1960's.

International developments also worked against a Swedish nuclear program. The theories in the 1950's that tactical nuclear weapons would be supplied to the armed forces of more and more nations turned out to be wrong. On the contrary, there was the test ban treaty, the nonproliferation treaty, and the start of detente. That Sweden of all countries should start a direct nuclear program under those conditions was naturally out of the question.

The result was that Sweden did not get the bomb. Most people probably feel that that was well and good. But as Agrell points out, the decision not to have its own nuclear weapons also meant that Sweden was giving up its belief in total defense against all forms of attack. That is the main conclusion in Agrell's dissertation.

Proud slogans to the effect that resistance would never be abandoned were weeded out. Big civil defense exercises for evacuating cities in the event of a threatened nuclear attack were dropped. The threat picture was whittled down to make it harmonize with the defense force's possibilities.

Unscientifically and perhaps somewhat unfairly, that attitude can be called an ostrich policy. It would be unfair in that there were also other reasons at



the time for modifying the picture of possible threats to Sweden. The United States was abandoning its doctrine of massive retaliation. The idea behind that doctrine was that any communist attack on the free world would be met with a large-scale nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.

That strategy was criticized at the end of the 1950's for its lack of credibility. Opponents said that no one would believe in the U.S. nuclear threat if, for example, a guerrilla war were to break out in Asia. A reorientation began under President Kennedy. The conventional forces--which for reasons of economy had been held back by Eisenhower--were expanded, and the new strategy became "flexible response": the idea that the nature of the threat would determine the countermeasures.

But at the same time, the United States strengthened its nuclear forces, and the new doctrine did not mean--and it does not mean now--that the plans called for a long-term conventional war in Europe. The higher nuclear threshold would provide some respite before the missiles were sent on their way.

So even though conventional weapons were assigned greater importance in the 1960's, it can nevertheless be asserted that by saying no to nuclear weapons of its own, Sweden was also saying no, by extension, to the policy of armed neutrality, the most important factor in which was the deterrent capability of the defense force. Perhaps we can see here the origin of the policy of the 1970's and 1980's that has involved a scaling down of our conventional forces as well. Since we cannot protect ourselves from the biggest threats, the defense force does not play such a large role. We can reduce our defense force and the threat picture and hope that things will be all right anyway.

At about the same time that Sweden was canceling its plans for nuclear weapons, another country was becoming a nuclear power. It was France. General De Gaulle had been ridiculed from the start because of his "strike force," which consisted of a few bombers that had to be refueled in flight to reach their intended targets. The probability that they would reach those targets was regarded as minimal.

But France stuck to its guns and developed its own nuclear force.

No one is smiling any longer. France has developed nuclear-armed submarines and so on. The country that was constantly criticized in the 1950's as the weak link in the West European chain is now a self-confident key state in that same area.

France chose one path, and Sweden chose another. We can only hope that both made the right choice.

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CSO: 3650/255



MILITARY

SWEDEN

#### NEW SHAPED CHARGE ANTITANK SHELL DESCRIBED

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 14 May 85 p 11

[Article by Erik Liden: "Multibillion Project for World Markets--New Swedish Design Defeats Modern Armor"]

[Text] A revolutionary Swedish invention can in a short time completely change the conditions for combat by tanks and other armored vehicles. The problem of the technology with shaped charges [RSV] not functioning well against modern armor has now been solved by Swedish technicians.

RSV is used today in most missiles and grenades which are used in different antitank systems for protection against enemy tanks and other armored vehicles and trucks.

RSV is based on the principle that an explosive charge has the greatest effect if it detonates a distance away from the armor plate which it is to penetrate. If the explosive is furthermore hollowed out in the direction of the detonation and the conical hole is fitted with a metal layer of copper, for example, the explosive effect is considerably increased.

The physical explanation is that the explosive gases of the detonation are projected out perpendicular to the surface of the charge. The gases are concentrated in the middle of the cone and directed with the help of the metal in the form of a narrow explosive ray which penetrates deep into the armor plate.

RSV is found primarily in the following Swedish weapons: rifle grenade ammunition, different antitank missiles and artillery ammunition, tank ammunition and light antitank weapons such as Miniman and AT4 from FFV [The Swedish National Industries Corporation].

#### Does Not Succeed

Through the development of a more sophisticated RSV ammunition, tank protection has for a long time not been successful against the effects of modern

RSV. Countermeasures were successful until the traditional armor steel could be complemented or replaced with composition armor or active armor which lessened the effect of RSV in a decisive way.

In composition armor common armor plate is blended with layers of glass or carbon fiber armored plastic, which greatly reduce the penetrating power of the RSV beam.

It is even worse with active armor, which consists of small explosive charges which are hung in boxes outside of the armor plate. These small charges are ignited by the RSV beam, which is broken apart by the detonations, and its penetrating power is greatly reduced. Different tests have shown that there is a 50-70 percent poorer penetration than against common armor.

The reduced penetrating ability against modern armor means that only TOW2, a heavy antitank missile which Sweden buys from the United States, can penetrate the front of the most modern tanks. Besides the subcaliber dart projectiles with wolfram or uranium tips which are fired from tank cannons, it is the only fully modern antitank weapon found in Sweden today.

Bofors, FFV, FMV [Defense Material Administration] and FOA [National Defense Research Institute] can now report that their engineers and technicians have, after many years of research, succeeded in designing the RSV beam so that it is only slightly affected by composition and active armor.

#### Top Secret

"Obviously the technology we used is top secret since we know that we are the first in the world to succeed with this redesign of RSV," said Soren Wigren, development chief of the ammunition division at Bofors in Karlskoga. "Existing weapons, both in Sweden and in many other countries, can with this new RSV ammunition have an entirely different effect against modern armor than we had reason to believe only a few years ago."


If production of the new RSV succeeds at Bofors and RSV it will be a multi-billion project for a very interested world market where the antitank function of most defense forces is dominated by RSV warheads in missiles and ammunition.

#### Secrecy Protection

The secrecy protection by the defense industry of this new RSV product is very high, as interest by foreign intelligence services has already been noted.

To get an idea of the size of the importance of RSV, it can be stated that just in the Swedish defense forces there are RSV weapons and ammunition for nearly 5 billion kronor in today's currency, weapons which because of rapid technical development in a few years would have limited military utility.

Export possibilities for RSV weapons and ammunition from Bofors and FFV are greatly increased by this entirely Swedish invention.



Caption: Swedish technicians have, by means of shaped charges (RSV), solved the problem of penetrating composition armor and active armor with a new secret RSV design, illustration farthest to the right. Today's RSV attacks, illustrations 1-3.

Key: (1) Shaped charge  
(2) Explosive  
(3) Armor

MILITARY

SWEDEN

# ARMED FORCES COMMANDER RECOMMENDS BINDING PILOT CONTRACTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 12 Jun 85 p 5

[Article by Arne Soderlund]

[Text] Fighter pilots should be bound to their job by contract.

That is the opinion of the OB [Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces], and he says so in a final report to the government by the committee on flight personnel benefits.

Fighter pilots currently work under the same conditions as other government employees: they can give notice and quit their job. That was what led to a crisis last fall: so many air force pilots wanted to go into civil aviation that Sweden's defense capability was threatened.

The government solved the problem temporarily by "persuading" the airline companies not to recruit so zealously and by granting fighter pilots a new premium that reduced the gap between the pay for fighter pilots and that for civilian airline pilots.

But the time has now arrived for a more long-term solution. And yesterday--Tuesday--came the OB's proposal.

His idea is that fighter pilots should be hired under contract, and that the first contract should run for 10 years. Three years would consist of training, and the rest would be spent in actual service.

A pilot who wanted to break his contract and leave the air force would be forced to pay a fine, says the OB. That fine would be proportional to what the pilot had cost the taxpayers in pay and benefits, and it would decrease progressively through the 10th year.

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

OFFICER SEES READINESS, MOBILITY, SURPRISE AS MAIN NEEDS

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 12 May 85 p 3

[Op Ed Article by Colonel First Class Hodder Stjernsward, former military commander of Stockholm: "Colonel Writes About Future Direction of the Swedish Defense--Must Be Swift and Effective." Previous contributions were by Hans Lindblad, 14 April, and Roland Brannstrom/Per Petersson, 3 May.]

[Text] Is our defense abreast of the times? The question is justified. It should be asked often. Politicians as well as the military must now and then try in the world of ideas to push aside what we have inherited, and instead see what is required now and in the future.

Our army is entirely structured around our war organization and the system of mobilization which is to ensure that the change from peace to war organization goes quickly and surely. What creates respect, therefore, is an army on home leave whose mobilization is first decided upon and then accomplished before it can act.

Rapid Tempo

A conscript army functions in that way. It has quantity, but it takes time to get it started. It is just on this point that one must ask whether the system is modern, if it is responsive to the demands of the time.

The postwar period shows an entirely different development of events in war and crises than previously. The tempo of the escalation toward violence and aggression is often very rapid. Communications, means of transport, weapons and weapons systems make this technically possible. It is often in the political and psychological interests of the aggressor to bring about a quick decision, to be able to confront the world with a fait accompli, before a counteraction can begin.

Since 1945 about 50 wars have been fought. The Middle East, Afghanistan, the Falklands are some of the places where the wars have begun quickly and by surprise. Nuclear weapons have not been used. The superpowers know that a nuclear war means mutual destruction, suffering and losses without equal, and no winners, only losers. But under the nuclear umbrella the limited wars are fought out, apparently unchecked.



## Vague Middle Stage

Another typical phenomenon in today's conflict world is the less perceptible difference between peace, crisis and war. Previously war involved visible preparations and a violent opening. Today there is an infinite number of more or less middle stages.

It is narrow-sighted to consider that these lead exclusively to a violent, shooting war. A country with the will to defend itself must create a defense against several forms of attack, everything from psychological and subversive to military assault. And since the latter can be begun quickly, the military defense apparatus must have the ability to react quickly and move weapons to the area of the attack quickly.

What the Swedish Army can produce in this regard in peacetime are limited readiness units and temporarily serving available refresher training units. That is obviously not sufficient.

## What Creates Respect

This conclusion probably agrees with the position of the supreme commander. In the 1984 program plan there is a statement calling for higher peacetime readiness. The measures recommended, for example greater distribution of refresher training units over the year, more peacetime units trained and organized for readiness tasks, increased authority to call up units, expanded possibilities to utilize the home guard, are all applicable now. But they are still only patchwork; revision of a partly antiquated system.

Here some of our readers will surely say, "He is out to get our conscription system. Woe and horror! It cannot be touched." Of course it is a political untouchable. I will, however, say that the present conscription should be able to accommodate a new, modern system with general conscription, but with a different form than it has today.

In the indifferent world in which we live, with the tremendous resources which are armed and ready on both sides of the iron curtain, what is it that creates respect besides our defense?

## Warplanes and Ships

In the first place it is hardly our army war organization's quantity, with uneven quality and sluggish mobilization. Instead it is things which exist and are visible and which can immediately be brought into play.

It is our warplanes, our armed and equipped warships and the guns, tanks, missiles and radar stations which are manned and are immediately available or can be employed on short notice.

In the second place, that which is not now visible but which can gradually be shaped, is what the aggressor seeks to avoid through swiftness and surprise. Then our mobilization organization and our willingness to maintain a large conscript army would not be so much admired. In the long term it is impressive, but the system is far removed from modern thinking and imagined or real threat situations in today's world.

#### The Demands of War Decide

Therefore here is the dilemma; if the entire conscript army is organized for war, we cannot afford to give more than a part of it modern weapons. The rest will be supplied with second-class equipment and will thereby be a secondary force. And what is worse, when it goes into combat, if it should last long enough, it goes into an admitted inferior position with heavy losses as a natural result.

The soldier whom we send against the enemy must be well trained and equipped and inspired with the will to defend the country. One can hardly in good conscience choose an organization which is suitable from a political standpoint, but which does not meet modern requirements. Under all circumstances the primary requirement must be the immediate wartime capability of the soldiers and the units.

It is dangerous to make a virtue of necessity. The so-called Swedish profile must be a swift, modern and efficient profile, not a large number of units, some of dubious combat value. It is the demands of war which should decide, not the demands of politics.

Just as we know that a "Viggen" aircraft today can make a good contribution, we must also be convinced that our army units can do the same. The British units which in the spring of 1982 first sailed half way around the world and conquered the east Falklands in terrible weather, without the use of tents, still were able to defeat a strong defense west of Stanley. Twelve thousand men with modern weapons and 2 months preparation could not resist a force which was hardly one-third as great, which furthermore had no greater support than "Harrier" aircraft and 10.5 cm guns, except for ships' gunnery.

A French parachute battalion in 1978 succeeded with great skill in flying 10 hours, reloading in Kinshasa, the capital of Zaire, where Congolese paratroopers with different equipment than the French were deployed, a new flight to Kolwezi over unknown terrain which 4,000 heavily equipped rebel soldiers were defending, and defeated this force and freed the 2,500 Europeans who were in the area.

Some will perhaps say: Why mention these examples? They are examples of experienced troops, trained for tasks of just the kind that they were used to solve.

## Necessary Conditions

But is not such reasoning incorrect? Why should one assume that one's own army would be worse? Why should not Swedish troops, in accordance with the demands of modern warfare, be quickly deployed to different parts of our lengthy country and after enduring the fatigue which long movements always cause, attack with force and achieve success? It would be in "peacetime" against a chance aggressor brought here by submarine or helicopter, or by a surprise attack.

## Great Reduction of Field Army

Then how shall we create an organization which can respond to the demands outlined above? The answer must obviously come after an open and thorough investigation.

It must however be that the weapons, equipment and training that we give our soldiers is up-to-date, powerful and modern. It is also important that we have an important part of our war organization ready in the circumstances that we live in today, and which is called peace. To be able to afford a thoroughly modern and effective war organization, the current field army must be significantly reduced.

The brigades and independant battalion units which belong to the standing ready army must be cherished by our society. They must have ample access to helicopters for rapid transport and support, and be transportable to the battlefield in armored vehicles. The organization should be built around trained units with supplementary conscripts.

The model of the UN battalion should serve as a basic element in recruiting. Stronger inputs of professional people must be present in this highly technical army. The general conscript must remain, but with reduced numbers for the reserve, which will not be in the wartime military defense. The home guard will be made more effective.

## Depressing Persistence

In this column Hans Lindblad has taken up some of these questions. He concentrated on helicopters. I believe that his thinking is correct. Lindblad's work on the Conscript Training Committee should bring more of this type of thinking into consideration.

In the proposal presented by the committee the current system was the foundation. It was not questioned. The main problem was obviously to find new methods to reduce the peace organization, as well as the peacetime costs, so as to be able to retain the army's current extensive war organization.

In this column the proposals have recently been motivated by the committee chairman, Roland Brannstrom and member Per Pettersson. On the one side it

is favorable to read that there is "a strong feeling in favor of having a relatively strong defense in order to maintain this policy and our independence."

But on the other hand it is depressing to see this obstinate persistence for an over-dimensioned war organization. Both these experienced men must of course know that we will never be able to afford to maintain all this, or even most of it, with weapons and material which are sufficiently modern and powerful, and thereby frightening.

#### Mass Army Impossible

They also know that the cost for this large field army will only permit widespread and limited ready units in peacetime. The great conscript army of the first half of the 1900's will simply not do in 1985. Now we need an army with speed, mobility and power, and units immediately available, so that the costs make a "mass army" impossible. We must have a "strong defense anchored in the people."

Certainly, but nobody believes that this "anchoring in the people" means quantity before quality. Our people have never agreed with this. General conscription can very well be combined with limited quantity and power with personnel and material quality. It should be obvious to most people that all the conscripts cannot have a wartime billet in the military defense.

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

#### BOFORS ACCUSED OF EXPORTING ILLEGAL EXPLOSIVES TO IRAN

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 5 Jun 85 p 6

[Article by Bo G. Andersson]

[Text] Swedish customs is accusing Bofors in Karlskoga of having delivered large quantities of war materiel to Iran. The deliveries took place at the same time that Prime Minister Olof Palme, at the request of the head of the United Nations, was trying to mediate peace in the bloody war between Iran and Iraq.

The Customs Service's suspicions about Bofors are concerned with exports of military explosives, which are used primarily as the main charges in various kinds of projectiles and ammunition.

According to the criminal investigation now underway--it is being handled by the Customs Criminal Investigation Unit in Stockholm under the direction of County Prosecutor Stig L. Age of Orebro--Bofors supplied Iran and at least two other states in the turbulent Persian Gulf area with military explosives. Customs suspects that the firm deliberately deceived the Swedish Government concerning its exports of the war materiel.

Based on information provided by Bofors, the government had issued permits for exports to a couple of European states on the assumption that they were the receiving countries and the final destination.

#### Third Countries Used

Customs suspects, however, that the European countries were merely used as transit countries by Bofors. This is confirmed by written evidence--order sheets, freight documents, invoices, and so on that were confiscated--as well as by testimony by responsible Bofors officials.

Between 1976 and 1978--with full authorization from the government--Bofors delivered 12 guns for Iran's navy. During 1978, however, when the disturbances broke out in Iran, all official Swedish exports of war materiel were halted. Exporting to a country at war conflicts with the principles governing the government's policy on arms exports.



Ingvar Bratt, the former computer engineer at Bofors who recently came forward to report Bofors' missile deals with Bahrain and Dubai, has no connection with this customs investigation. It is the result of an independent investigation by customs that has been underway for a long time.

#### Tip From Abroad

It began when the Customs Service received a tip from a foreign customs authority last fall. The information was based on the fact that an overland shipment of military explosives from Bofors had been rerouted under strange circumstances down on the continent.

Investigation by Swedish Customs revealed that the cargo was bound for a West European country named as the destination in an export permit which Bofors had obtained from the government. But before the shipment reached the land frontier, the truck changed direction and headed for a port city in another European country. There the explosives were loaded onto a ship which then, according to freight documents and other evidence, took the war materiel to a country on the Persian Gulf that is "off limits" to Swedish arms exports.

In February of this year, suspicions by customs that there had been a serious goods smuggling offense became strong enough to justify starting a preliminary investigation of Bofors. The suspicion is that the government's permanent body for arms export matters, the War Materiel Inspectorate, was deliberately deceived concerning the war materiel export.

#### Worth 100 Million Kronor

Sigvard Falkenland, head of division in the Customs Service, told DAGENS NYHETER: "From the standpoint of value and quantity, this is the biggest smuggling investigation ever carried out by customs."

All told, suspicions currently cover deliveries worth about 100 million kronor. The Customs Criminal Investigation Unit is investigating Bofors exports of military explosives all the way back to 1979-1980. But in the case of Iran, the suspicions cover only the past 2 years.

Although the investigation is in full swing--legal action is not expected until this fall--customs feels that it is as good as proven that the war materiel did indeed wind up in Iran and the other two suspected countries on the Persian Gulf. That feeling is based on written evidence and several admissions by responsible officials at the Nobel Chemical Corporation, the Bofors subsidiary that manufactures and sells the military explosives.

#### Search

County Prosecutor Stig L. Age has confirmed that a criminal investigation is underway. In a statement to DAGENS NYHETER, he said: "The Customs Criminal Investigation Unit is carrying out a preliminary investigation into questionable sales of war materiel, and searches have been conducted at a firm belonging to

the group in question. Written evidence has been secured, but for the present, I cannot comment because the investigation is still underway."

DAGENS NYHETER submitted a few questions to Minister of Foreign Trade Mats Hellstrom. He answered through his press secretary that he did not intend to make any comments before seeing the results of the customs investigation. Here are two of the questions we asked:

1. Besides the missiles for Dubai and Bahrain, Bofors is now suspected of having smuggled military explosives to a belligerent country on the Persian Gulf. How do those suspicions affect Sweden's credibility abroad?
2. War Materiel Inspector Carl Algernon has carried out his own investigations on the basis of those suspicions. What was the result?

#### Possibility of Imprisonment

Bofors is already under investigation by police because of its missile deals with Bahrain and Dubai. In that case, the firm is suspected of having used Singapore as a transit country and exporting missiles by that route in order to deceive the government and the War Materiel Inspectorate. It was the Swedish Peace and Arbitration Association that reported that case to police and prosecutors after being contacted by Ingvar Bratt.

The missile case also involves suspicions of serious goods smuggling. If the responsible Bofors officials are convicted, they face the possibility of imprisonment for up to 6 years.

#### Bofors Project Threatened With Bombing

Bofors has had sizable economic interests in Iran since 1974. That was when the planning and design work began for a chemical plant several miles outside Isfahan, Iran's second-largest city.

The plant, which is being built by Skanska, will be completed this fall. It will produce various acids such as sulfuric acid, nitric acid, and acetic acid as well as nitrocellulose and nitroaromatics. Those chemicals are the base for the production of both civilian and military explosives.

Bofors and the Iranians both claim, however, that the project is entirely civilian in purpose. Iran says, for example, that the plant will manufacture fertilizer, dyes, and copying fluids.

A year ago, the Isfahan area was threatened with bomb attacks by Iraq. The country's charge d'affaires in Stockholm conveyed those threats directly to the Swedish Government. Iraq claimed very firmly that the Bofors plant was a military target and that it was going to manufacture military explosives that might be used in the war that was underway.

Under Secretary of State Carl-Johan Aberg of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied to the Iraqi threats. He, too, explained that following diplomatic

inquiries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had determined that the Bofors project was a civilian project.

The Bofors order from Iran is worth a full 700 million kronor.

#### Palme's Mediation Unsuccessful so Far

Shortly after the war between Iraq and Iran flared up in the fall of 1980, Olof Palme was asked by the UN secretary general of the time, Kurt Waldheim, to try to mediate peace.

Palme has since made several futile trips as mediator to the war-stricken countries on the Persian Gulf.

How the suspected smuggling of explosives will affect Palme's role as mediator is something he does not want to comment on at present, however. He sent word on Tuesday that he is not prepared at present to comment on the new suspicions involving Bofors.

In the time that Palme has been striving to mediate between those countries, far more than 300,000 people have been killed in the war.

On repeated occasions, both states have attacked civilian targets in the other's country. Tehran and Baghdad have both been attacked, and the civilian population has had to endure great suffering.

As recently as Friday of last week, Olof Palme appealed to both Iraq and Iran to stop bombing civilian targets.

At the United Nations, people are no longer especially optimistic about an armistice between the countries. UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar said recently that both sides still believe they can win.

#### Explosives Classified as War Materiel

According to the policy on Swedish exports of war materiel that was adopted by Parliament in 1982, export permits may not be issued for the following:

- a) A state that is in armed conflict with another state.
- b) A state that is involved in an international conflict which shows signs of turning into an armed conflict.
- c) A state that is experiencing domestic armed violence.
- d) A state that can be expected to use the materiel to suppress human rights in violation of UN rules.

Exports of war materiel to Iran, which is one of the countries under suspicion here, are therefore banned under the terms of that policy.

The explosives in question in this case--various mixtures of pentyl, TNT, and so on--were already classified as war materiel by the War Materiel Inspectorate and are included on a list of Swedish war materiel. The list is revised from time to time, however, based on technical developments.

Swedish arms firms that export must apply to the War Materiel Inspectorate for an export permit. The inspectorate investigates the matter before sending the application on to the minister of foreign trade, who in almost all cases brings those export matters before the government. Before permission to export is granted, the Political Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs evaluates the purchasing state to determine whether there are obstacles to the export in question from the standpoint of foreign policy or the policy of neutrality.

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MILITARY

SWEDEN

# CHARGES BOFORS SHIPPED ARMS ILLEGALLY TO MIDDLE EAST STATES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Jun 85 p 5

[Various authors]

[Text] The head of Bofors told DAGENS NYHETER, "We will help the county prosecutor. If suspicions of smuggling turn out to be true, there is no excuse. I will then take the necessary measures."

That was said by the head of the Bofors company, Anders G. Carlberg, in his first comment on the suspicions of smuggling against the company. He is meeting the poor publicity which Bofors is now getting from all the articles with offensive strategy. But he is not prepared to say at this time what an eventual "purge" would consist of.

"I can only say that the measures will be sufficient. I will decide on them when I see the report of the county prosecutor and his decision on the matter of prosecution," explained Carlberg to DAGENS NYHETER.

On Thursday Anders Carlberg came home from a business trip to the United States and was met by a crowd of journalists and negative columns about Bofors export of war material.

DN: What is your spontaneous reaction to the suspicions?

"I am both surprised and perplexed. The mere suspicion that we have not obeyed the laws for export of Swedish defense material is very deplorable, and I regret it," said Carlberg.

New on the Job

He became the managing director of Nobel Industrier AB, as Bofors is called since it merged last fall with Kema Nobel, at the start of the year. As he is so new on the job he has no personal responsibility for the suspicions of smuggling war material. Carlberg replaced the current chairman of SAF Ulrik Winberg. The latter was the senior responsible official at Bofors before the suspected missile and explosives affairs.



Anders Carlberg has been informed about the investigations of the criminal police and the customs since they began in February of this year. But he says he knows no details of the reports and will not comment on information about specific receiving countries.

"In general I can say that we are trying in every way to facilitate the work of the county prosecutor so that the investigation can go as quickly as possible."

DN: Are you urging Bofors employees in Karlskoga to tell what they know and to assist the investigations of the police and customs officers?

"We have told them that they will help the ongoing investigations. I really hope that they give a complete picture of what has happened."

Anders Carlberg assured that in the future the defense material division would follow all existing rules and laws for exports. He said that he would personally vouch for that.

DN: Does Bofors still have the full confidence of the government and the permission-granting authorities?

"For 100 years we have manufactured defense material for the Swedish defenses and I hope that has created great confidence which we will continue to build upon."

#### Alternatives

The manufacture of war material comprises about 20 percent of the activity of Nobel Industrier. Anders G. Carlberg hopes, however, that efforts to find civilian alternatives to weapons manufacture at Karlskogs will produce results. He believes that the company has already partially succeeded in getting away from the dependence on weapons, and points to investments in the chemistry area, biomechanics and civilian electronics.

Olof Palme: 'If True, It Is Serious'

"If it is true that Swedish explosives were exported to Iran it is extremely serious," said Prime Minister Olof Palme on Thursday in a comment on the suspicions by customs officials that extensive war material was smuggled to the warring country on the Persian Gulf.

Palme does not believe, however, that the suspicions and an eventual conviction against the Bofors leadership will affect his UN role as mediator in the war between Iraq and Iran.

"Both countries must be fully aware that criminal activity was taking place. It surely has no significance at all," said Olof Palme.

Beyond that Palme would not comment on information concerning the suspected smuggling of explosives. "It is still too early to judge whether Bofors is guilty of any criminal activity," said Palme.

Also Foreign Trade Minister Mats Hellstrom said on Thursday that the suspicions against Bofors are very serious.

"The government must strongly intervene if it is proved that systematic criminality is taking place within Bofors," said Mats Hellstrom.

He did not, however, want to comment in detail on the smuggling because of the ongoing investigation.

### 'Through Their Fingers'

Bjorn Molin, member of the leadership of the Liberal Party and former trade minister, went on a hard attack against the government over the Bofors affair which was recently disclosed.

"It is amazing that the government is looking through its fingers at the unlawful weapons export from Sweden," said Bjorn Molin.

"The government can no longer continue to be silent about the weapons smuggling. The legislation contains all the necessary instruments for stopping the export of war material to warring nations," said Molin.

"Information now disclosed indicates that for a number of years Bofors hoodwinked both the government and the inspectors of war material."

### Critical

According to Bjorn Molin he stumbled across a couple of cases when he was trade minister in which weapons exported to Yugoslavia would be sold to a "prohibited" country.

"I believe that we need to appoint a critical authority which will verify that firms which get dispensation from the prohibition against weapons export really carry out the business according to regulations," said MP Maj-Britt Theorin, the government's ambassador for disarmament.

As an MP in the opposition, Theorin has advocated greater control over the Swedish weapons firms.

But like the Social Democratic Government, which is also shaken by the disclosures, she refers to the ongoing police investigation.

Bertil Fiskesjo, Center Party member of the Constitution Committee, is upset and told DN that "Here we obviously need a real purge."

"We must quickly find out what really happened," he said.

#### 'KU [Constitutional Committee] Should Investigate'

The Left Party Communists (VPK) have reported the government to the investigating Constitutional Committee. KU should investigate the government's inadequate control over Bofors' weapons deals.

Carl Bildt, security expert of the Conservative Party, which does not usually criticize the export of weapons but rather speaks of the necessity of it for Swedish security policy, told DN that "there must be personal consequences for those who are responsible for unlawful acts.

Bildt also pointed out that according to the applicable rules, weapons export is necessary so that Sweden can maintain domestic weapons production.

#### A Clear Pattern...

A clear pattern appears in the smuggling deals of which Bofors is suspected: the firm sought government permission to export war material to a "recognized" receiving country, for example Yugoslavia, Singapore or some West European country. Parallel with this effort, which is primarily the responsibility of the inspector of war material, secret negotiations are conducted with the real customers.

Internally within Bofors different codenames or project designations have been used for the actual buyer countries. This in order to make it more difficult to observe the operation and to prevent the real identity of the customer from being known by the inspector of war material, the foreign ministry or the government. Only a small circle of project chiefs, marketing and sales officials knew that the firm deliberately misled the authorities in order to increase exports.

With the government's permission in hand, which also referred to the "wrong" country, Bofors could ship the material out of Sweden. In certain cases the weapons and explosives did not even pass through the country for which the government gave permission, but instead took other routes to the final destination.

In one case, in the fall of 1981, a smuggling attempt to Libya was stopped by the then Trade Minister Bjorn Molin, who went to Karlskoga and "lectured" the then head of the firm, Claes-Ulrik Winberg, now chairman of SAF. It involved a large number of 40 mm guns which Bofors intended to sell via Yugoslavia. But the Swedish military attache in Belgrade learned of the plans and immediately notified Stockholm. (See Nr. 4 on the map at the end of the article.)

The suspected smuggling of military explosives to at least three countries in the Middle East are is probably the most extensive and complicated affair.

Several European states, both in the East and the West, were used as "transit countries" by Bofors. It was to these states that the government permitted the export of war material. Bofors, however, from Karlskoga, or with the help of middlemen in Europe, secretly redirected the material so that 50 kg casks of explosive would reach their final destination. This report came from the criminal police in Stockholm who investigated.

The entire Middle East is regarded as a war zone by the Swedish government and the export of war material there is therefore prohibited. (See the shaded countries on the map.)

#### Missile 70 Being Stopped?

Bofors is threatening to stop most production of the export product Missile 70. In an internal memorandum to its personnel on Thursday it was confirmed that "new decisions had been made about delivery conditions" and that "manufacture therefore can not continue in the present circumstances."

In clear text that means that the expected export success of this weapons system failed to appear. In the latest annual report there were great hopes for Missile 70.

According to the internal memorandum 150 employees--mostly from the personnel in missile production--will get new jobs within the firm. No layoffs were announced in the memorandum.

The vice chairman of the Metal Club, Stig Stahlberg, is not surprised by the memorandum. He has already reported the plans in the MBL [Codetermination Act] negotiations.

"There will not be an abrupt stop, but if no new unexpected orders come in Missile 70 production will be successively reduced," he said.

The export of Missile 70 has long been disputed. In March of this year county prosecutor Stig Age began an investigation of alleged weapon smuggling to Bahrein and the United Arab Emirates of this weapon system. The smuggling was to have taken place 1979-80, and gone through a middleman in Singapore.

Spokesmen at Bofors told DN that it was these deals which caused the Bofors leadership to make another judgment of export possibilities for Missile 70. Another interpretation offered is that through the contemplated cutbacks the firm will demonstrate that they cannot maintain employment with the political restrictions on Swedish weapons export.

#### Not Definite


Bofors head Anders Carlberg will not comment in more detail on the causes for the announced reduction in production, since according to him there has been no definite decision.

"We will look at this next week," he said. "Then we will make a final decision based on the orders and the stockpile situation."

Carlberg pointed out, however, that the plans had nothing to do with the alleged smuggling affair.

"The export that we are deciding upon only applies to countries which fall within the framework of the Swedish law."

## Bofors: fyra misstänkta smuggelaffärer





Caption: Bofors: Four Suspected Smuggling Deals

- Key: (1) Missile 70 to Dubai and Bahrein. Preliminary investigation going on. Indictment expected in the fall. Suspected of smuggling Missile 70.  
November 1979: 161 missiles and 14 aiming devices delivered to Bahrein in the Persian Gulf via Singapore. Value about 30 million.  
March 1980: 143 missiles and 13 aiming devices via Singapore to Dubai. Value 27 million.
- (2) Explosives to the Middle East. Preliminary investigation going on. Indictment expected in the fall. Suspected of smuggling military explosives. The explosives, in 50 kg casks, "bounced" between as many as three different countries before they arrived at the buyers in the Middle East, including Iran. Value at least 100 million kronor.
- (3) 57 mm antiaircraft guns to Iraq. Police reported "carelessness" in 1980. The guns were exported to Yugoslavia to be mounted on three frigates. The frigates with the canons aboard were, however, already sold to Iraq during 1979, which was reported in military journals.
- (4) 40 mm antiaircraft guns to Libya.  
1981: the government stopped a smuggling attempt to Libya via Yugoslavia.

9287

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ECONOMIC

FINLAND

# SOVIET EFFORT TO BALANCE TRADE WITH WEST HURTING FINNISH EXPORTS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 28 Jun 85 p 25

[Article by Kalle Heiskanen: "West Eats Into East: Finland Offers Help to Central Europeans in Soviet Commercial Megaprojects"]

[Text] The gas pipeline that runs from the Soviet Union to Central Europe thrusts challenges but also puts pressure on Finnish export firms. More and more projects are slipping into the hands of Austrian, Italian, French and West German enterprises as the Soviet Union tries to bring its trade balance surplus into equilibrium.

The most recent example is a 1.6 billion mark contract obtained by an Italian factory to build two tanneries in the Soviet Union. Likewise, only a month has elapsed since announcement of the Italian Finsideri's pipe contract for \$2 billion (roughly 13 billion marks).

Additional choice offerings dangle before Central European business firms. Almost always at stake are factory shipments worth hundreds of millions--even billions--of marks on the so-called turnkey principle.

Finnish firms try to get a piece of the action as subcontractors. A lot of contacts have been made, but so far the results have been meager. It has not even helped that the Soviets have marketed Finland to other Western enterprises. Even more effectively than the Finns themselves, says one source.

Soviet trade officials have painstakingly guided the Finns toward those enterprises which compete for big contracts. They have acted as agents for the Finns with the English companies John Brown and Davy McKeen, among others. The companies are seeking a contract for a chemical plant project worth about 6 billion marks.

A goal of the Finns is to collaborate with the West German Mannesman, which is vying for a metallurgical factory to be built in Volsk during the next 5-year plan, 1986-1990. The project's value is approximately 6.5 billion marks.

One alternative could be a metallurgical plant which will go up in Orel, west of Moscow. It, too, is a project worth roughly \$1 billion, or over 6 billion

marks, which the Austrian Voest Alpine and the Italian Danieli are launching. Projects worth hundreds of millions of marks in the production and refinement of oil and gas are available to Western firms in Kazakhstan. Mannesman and the French Teknip, among others, are on the starting line.

A gas pipeline is being laid on the Czechoslovakian border, and various installations--worth as much as 10 billion marks--for gas and oil production are needed on the island of Sakhalin. An electronics industry is planned for Yerevan, a chemical industry for Prikumsk and Bashkir. Plans are also under way to construct--with Western resources--shoe factories, cloth and clothing factories, factories that make athletic garments...

In this way, the Soviet Union eliminates the deficit which arose in trade between it and Italy, West Germany and France after Soviet gas began to flow into Central Europe. It is predicted that Soviet counterpurchases from these countries will rise all told to at least 3 or 4 times what Finnish projects with the Soviet Union have been up until now.

#### Finns Make Effort

The Finns have tried, separately and jointly, to get into the megaprojects. Director Tapio Pietila of the General Industrial Group, which belongs to the Central Federation of Industry, chiefly strives to bring Finnish firms into contact with Central European and Soviet builders. Before him is a nearly month-long tour of Central Europe, behind him exploratory trips to the Soviet Union. He believes that the Finns have good opportunities to participate in projects.

The countries of Western Europe still lack experience in trading with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Pietila says that because all countries aspire to self-sufficiency, the Finns must really be able to offer superior know-how: construction technology, familiarity with markets. "The Soviets are aware of Finnish skills, but what do they know about the ability of some Italian firm to build in minus 40 degrees Celsius," says Pietila, selling his product.

Pietila urges Finnish firms on. Time is already starting to run out on the Finns. "We still have prejudices about doing business with the Italians and the French. Yet the opportunities are widespread," relates Pietila.

Finnish trade with the Soviets has been too easy, according to Pietila, although a businessman who visits Moscow every week may have a different opinion. "The Western countries bring new stimuli to business deals. Finland's competitiveness will now be put to an authentically rigorous test," says Pietila.

#### Finns Were Swindled

"The possibilities for getting projects are good," believes director Ilpo Kokkila of Perusyhtymä but admits that the deals obtained by others are reducing the Finns' advantageous position. Others are gaining experience, too.

Kokkila warns against overeagerness. According to him, there are examples of cases in which the Finns have been included in the preparation of bids. But the closer one comes to reaching a decision, the more intense becomes the pressure to also have subcontractors from the country in question.

"There is no point in getting involved without a precontract. Just formulating the bids is an infernally expensive job," says Kokkila.

He thinks that the Soviets are suggesting inclusion of the Finns in genuine good faith, but "the John Browns and others certainly have their own stipulations. Nor are they throwing themselves headlong around the necks of Finns."

Kokkila reports that "a heck of a lot" of contacts have been made. There are projects under consideration, but Kokkila does not dare to promise quick results. "We are looking 3 or 4 years down the road."

#### Here Would Be New Element

The Soviet standpoint was relayed to the Finns in April by Y.A. Pekshev, chief of the foreign trade division of the State Planning Committee, Gosplan. At a seminar arranged by KAUPPALEHTI, he called for a new attitude toward trade between Finland and the Soviet Union. One new element would be precisely the subcontracting in West European enterprises' projects aimed at the Soviet Union.

On the Finnish political level, support was given by Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa and Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen, who proposed the use of varying exchange rates in collaboration with third countries.

For example, Vayrynen said that he would like collaboration in the competition with third countries for Soviet markets. Vayrynen thought that one could end up considering the use of varying exchange rates as a medium of payment in place of the clearing method or alongside it. Vayrynen emphasized: "I would consider it a positive idea if our clearing agreement--which has proven to be good--were supplemented, if possible, by a free exchange rate operation in collaboration with other market-economy countries."

Jorma Inki, chief of the Foreign Ministry's Soviet trade bureau, stresses that reciprocal trade between Finland and the Soviet Union is and will remain based on the clearing method. Cooperation with Western firms does not replace this trade but rather is, as a matter of fact, exports to the West, which occur within the framework of standard credit regulations.

Inki does not believe that Finnish enterprises are "an open hole in the ground, but big business deals may come." Not immediately, however.

Antti Lehtinen, managing director of Export Credit, also emphasizes that it is a matter of standard trade with the West. The Soviet party favors currencies whose interest rate is lower than the dollar's, for example.

## Financing as Hardship

The Soviets have criticized the Finns for being unversed in matters of financing and have warned that if the Finns are incapable of competitive decisions, business deals will fall by the wayside.

The Soviets do not pay more than 7.4 percent interest for projects performed on credit. At this price, according to the Soviet viewpoint, there are no difficulties getting credit from Western markets. For their part, the Finns consider the interest rate too low.

Director Kokkila says that "it is claimed Western enterprises conceal the financing costs in the price of the projects." Bureau chief Inki emphasizes, for his part, that in Finland the state does not subsidize exports any more than does the Bank of Finland.

Director Pietila believes that financing places the biggest obstacles to the realization of projects. Their contractor gives credit for the projects, and the credit also extends to the subcontractors. The Finnish interest rate is too high, and he directs the Finns to international financing institutes, pointing out that the West German banks financed construction of the natural gas pipeline at 7.6 percent interest. Pietila also says that the costs of financing can be concealed in the prices for a while, but not forever.

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9 July 1985

ECONOMIC

NETHERLANDS

## ALBEDA DEFENDS CDA'S VIEWS ON UNEMPLOYMENT, ECONOMY

Rotterdam HET VRIJE VOLK in Dutch 15 May 85 p 4

[Interview with W. Albeda, co-architect of the CDA program, by Henk Drent and Yvonne Zonderop, in Maastricht; date not specified: "Co-architect Albeda: 'CDA Program Needs Luck'"]

[Text] "Do you know how else we should do it? Then just tell us a way to cut the number of unemployed in half. I wouldn't know how to," says Professor Dr. W. Albeda halfway through our interview.

It is a striking moment at our table on a terrace at the Vrijthof in Maastricht. An important architect of the new CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] election program asks us how you can reduce unemployment.

"You're turning things around," we object. Does Albeda have no better reply when we point out that for most of the unemployed the CDA offers no prospects? After all, if the CDA program is carried out in its entirety, in 1990 we will still have some 700,000 unemployed. A horrible picture.

"You must not suggest that it's pleasant," says the former minister. "There is [emphasis in original] no simple solution."

[Question] Of course it's not simple. But the voters have been hearing for years now that thanks to the present cabinet policy there is once again "light at the end of the tunnel." Up till 1990 most of the unemployed will be deprived of that light.

Albeda: That's really very cynical. You could say that in 1990 a better starting point for further economic growth will have been created. Government finances will then be in order, the social security system reorganized. That's a good starting point from which to have employment grow.

Of course it would much nicer if we had a program that would reduce unemployment by 150,000 a year. But I don't know how you're supposed to do that. Or better: I cannot figure out any measures to achieve that. We find ourselves with a difficult task. Three quarters of a million unemployed people are looking for a job. Besides that, each year 70,000 new-comers enter the labor market. Using all sorts of tricks, we can reduce

that number to 50,000. In part by no longer including people 57.5 years old and older in the figures. Nonetheless, in the next 4 years we have to create an extra 200,000 jobs to stop unemployment from climbing further.

#### Optimistic

[Comment] It is precisely the increase in the working population that the CDA plans to help find jobs for through reducing the hours worked. On the average, in 1990 the 34-hour work week is to be a reality, with two thirds of the jobs thus opened up being filled again. Workers are being asked to give up improvements in their pay voluntarily for this purpose, with the result that their purchasing power will not go up in the coming years.

Albeda: Look, the Central Planning Bureau calls us overly optimistic if we just work on the basis that working time will be reduced 1.5 percent per year. We're working on the basis that we can appeal to employers and workers. In addition, we're aiming at a speed-up in part-time jobs and early retirements. That can really make unemployment come down. We estimate an additional 200,000 or so.

[Question] In PvdA [Labor Party] circles they don't entirely rule out government intervention. It needs an iron fist in the velvet glove to achieve more results, they say.

Albeda: I don't believe in that. A 25-hour work week will only come about by legislative intervention. Unions and employers are not interested in that. It would demand that the business world re-adapt much too much in a short time. The black and gray economies would take off because of the citizens' income sacrifices. Thus we're dependent on a gradual reduction in the time worked and on extra economic growth.

#### False Bottom

[Question] Economic growth in the next few years will amount to two percent per year, says the CDA election program. Prime Minister Lubbers and other CDA politicians, however, are counting on more growth. What's the CDA actually basing itself on?

Albeda: The Central Planning Bureau urgently advised us to go on the basis of two percent. Personally, I'm more optimistic.

[Question] Anybody who reads the draft program will see the optimism between the lines. They are actually expecting more than two percent.

Albeda: Yes, you can well say that. In the program there is a hidden, or not entirely hidden, reserve. There are things in it that can only come into being if growth is better than expected. Take the reduction in social contributions and taxes to pep up purchasing power. That actually only really makes sense if growth exceeds two percent.

[Question] The CDA thus holds out to the voters prospects that will only become reality if growth is greater than estimated. An election program with a false bottom.

Albeda: That sounds dishonest. But it is an open-ended program, you could say. It makes allowance for better-than-expected growth.

[Question] It also reckons with workers giving up pay for shorter hours. Their purchasing power will be kept up by lower taxes and social contributions. Will that really work with economic growth at two percent?

Albeda: We are going on that assumption. I think that with two percent economic growth you must at any rate make the effort to manage the purchasing power of those receiving social benefits and of civil servants. That then works its way through to the business world. A solution like that is cheaper than a gross increase in incomes.

But well, the amount of economic growth and the possibilities that will present, those are things you still do not know when you draft an election program.

[Question] But in the meantime the voter is being told that a period of roughly equal income development is starting, i.e. that everybody will remain equal in purchasing power.

Albeda: That is correct. That is also the recommendation to the social partners. I.e. to the unions and to employers: if you want equal income development, then support our plan. But if the business world pays out the two percent growth in pay increases, then we can no longer guarantee that social benefits and civil servant salaries will rise equally.

[Question] But once more: with two percent growth, is there or is there not any certainty that pay and social benefits will be maintained?

Albeda: Yes, there is money for that. But there will be difficulties with that guarantee for certain if the social partners do not abide by our recommendations.

#### Illusion

[Question] Politics declares itself in a state of tutelage from now on. Two fundamental problems, incomes and employment, are pushed entirely on to the shoulders of the social partners.

Albeda: That is where they belong. Our program pushes a bit of responsibility back to the social partners. That is very fundamental. Employers and workers are responsible for developments in pay. They will soon also get the management of social security and labor market policy.

Our program moves away from what in my opinion has turned out to be an illusion. The government cannot guarantee equal income development and employment. We reintroduce ideology a bit. We have thought out again what Christian Democracy actually means.

The government cannot do it. Experience since 1962 teaches us that. If the social partners are not willing, the government cannot force anything out of them. Actually, that is just fine too, our program says. The social partners must bear the responsibility.

[Question] Civil servants and those receiving social benefits as hostages of the business world?

Albeda: It was never any other way. We say to the employers and workers, if you behave yourselves, the bill will go around to everybody. If you do not behave yourselves, then you will still be presented with the bill later. Of course our plan presupposes very intensive consultations and not too polarized attitudes.

[Question] It also presupposes that employers will give up their opposition to the shorter work week.

Albeda: Employers want time to adapt themselves to a shorter work week. They are especially worried that it all has to fit into one form. They want shorter hours, customized for each situation. It must be possible to make compromises on that.

More Efficiently

[Question] The CDA program speaks of a "government stepping back," hence giving up tasks government has done, and privatization. Will that not cost an awful lot of jobs?

Albeda: I do not think so. If you have things done by a private company that used to be done by the government, the jobs are still there, unless the entrepreneur can do the same work with fewer people.

[Question] Privatization is also intended, is it not, to get things done more efficiently. Thus that costs jobs. What other advantage is there, except that the salaries of the former civil servants are no longer a burden on government spending?

Albeda: Yes, reducing government spending is an important consideration. And the conviction that the government is not the most efficient producer.

[Question] If you ask exactly which tasks that government does should be taken away from the government, everybody falls silent. Including VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] leader Nijpels.

Albeda: As soon as you name a task there is a furore in that sector. That is why we say that many present government tasks lend themselves to this, but we do not much want to name them.

[Question] But you will surprise the people affected after the coming elections?

Albeda: I am sure that everybody can think of something that lends itself to privatization. I really do not want to say: public transport, the State Building Service, Van Gend & Loos, or the railroads. You can name so many. Our program does not say: that one yes, and that one no. We believe that there is a lot to do.

Now take a ministry like Education. Has a nice new, immensely big building. What do the people there do? A large portion of them keep busy managing what happens in schools and universities. Maybe it can be done more efficiently. You could, for instance, give a university or other school of higher education its own budget. They could then try to manage on that. Then you could get by with much less bureaucracy in the ministry. In our program it says: make more use of the idea of using budgets. You can imagine that you could spare a lot of civil servants in that case.

Pruning

[Question] The CDA, according to this program, wants to cut 11 billion guilders during the coming government term. On what exactly?

Albeda: That little list is not in our program, to be sure. But we do have it thought out, with all the totals carefully worked out. Over a billion on health. In the multi-year estimate they assume higher health expenditures, because the population is growing older. We do not want to let those expenditures rise. Thus, you have to save something extra somewhere else in health.

Too, we will prune more than a billion guilders because we want to build less Housing-Law housing. Further, you can save on civil servant pensions. In addition, the cuts from the new social security system are working their way through.

Too, the total number of civil servants--i.e. no longer just the ones in the ministries--will be reduced by one half percent per year. You see it is a fairly concrete little list that has already been officially drawn up and published before the elections. In addition we also have a hidden reserve consisting of the gains we expect from fighting fraud. We estimate that at between 2 and 4 billion guilders. So that comes on top of the 11 billion.

[Question] Does that hidden reserve help bridge the gap over to Finance Minister Ruding's view? He wants to cut 24 billion guilders by 1990.

Albeda: No. Ruding wants something quite different from what we want. He wants to have the government deficit back to one percent in 1990. Duisenberg may support him in that. The two lunch together rather often. The question is whether Ruding's goal is really desirable in our present economic situation.



There comes a time when you have to go back to Keynesian theory. More margin therefore for injections of purchasing power. Hence too our program's open-endedness, making allowance for the possibility that the deficit may have to be reduced at some other rate.

Hence the stipulation in our program that the deficit can be reduced by one half percent a year at the minimum and by one full percent at the maximum. We are balancing on the edge of the sword between cutting too much and too little. That requires great care.

[Question] It is not only the fight against fraud but also the reduction in the WIR [Law on Investment Accounts], the investment premiums to employers, that can soon provide extra money. We are talking about 6 billion a year.

Albeda: The program reads: 'gradual reduction.' When will the reduction begin? I do not know. I think when the new cabinet is a few weeks old, has gotten down to calculations, and has quickly come up against some bad news. (Albeda smiles.) Well, a person is more inclined to think himself poor than rich. At that point they will say: 'Shall we tinker a bit with the WIR?'

[Question] And finally one more question about the remarkable CDA ideology of pruning a number of social and societal provisions while referring back to the age-old custom of neighbors' helping neighbors and other mutual care that existed in the past. The CDA wants to have us get away from care by the government in the expectation that we will again help one another. But is that not rowing against the stream?

Albeda: We do not so much want to throw people back on their families as on social organizations. It is not that children will have to take grandma into the house, and so on. Going back to the old days never works. But breathing new life into organizations means, among other things, that the citizen again pays for all sorts of care himself. And not indirectly, through the government. The Socialists too, I understand, are busy with curing the addiction.

[Question] Curing the addiction is a rather crude notion for a family that has to live on one minimum wage.

Albeda: In the new vision the unions can very well offer an increase in social contributions by workers, so that for instance the unemployed can benefit from it. We want to give the social partners--the unions and the employers--the management of the social security funds. Thus if they once agree on the contributions, nothing in our program will stand in the way of that. Our idea is simply this: the social partners are not crazy, they know perfectly well what is possible and what is not.

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ECONOMIC

NETHERLANDS

BRIEFS

EXPORT INSURANCE LOSSES--Noordwijk, June 6--The Dutch state is expected to make a loss of one billion guilders this year on insurance of export credit risks, Foreign Trade Minister Frits Bolkestein said here today. Speaking at a study day on export credit risks, the minister said the government had not made a profit on insuring these risks since 1982, when the surplus was 153 million guilders. It lost 650 million guilders in 1983 and 968 millions last year. Bolkestein said he did not expect losses to fall until after 1986, partly because the Netherlands was still expected to reclaim some of the payments owed by debtor nations. Concerned about the soaring losses, the Dutch government raised premiums for insuring export credits by an average 25 percent for the highest-risk countries from January 1 this year. Bolkestein said this might hit income from premiums, along with a general reluctance on the part of exporters, and more stringent terms for insurance for exports to certain countries. So far income this year was 97 million guilders, compared with 132 million in the same period in 1981, he said. The minister said that in his view the rising risks had increased the need for insurance. Without insurance of export credit risks, neither banks nor exporters were in a position to finance exports to non-Western countries, he said. However, if it emerged that the premiums had been set at too high a level, a reduction would be considered, he said. He called for further study on the matter, and the formation of a fund which would eventually be able to cover losses. [Text] [The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 7 Jun 85 p 5]

CSO: 3600/20

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

NATION'S CAPACITY TO COMPETE INTERNATIONALLY TERMED WEAK

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 30 May 85 p 15

[Excerpt] The international competitive capacity of Portugal ranks next to last among the 22 countries in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], according to the annual report of the European Management Forum (EMF) Foundation. The report further evaluates the international competitive capacity of six of the so-called "new industrialized nations."

Portugal has an index of 30.93 percent in this evaluation, placing us last except for Greece. The competitive capacity of each country is determined on the basis of the balancing of two factors, related to dynamism in the economy, industrial efficiency, market dynamics, financial dynamism, state intervention, human resources, natural resources, foreign policy, research and development policy, stability and sociopolitical consensus.

Our country ranks on a rather low level for most of these indicators, particularly with regard to industrial efficiency, financial market dynamism and sociopolitical consensus, where we "achieved" the lowest levels of any of the countries analyzed.

In the view of Cristina Relvas, a technician at the State Information Institute, who commented on the report under discussion, the results obtained by our country lead to the conclusion that "our low level of international competitive capacity is the result mainly of two types of factors. On the one hand, there are the factors which are regarded as objective in terms of economic policy, such as the gross domestic product per capita or the rate of inflation, and which therefore cannot be manipulated directly. On the other hand, there are factors such as tax and labor legislation or the communications network, which are the environment surrounding business activity and which can indeed be the focus of short-term changes."

That having been said, it can be concluded that Portugal can increase its international competitive capacity only in the medium or long term, "since structural reforms, by their very nature, require a more or less long period of time to produce effects," this technician went on to say.

Thus the recovery of our country in international terms will necessarily involve making research and development more dynamic, activating the capital market, greater fiscal rationality and equity, more flexible labor relations and an improvement in the transportation and communications networks.

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

# INFLATION RATE DECLINING SLIGHTLY BUT STEADILY

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 24 May 85 p 5

[Excerpt] Inflation should not exceed 1 percent per month from now until the end of the year, leading to the expectation that the annual rate will come to about 20.8 percent in December, the secretary of state for foreign trade told NP.

"With the reduction in inflation, the conditions needed for a reduction in interest rates in the short run are being created," Agostinho Abade stressed. He added that financial charges were responsible for a third of the inflation in 1984.

In an interview with NP, he said that "inflation is slowing," and that "the main increases have already been seen," such that price increases will not exceed 1 percent per month until the end of the year.

The estimates of the Secretariat of State for Domestic Trade suggest that for the month of June 1985, the rate of inflation will come to about 21.5 percent (as compared to 32.1 percent in 1984, during the same month), while the average for the last 12 months comes to 25.5 percent (30.2 percent for the same period in 1984).

In December 1985, the rate of inflation is likely to come to about 17 percent (compared to 21.3 percent for the same month in 1984), while annual inflation will come to about 20.8 percent (28.9 percent for the same period in 1984).

The secretary of state stressed, however, that these "excellent results will be achieved if unforeseeable factors do not intervene," in particular "a new rise for the dollar and weather factors."

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CSO: 3542/192

ECONOMIC

PORTUGAL

BRIEFS

PORT, AIRPORT AID--The Atlantic Alliance has decided to allocate a sum of 1.2 million contos to projects for the functional strengthening of port and airport infrastructures in Porto Santo in the course of 1986. There are almost no NATO facilities in Porto Santo, but that island has sometimes served as a logistic support center, in particular for the United Kingdom during the war in the Falkland Islands, and for Belgium during the conflicts in the former Belgian Congo. [Text] [Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 30 May 85 p 7] 5157

CSO: 3542/192



ENERGY

DENMARK/GREENLAND

# EAST COAST AREA SOON TO WITNESS INTENSIVE OIL SEARCH

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 7 Jun 85 p 9

[Article by Allan Boldt]

[Text] Jameson Land, the untouched peninsula on Greenland's east coast, will be the center of an intense search for oil over the next 6 years.


The starting shot has been fired for the search for oil on the east coast of Greenland. Encouraging results from geological studies have led the authorities and multinational oil companies to dream about finding black gold. But for the time being the parliament's decision to permit a search for oil only on land still stands.

The first exploration area will be the Jameson Land peninsula, where the Nordic Mining Company has had the right for a good 30 years to search for and extract minerals.

Investments here will run up to at least 1 billion kroner over the next 6 years. In the long run if successful test drillings show that the deposits are big enough to justify the enormous extraction costs, the investment could go up to around 100 billion kroner.

Not everyone is equally enthusiastic about this development. When the Canadian ship "Lake Huron" passes the fishing community of Scoresbysund and the rural districts of Cape Hope and Cape Tobin on its way to Hurry Fjord in the middle of July it will not exactly be greeted with shouts of welcome.

The small local communities are not happy about the supply depot that is being built on Constabel Point in Hurry Fjord to the west of these communities. "Lake Huron" which has a weight of 28,000 gross register tons will be bringing supplies and seismic exploration equipment to this depot.



The first test of the dream of finding oil in Greenland will take place in Jameson Land.

Key: 1. Greenland

## Animal Life

The local people fear that animal life in the region will suffer as a result of the heavy ship traffic and the future search for oil in Jameson Land. And they fear this will have an adverse effect on their trapping opportunities.

The animal life includes musk oxen, with Greenland's largest concentration in Jameson Land, and ring seals, which congregate at the outlet of Scoresbysund in the summertime.

But the objections from the Scoresbysund municipal council, the local trappers' organization and concerned biologists have been drowned out by the enthusiasm of Danish geologists, the Greenland parliament and the Ministry of Greenland Affairs with their dreams of subterranean oil--especially large quantities of oil.

Director Roberto Kayser of Nordic Mining estimates that a profitable oil production would involve a production level that could cover Denmark's entire energy consumption.

The oil dreams are shared by one of the world's big oil companies, American Arco--Atlantic Richfield Company--which has 28 years of experience in the area of oil exploration and extraction in Arctic climatic conditions from Proudhoe Bay in Alaska.

In the hope of seeing its dreams realized Arco will pay the government for the next 6 years of oil exploration in Jameson Land. This will add up to between 800 million and 1 billion kroner.

## Eastward

In 1978 offshore activities off the west coast of Greenland came to a halt with five dry test drillings on the continental shelf. At least for the time being.

Two years later a unanimous Greenland parliament decided that oil exploration would have to come ashore and abandon offshore activities. Therefore northeastern Greenland and especially the Jameson Land peninsula became the next focus of attention for the oil geologists.

The Danish Nordic Mining Company, Inc. has held a 50-year concession on the production of minerals and oil in Jameson Land since 1953. But the old lead and zinc company has neither the expertise that is needed nor the money it would take to start searching for oil.

The American oil company Arco has both. And it is the main stockholder in Nordic Mining with a good third of the stock capital. Another big stockholder is the Lauritzen concern which owns almost a quarter of the company's stocks.

The negotiations between Nordic Mining and Arco on the one hand and the Danish-Greenland Joint Raw Materials Council on the other finally ended after a 4 1/2-year tug of war with the granting of an oil concession for Jameson Land.

The Nordic Mining Company's old concession has now been completely revoked and in its place the company has been granted the oil concession mentioned above and the right to search for so-called "hard" minerals in six specified areas of East Greenland. This mineral concession runs for 12 years and there are no special obligations attached to it.

The oil concession, which went into effect on 1 January of this year, grants a 12-year monopoly to search for and extract oil on a specific section of Jameson Land with an area of 10,000 square kilometers.

The concession holders are a consortium consisting of: Arco Greenland--a subsidiary of Arco International; the Arctic Mine Company, a subsidiary of the Nordic Mining Company; and Nunaoil, a public joint Danish-Greenland company.

Nunaoil is a newly-established company set up to handle public Danish-Greenland participation in the search for and extraction of oil--or more precisely, hydrocarbons, the designation for both oil and gas--in Greenland.

The Danish state and the Greenland home-rule government are equal owners of Nunaoil, which took over Denmark's 15-percent share of the stock capital in the Nordic Mining Company when it was established.

#### Free Ride

The oil concession involves a gradual return of 25 percent of the exploration area after the eighth and tenth years respectively. The consortium cannot cancel the agreement until the end of the first 6 years and every second year after that.

Nunaoil has a free ride financially during the exploration period as do the Arctic Mine Company and thus Nordic Mining along with it.

As partners in the consortium, Arco Greenland owns 63.75 percent, Arctic Mine Company owns 11.25 percent and the public Nunaoil owns 25 percent.

The obligations involve an investment by Arco of between 800 million and 1 billion kroner in the search for oil over the next 6 years. The money will be used for seismic studies and two test drillings as well as the construction of the supply base on Constabel Point mentioned above and an airplane landing strip at the same location.

In the last 6 years the consortium is committed to conducting further seismic studies and nine extra exploratory drilling operations.

When--or if--the goal is reached and a sufficient quantity of oil is found, there will be two immediate consequences. The consortium will acquire the rights to the oil deposit for the next 30 years. And both Nunaoil and the Arctic Mine Company will end their free ride on the oil bus. In the extraction phase they must pay their share of the costs based on their ownership percentage.

Gert Vigh, head of the Greenland Affairs Ministry's raw materials division, estimated that the earliest that extraction could start would be in the last half of the 1990's.

In this phase of the activity the public Nunaoil will have an opportunity to expand its involvement in the consortium--and its share of the profits--according to a sliding percentage scale, depending on how much oil is taken out.

The maximum share of public participation has been set at 50 percent, unless an extremely large oil find is made in which case it could go up to 75 percent.

#### Local Payments

In the exploration period Arco will pay an annual price-indexed fee of 8 million kroner of which at least 3 million will go toward technical and environmental studies in Jameson Land.

The raw materials division of the Greenland Affairs Ministry anticipated that roughly 63 million kroner will be spent on these background studies over the 12 years.

The environmental studies will concentrate on the vegetation and animal life, especially the musk oxen, birds and ocean mammals. The studies are aimed at enabling the raw materials administration to take the necessary environmental concerns into consideration when the consortium's plans for exploration are approved.

Greenland as such will not benefit directly from the oil. The country's energy plans call primarily for replacing oil with water power and there is no processing capacity for crude oil there.

It is true that possible revenues from the oil search will benefit the government of Greenland but they will merely replace the subsidies Greenland receives from Denmark.

#### Oil Exploration

At the moment around 15 people are preparing for the reception of the big shipment of equipment and building materials that will arrive at Constabel Point in Hurry Fjord on the "Lake Huron" in mid-July.



Some 90 men will be involved in the actual construction of the supply depot which will function as a base camp for the oil exploration activities on the peninsula over the next 5 or 6 years.

One of the items the "Lake Huron" will bring from Denmark is the prefabricated buildings that will be put up to provide local housing for the oil exploration personnel.

The camp is expected to be ready by the middle of October before this winter's seismic studies are due to begin.

In the wintertime around 50 people are expected to be stationed at the base.

In the summer of 1986 other types of seismic studies will be made, including studies from equipment carried on helicopters and in the winter of 1986-87 concluding vibrator studies will be made.

Two years from now an enormous drilling rig with the supplies that go with it will be transported to Jameson Land where at least one and perhaps two exploratory drilling tests will be made in the course of 1987-89.

Holes will be drilled to a depth of 3.5 km, which is why the drilling operations are a big item in the exploration budget.

Director Roberto Kayser of Nordic Mining said that as many as 5-6 drilling tests must be made before the evaluation program has reached the point where they can make a qualified evaluation of the deposits there.

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CSO: 3613/159

ENERGY

NETHERLANDS

NATURAL GAS EXPORTS FACE STIFF COMPETITION

The Hague ANP NEWS BULLETIN in English 10 Jun 85 pp 1-2

[Text] Amsterdam, June 10--Dutch natural gas exports, a vital source of revenue for the government here, face stiff competition from rival producers vying for a market where supply appears likely to outpace demand, according to industry experts.

Last year gas sales earned 30.4 billion guilders (8.8 billion dollars), almost half of which came from exports. More than 10 percent of government income came from gas sales, a valuable contribution to Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers' struggle to slim a bloated budget deficit.

The country is now the world's biggest gas exporter after the Soviet Union, a remarkable achievement considering that when it was first produced in the early 1960's, Dutch gas was seen as a stopgap before nuclear power took over.

The gas is marketed by Gasunie, a joint venture between the state and energy giants Shell and Esso which was set up to buy gas from producers and sell it to industrial and domestic consumers during the transition period.

But nuclear energy hit fierce opposition from environmental groups. Among other energy sources, Dutch North Sea oil output is growing fast but is tiny compared with Britain or Norway, and coal mining stopped in 1975.

Different Picture

But as in the oil market, conditions in the gas world today provide little comfort for producers. European gas supplies now far outstrip demand, raising the prospect of a price war with rival producers such as the Soviet Union, Norway and Algeria.

Gasunie itself plays this danger down and forecasts that supply will fall below demand in the early 1990's as reserves dwindle and industry slowly recovers from the present recession.

But Peter Odell, professor of international energy studies at Rotterdam's Erasmus University, sees another picture.

Odell says Gasunie's forecast takes account only of gas under contract and ignores reserves yet to be found by intensive energy company exploration. "Gas is in long (surplus), long supply and will be for the foreseeable future," he said.

Gasunie managing director Ton Grotens is hopeful that a price war can be avoided. "There's no reason for having price fights since there is enough room for all the suppliers... It is our experience that the people who are in the natural gas business all have the same policy on pricing."

But Dutch export charges are tied to rates on the spot oil market where prices have long been in the doldrums, and Gasunie has already been hit by aggressive Soviet competitions which last year forced a temporary 15 percent price cut to Belgium.

#### Time To Adjust

"The best price for (the Soviet Union) is the price they have to go down to persuade people to buy Russian gas rather than Dutch or Norwegian gas," Odell said.

Dutch gas nevertheless holds several advantages. Gasunie offers secure supplies whereas some politicians have voiced fears about Western Europe relying too heavily on Soviet supplies, which could be interrupted by East-West tensions.

Output from the main Groningen field can be boosted from almost zero in the summer to high levels in the winter to meet peak demand. Rival suppliers deliver constant amounts over the year, causing storage problems for customers.

How long the gas will keep coming ashore is also a matter of debate between Gasunie and the industry experts.

Gasunie says that when contracts with West Germany, Belgium, France, Switzerland and Italy expire between 2005 and 2010, there will only be enough gas left for the home market. Odell, however, says new gas finds in the North Sea mean that reserves are unlikely to run down so soon.

"Why are the companies putting more and more money every year, into finding gas... If there's nothing more to be found?"

Overall, the experts were cautiously optimistic about the future. One economist expected revenues to fall gradually over the next 25 years, giving the economy time to adjust.

CSO: 3600/21

ENERGY

SWEDEN

# POLL FINDS INCREASE IN THOSE FAVORING NUCLEAR POWER

Compared with 1980 Poll

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Jun 85 p 10

[Article by Dick Ljungberg/

[Text] The platform which was most favorable to nuclear power in the referendum of 1980 has received increased support in the five years which have passed since then, while the opposition to nuclear power has for the most part remained unchanged. The Social Democrats are extremely divided on the nuclear power issue.

DN-IMU's study on opinions concerning nuclear power shows this today as compared to the turnout in the referendum of March 1980. The study was made in April-May and 1,008 people were consulted.

The nuclear power accident in Harrisburg, USA in March 1979 got the Social Democrats, who were then in opposition, to join the Center's and VPK's [Left Party Communists/ demand for a referendum. The Liberal Party Government at that time was also forced to go along.

One year after the accident, the Swedish people had to choose between three lines at the polls which were each in their own way "disengagement lines."

--Line 1 was advocated mainly by the Conservatives and the business. They wanted to have permission to use the 2 reactors that were in operation, finished or being constructed. Nuclear power was to be disengaged at the pace which was possible with respect to the need for electrical power.

--Line 2 - the "compromise line" - was supported by the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party. Their proposal was the same as line 1 in terms of the number of reactors and disengagement. However, line 2 emphasized that society must have greater influence upon power production and that saving energy must be intensified.

--Line 3 was supported by the environmental movement, the Center and VPK parties coordinated in a people's campaign against atomic power. They wanted to put a stop to the six reactors which were then in operation and disengage these in ten years.

Line 1 received 18.7 percent of the votes, line 2 got 39.3 percent, line 3 receiving 38.6 percent. There was therefore a clear majority for the 12-reactor line.

Parliament later declared that the foundation of the referendum showed that the twelve reactors should be used during their technical lifetime, which was judged to be 25 years. Nuclear power would be disengaged in the year 2010.

#### Answer Today

In May 1985 the answers to the IMU study are divided so that line 1 would receive 29 percent of the votes-- a clear increase--while line 2 receives an equally clear decrease of 22 percent. Line 3 is at 34 percent.

However, there is a difference between a referendum and an opinion poll. In the IMU study a total of 13 percent say that they would not vote or that they do not know, while the referendum result is calculated as percentage of the number of voters.

In order to improve the comparison, IMU has also taken away this 13 percent and then receives the following result:

	1980 Referendum	IMU 1985
Line 1	18.7	33
Line 2	39.6	26
Line 3	38.6	39
Blank	2	2

This method of counting also shows that line 1 went forward in opinion, line 2 went backward and that line 3 is approximately unchanged, despite the fact that it now should be the line which receives the greatest support. However, both the 12-reactor lines have a total of 59 percent as opposed to the "no line's" 39. This is rather exactly the same result as in 1980.

#### Younger for "The 3rd"

However, then the voter participation was 75.6 percent, as compared to IMU's estimated 87. Moreover, the IMU study encompasses the ages 15 to 74 years, that is, three age groups who are not allowed to vote while older voters are lacking.

Not unexpectedly, the study shows that the younger people to a greater extent prefer line 3, while line 1 appears to a higher degree to attract middle aged and elderly people. Women clearly support line 3 more than men, whose support also is still strong in rural areas.

Opinions within the parties in May 1985 are more interesting, not least of all because Parliament will have its great energy debate on Monday.



The study shows that the Social Democrats' sympathizers are very equally divided between the three lines in the referendum. An entire 27 percent support "the Conservatives" line 1, 29 percent support the old party line 2, but most, 30 percent, support disengagement line 3.

Among the Moderates, almost half (47 percent) support party line 1, 21 percent support line 2 and 19 percent line 3. In the center it is just the opposite, as it was before. Over half (55 percent) support line 3, 15 percent support line 1 and 13 percent support line 2. In contrast, the Liberal Party has an equal division: 31 percent support line 1, and 29 percent support both lines 2 and 3. VPK has a base total which is too low to be able to be analyzed in detail.

Divided up into blocks, the predominance for the nuclear power lines within the non-socialist parties would be 56 percent as opposed to 30 percent saying no, compared to 53 percent -- 33 percent within the Socialist block. What is then today the actual political situation in Parliament in the nuclear power issue? In brief, energy minister Birgitta Dahl ensures that the government reiterates that nuclear power will be disengaged in the year 2010. However, she will not commit herself to a timetable for the study. The decision will be made step by step with respect to the technical development.

In contrast, the Center and VPK (the line 3 parties) demand a disengagement plan for nuclear power. The closing of the reactors must begin already in the mid-1990s, but Ringhals 2 (which requires rebuilding for 1.5 billion) must be closed right away.


The Conservatives dismiss the year figure of 2010 and believe that the technical development has made the reactors' technical lifetime longer than 25 years. The premature closing of the reactors would mean an enormous waste. The Conservatives also support the Secure thermal nuclear reactor.

The Liberal Party leader Bengt Westerberg has explained that if the referendum and statement on disengagement as of 2010 are to be changed, a new referendum will be required.

According to a study by the Board of Opinion Analyses in DAGENS NYHETER last Sunday, only 9 of 100 Swedes believe that nuclear power will be disengaged by the year 2010.

If one subtracts the 13 percent of those in the IMU study who would not vote or do not know, a comparison with the 1980 referendum shows that the most pro-nuclear power line (line 1) progressed just as much as the "compromise line" 2 declined. The disengagement line 3 attracts approximately unchanged support, but is now the largest individual line. The figures are rounded off.

NUCLEAR POWER POLL  
1980 and 1985



Paper Examines Poll Meaning

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 2 Jun 85 p 2

[Editorial: "Still No to Nuclear Power"]

[Text] Five years have passed since the referendum on the future of nuclear power. Since then, the nuclear power issue has played a subordinate role in the political debate. No new, large nuclear power catastrophe of the magnitude of Harrisburg has occurred which demonstrated the danger of nuclear power.

In spite of this, the opposition to nuclear power remains unchanged in its strength. In the 1980 referendum the opposition line (line 3) took 38 percent of the vote. In the IMU poll which DAGENS NYHETER has published today, 34 percent of those polled answer that they would vote for line 3 if the same referendum were held today.

However, a more accurate comparison is to count out those who answer that they would not vote at all or do not know how they would vote. Then, line 3 receives 39 percent or just about as much as in 1980. According to IMU, none of the other alternatives receive such strong support.

Line 1 is the most pro-nuclear power line and certainly has progressed strongly from 20 to 33 percent. However, line 2, which was supported by the Social Democrats and Liberal Party in 1980 and which advocated "disengagement with sense," (that is, a massive expansion of nuclear power first, and then disengagement of the expanded nuclear power in an uncertain future) has decreased just as much from 39 to 26 percent.

In a DAGENS NYHETER interview last Friday, chairman of the parliamentary commerce committee Nils-Erik Waag (Social Democrat), commented on another study which states that only every tenth Swede believes in the government's promise to disengage nuclear power by the year 2010 at the latest. Waag construed this as, "a sound reaction...people understand that nuclear power cannot be shut off just by pushing a button."

However, the IMU poll therefore shows that it is not the opposition to nuclear power which has weakened. It is the citizens' confidence in the government's will and decisiveness to carry out the results of the referendum and the subsequent parliamentary decision based on the vote which has declined. Many voters have seen through the pretentious negative which line 2 stood for.

This is certainly "a sound reaction." However, it must not lead to self contentment among the leading Social Democrats.

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*17 July 85*